New Special Report on "Saving Our Economy"

[Little-Acorn]

Have you seen the Special Report composed by Fox News, on the financial crisis? It's a hour-long show, and been broadcast several times. Someone has put it on YouTube, in six segments. Fox calls it "Saving Our Economy". Go to YouTube and do a search on that title, and you should get all six segments. They vary from 5 to 10 minutes each, about 45 minutes running time total (no commercials).

It's a GREAT explanation of how the crisis started, who did what, what the results were, etc. A real must-see.

We'll get the usual head-in-the-sand board hysterics who announce that since it's from Fox News, therefore it must all be a lie. But they won't be able to refute any particular parts of it, I'd guess.

Here's a summary:

-----------------------------------------

Sept. 23, 2008: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson: "The events leading us here began many years ago, starting with bad lending practices by banks and financial institutions, and by borrowers taking up mortgages they couldn't afford."

-----------------------------------------

The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or "Fannie Mae") was created in 1938 during the Great Depression. to create a market for mortgages where they could be bought and sold.

In 1968, Lyndon Johnson and a Democratic Congress spun off Fannie Mae so that it would not show up in the Federal budget. But the Federal govt was always there, ready to bail out Fannie Mae if problems happened. This enables Fannie Mae to offer lower rates for the mortgages it bought, since it was not taking the risks that other banks and institutions had to. In 1970, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") was formed, to create competition for Fannie Mae, since ordinary banks could NOT compete with the government-backed rates they offered.

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed by a Democrat Congress and signed by Jimmy Carter in 1977. It made sure banks were lending to people of all colors and income levels. But things quickly began going off the rails, as activist groups found a new weapon in the law: The could start suing lenders for discrimination if they didn't lend to enough minority families, regardless of the families' ability to pay the loans back as promised. Banks began making riskier and riskier loans for fear of having to fight expensive lawsuits.

Community groups began bullying the banks, especially one called the Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now ("ACORN"). It hired several specialized lawyers, including a young man named Barack Obama, to teach its employees how to go to the homes of bank CEOs and senior officers, harassing and publicly embarrassing them while remaining within the limits of local law to avoid prosecution. At one point, ACORN brought a lawsuit against a thrift merger in Illinois, insisting that the lending institutions had not made as many loans to minorities as ACORN thought they should. The bank replied that such loans would be financially irresponsible, and would put ALL the bank's customers at unacceptable risk. ACORN prevailed in court, and banks began making more and more risky loans to home buyers who could have never qualified for those loans under ordinary circumstances.

In late 2000, in the last days of the Clinton administration, the government ordered Fannie and Freddie to increase the numbers of these risky ("sub-prime") mortgages they were buying from banks and lending institutions across the country. They did, lowering their rates and buying more and more, until fully half their portfolios consisted of these risky sub-prime mortgages, combined and packaged in various ways.

The Bush administration raised red flags starting in April 2001. Their 2002 Budget Request declared that the size of mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae is "a potential problem" because financial trouble in either one of them "could cause strong repercussions in financial markets".

In 2003, the White House warning about Fannie and Freddie, was upgraded to a "Systemic Risk that could spread beyond just the housing sector".

As Fannie and Freddie continued to lower their rates and buy mortgages, lenders made more and more mortgages to buyers with questionable ability to pay, safe in the knowledge that they could immediately turn around and sell the mortgages to the government-sponsored Fannie and Freddie, thus avoiding any consequences if the loans were later defaulted. They were happy to make more and more such mortgages, collecting fees for each and selling the mortgages to F&F.

Countrywide Financial chairman Angelo Mazzillo literally started screaming at Wall Street Journal editor Paul Gigot, when Gigot asked him about the wisdom of making so many loans to buyers unlikely to pay them back. Mazzillo insisted loudly that Gigot had no idea what he was talking about, did not understand the first thing about mortgage lending, etc., etc. He failed, however, to answer any of Gigot's questions in even the simplest terms or explain why they were "wrong".

In Fall 2003, the Bush Admin was pushing Congress hard to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise Fannie and Freddie, both Government Sponsored Entities, or GSEs.

At a Congressional hearing on Sept 10, 2003, John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury stated: "We need a strong, world-class regulatory agency to oversee the prudential operations of the GSE's, and the safety and soundness of their financial activities."

At that same hearing, ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank (D-MA) defended his practices with regard to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are not in a crisis."

Frank said the Fed Govt should be encouraging F&F to do more to get low-income families into homes:
"The more people, in my judgment, exaggerate a threat of safety and soundness, the more people conjure up a possibility of serious financial losses to the treasury - which I do not see, I think we see entities which are fundamentally sound financially and can withstand some of the disaster scenarios - the more pressure there is there, then the less I think we see in terms of 'affordable housing' ".

