Alasdair MacIntyre is a contemporary philosopher who represents an unusual, but really very important, position on the contemporary philosophical scene, which we could call the concern for the rationality of traditions. Modernity in general and the Enlightenment in particular tended to see tradition as an enemy of rationality. MacIntyre contends, on the contrary, that tradition is necessary for rationality—that all reasoning takes place in the context of some tradition or another.
One of the central preoccupations of modern philosophyis meta-ethics, the attempt to explain and justify themeaning and of ethical terms, such as ought. One of the basic problems of meta-ethics is to findrational justification for moral obligation, our sense that we ought to follow certain moral rules. The difficulty of this problem is that if (like most modern philosophers) you assume a fundamental distinction between facts and values, it seems impossible to move logically from a statement of fact (or “what is”) to a statement of value (or “what ought to be”). This means that it is difficult to find convincing reasons to justify particular moral rules and the obligation to follow them. This inability to justify moral rules, in turn, makes irresolvable moral disagreement (e.g., about abortion) a pervasive feature of modern thought. MacIntyre argues that such disagreements are inevitable and irresolvable in our time, because modernity has inherited only incoherent fragments of the coherent traditions of ethical reflection in the past.
Contrast the modern focus on rules, obligations, and “the right thing to do” with Aristotle’s focus on forming character. Modern philosophy typically wants to establish an “autonomous” morality, which is not derived from legislation or theology. Modern moral philosophy seems to have forgotten about the notion of virtue. In fact, modern moral philosophy tends to focus on moral rules and obligations rather than on character and virtue—on ewhat makes an act right or wrong rather than on what makes a person good or evil. Thus, modern moral philosophy leads to moral skepticism, as our narrow focus on moral rules, isolated from the larger context that would make sense of them, starts to seem irrational and unjustified, the expression of mere preference or “personal commitment” (as if we decide what’s right and wrong). Likewise, intelligence is separated from morality, so that what matters is either rigidly following rules or else abandoning all rules and just being well intentioned.
MacIntyre argues that specific “social practices” support both virtues and practical intelligence in pursuit of goods internal to the practice. Practical intelligence, in the Aristotelian sense, is the root of moral reasoning (= critical, philosophical thought about practical moral life in general). Hence,moral reasoning, like the practical intelligence it is founded on, is impossible without social practices sustained by traditions. Thus, for MacIntyre, tradition does not hinder moral rationality but makes it possible.
Excepted from: The Western Intellectual Tradition, Third Edition, course guidebook, copyright The Teaching Company, 2000.
One of the central preoccupations of modern philosophyis meta-ethics, the attempt to explain and justify themeaning and of ethical terms, such as ought. One of the basic problems of meta-ethics is to findrational justification for moral obligation, our sense that we ought to follow certain moral rules. The difficulty of this problem is that if (like most modern philosophers) you assume a fundamental distinction between facts and values, it seems impossible to move logically from a statement of fact (or “what is”) to a statement of value (or “what ought to be”). This means that it is difficult to find convincing reasons to justify particular moral rules and the obligation to follow them. This inability to justify moral rules, in turn, makes irresolvable moral disagreement (e.g., about abortion) a pervasive feature of modern thought. MacIntyre argues that such disagreements are inevitable and irresolvable in our time, because modernity has inherited only incoherent fragments of the coherent traditions of ethical reflection in the past.
Contrast the modern focus on rules, obligations, and “the right thing to do” with Aristotle’s focus on forming character. Modern philosophy typically wants to establish an “autonomous” morality, which is not derived from legislation or theology. Modern moral philosophy seems to have forgotten about the notion of virtue. In fact, modern moral philosophy tends to focus on moral rules and obligations rather than on character and virtue—on ewhat makes an act right or wrong rather than on what makes a person good or evil. Thus, modern moral philosophy leads to moral skepticism, as our narrow focus on moral rules, isolated from the larger context that would make sense of them, starts to seem irrational and unjustified, the expression of mere preference or “personal commitment” (as if we decide what’s right and wrong). Likewise, intelligence is separated from morality, so that what matters is either rigidly following rules or else abandoning all rules and just being well intentioned.
MacIntyre argues that specific “social practices” support both virtues and practical intelligence in pursuit of goods internal to the practice. Practical intelligence, in the Aristotelian sense, is the root of moral reasoning (= critical, philosophical thought about practical moral life in general). Hence,moral reasoning, like the practical intelligence it is founded on, is impossible without social practices sustained by traditions. Thus, for MacIntyre, tradition does not hinder moral rationality but makes it possible.
Excepted from: The Western Intellectual Tradition, Third Edition, course guidebook, copyright The Teaching Company, 2000.