The top executives at F&F began cooking their books, exaggerating their sales in their quarterly reports, so that the company officials could claim they had met their companies' sales targets, and thus collect huge salary bonuses. They were finally caught in 2004. Several of them stepped down, but none was every punished, or even charged. One of them, Franklin Raines, CEO of Fannie Mae, later gave financial and housing advice to the campaign of Presidential contender Barack Obama.

At a House Financial Services Committee Hearing on Feb. 17, 2005, Alan Greenspan warned against one of the fundamental ideas of modern liberalism, the idea of putting all our eggs in one basket by concentrating financial activity into just a few big agencies in central government: "... Enabling these institutions to increase in size - and they will once the crisis in their judgment passes - we are placing the total financial system of the future at a substantial risk."
He later added at another hearing on on April 6, 2005: "If we fail to strengthen GSE regulation, we increase the possibility of insolvency and crisis."

Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) ignored any possibility the F&F might be in trouble at that hearing, and simply pointed to the advantages some people had gotten from the government's activities: "I think Fannie and Freddie ... are an intrinsic part of making America the best-housed people in the world... if you look over the last 20 or whatever years, they have done a very, very good job."
Schumer also complained, "Things are good in the housing market. Why are people entertaining radical change?"

On April 7, 2005, Treasury Secretary John Snow warned again: "These large portfolios, unchecked in their growth over the last decade or so, pose a real problem." The Senate Banking Committee adopted strong regulation that would have prevented Fannie and Freddie from acquiring these bad mortgages. All of the Republicans on the committee voted for it, and all the Democrats voted against it, and it passed out of the committee on a straight party-line vote. But Democrats then filibustered the bill on the Senate floor, preventing it from being brought to a vote.

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae was active in making campaign contributions to politicians, from money that ostensibly was for low-income mortgages. The top two recipients were:

Christopher Dodd (D-CT): $165,000
Barack Obama (D-IL): $126,000

The highest-receiving Republican was Bob Bennett (R-UT), who got $108,000. Further down the list was John McCain (R-AZ), who accepted $25,000.

On May 25, 2006 in the Senate, John McCain (R-AZ) sounded more warnings over the huge size and lack of discipline in the government companies, and sponsored a bill to regulate the companies more firmly: "For years I have been concerned about the regulatory structure that governs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac... and the sheer magnitude of these companies and the role they play in the housing market... the GSEs need to be reformed without delay." McCain's bill was voted out of committee on a straight party-line vote: All Republicans voted for it, and all Democrats voted against. Democrats then announced they would filibuster the bill in the Senate, as they had the previous year's regulatory legislation. Republicans knew they did not have enough votes to achieve the 60% needed, and so never brought the bill to the Senate floor.

By the beginning of 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had bought up over $4 trillion in mortgages, roughly one-quarter of which was risky sub-prime mortgage paper. With interest rates rising, these rickety homeowners started defaulting on their loans. Only about 2% of them defaulted by January 2008, but the effect was disastrous. Banks began to get leery of lending money to each other, knowing that their fellow banks held substantial assets that might default and become worthless, thus making the banks unable to pay back their loans to each other.

Banks and lending institutions began collapsing or seeking emergency help: Countrywide Financial, Lehman Brothers, insurer AIG, Bear Stearns, IndyMac bank, etc. buckled to their knees as paralysis spread. The huge numbers of risky subprime mortgages, had become like a "poison pill" that choked the institutions that had swallowed them. The Fed finally took over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, but the damage had long been done.

Congress appropriated nearly $1 trillion in emergency funds to loan to, or otherwise prop up, failing financial institutions. But none of the original legislation that had spurred decades of risky lending, has been repealed in all the "bailout" frenzy, and there are no bills pending to do so.

 

[FUCK THE POLICE]

 

[Mott the Hoople]

Why in the world would any rational intelligent person would want to hear anything from the fascist at the Nazi news network?

 

[uscitizen]

Sorry little nut I boycott Fox nooz.
Just a matter of principle.

 

[Bonestorm]

Sorry little nut I boycott Fox nooz.
Just a matter of principle.

Yeah. You would think they would avoid saying things that are demonstrably false but they don't. I also find it interesting that the little guy reposted the same ignorant crap he posted a few days ago apparently under the impression that if he slapped a FOXNews label on it people would believe it.

Anyway, here's a decent article that has the benefit of containing factual information:

WASHINGTON — As the economy worsens and Election Day approaches, a conservative campaign that blames the global financial crisis on a government push to make housing more affordable to lower-class Americans has taken off on talk radio and e-mail.

Commentators say that's what triggered the stock market meltdown and the freeze on credit. They've specifically targeted the mortgage finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which the federal government seized on Sept. 6, contending that lending to poor and minority Americans caused Fannie's and Freddie's financial problems.

Federal housing data reveal that the charges aren't true, and that the private sector, not the government or government-backed companies, was behind the soaring subprime lending at the core of the crisis.

Subprime lending offered high-cost loans to the weakest borrowers during the housing boom that lasted from 2001 to 2007. Subprime lending was at its height vrom 2004 to 2006.

Federal Reserve Board data show that:

_ More than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending institutions.

_ Private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year.

_ Only one of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006 was directly subject to the housing law that's being lambasted by conservative critics.

The "turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007," the President's Working Group on Financial Markets reported Friday.

Conservative critics claim that the Clinton administration pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to make home ownership more available to riskier borrowers with little concern for their ability to pay the mortgages.

"I don't remember a clarion call that said Fannie and Freddie are a disaster. Loaning to minorities and risky folks is a disaster," said Neil Cavuto of Fox News.

Fannie, the Federal National Mortgage Association, and Freddie, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., don't lend money, to minorities or anyone else, however. They purchase loans from the private lenders who actually underwrite the loans.

It's a process called securitization, and by passing on the loans, banks have more capital on hand so they can lend even more.

This much is true. In an effort to promote affordable home ownership for minorities and rural whites, the Department of Housing and Urban Development set targets for Fannie and Freddie in 1992 to purchase low-income loans for sale into the secondary market that eventually reached this number: 52 percent of loans given to low-to moderate-income families.

To be sure, encouraging lower-income Americans to become homeowners gave unsophisticated borrowers and unscrupulous lenders and mortgage brokers more chances to turn dreams of homeownership in nightmares.

But these loans, and those to low- and moderate-income families represent a small portion of overall lending. And at the height of the housing boom in 2005 and 2006, Republicans and their party's standard bearer, President Bush, didn't criticize any sort of lending, frequently boasting that they were presiding over the highest-ever rates of U.S. homeownership.

Between 2004 and 2006, when subprime lending was exploding, Fannie and Freddie went from holding a high of 48 percent of the subprime loans that were sold into the secondary market to holding about 24 percent, according to data from Inside Mortgage Finance, a specialty publication. One reason is that Fannie and Freddie were subject to tougher standards than many of the unregulated players in the private sector who weakened lending standards, most of whom have gone bankrupt or are now in deep trouble.

During those same explosive three years, private investment banks — not Fannie and Freddie — dominated the mortgage loans that were packaged and sold into the secondary mortgage market. In 2005 and 2006, the private sector securitized almost two thirds of all U.S. mortgages, supplanting Fannie and Freddie, according to a number of specialty publications that track this data.

In 1999, the year many critics charge that the Clinton administration pressured Fannie and Freddie, the private sector sold into the secondary market just 18 percent of all mortgages.

Fueled by low interest rates and cheap credit, home prices between 2001 and 2007 galloped beyond anything ever seen, and that fueled demand for mortgage-backed securities, the technical term for mortgages that are sold to a company, usually an investment bank, which then pools and sells them into the secondary mortgage market.

About 70 percent of all U.S. mortgages are in this secondary mortgage market, according to the Federal Reserve.

Conservative critics also blame the subprime lending mess on the Community Reinvestment Act, a 31-year-old law aimed at freeing credit for underserved neighborhoods.

Congress created the CRA in 1977 to reverse years of redlining and other restrictive banking practices that locked the poor, and especially minorities, out of homeownership and the tax breaks and wealth creation it affords. The CRA requires federally regulated and insured financial institutions to show that they're lending and investing in their communities.

Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote recently that while the goal of the CRA was admirable, "it led to tremendous pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — who in turn pressured banks and other lenders — to extend mortgages to people who were borrowing over their heads. That's called subprime lending. It lies at the root of our current calamity."

Fannie and Freddie, however, didn't pressure lenders to sell them more loans; they struggled to keep pace with their private sector competitors. In fact, their regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, imposed new restrictions in 2006 that led to Fannie and Freddie losing even more market share in the booming subprime market.

What's more, only commercial banks and thrifts must follow CRA rules. The investment banks don't, nor did the now-bankrupt non-bank lenders such as New Century Financial Corp. and Ameriquest that underwrote most of the subprime loans.

These private non-bank lenders enjoyed a regulatory gap, allowing them to be regulated by 50 different state banking supervisors instead of the federal government. And mortgage brokers, who also weren't subject to federal regulation or the CRA, originated most of the subprime loans.

In a speech last March, Janet Yellen, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, debunked the notion that the push for affordable housing created today's problems.

"Most of the loans made by depository institutions examined under the CRA have not been higher-priced loans," she said. "The CRA has increased the volume of responsible lending to low- and moderate-income households."

In a book on the sub-prime lending collapse published in June 2007, the late Federal Reserve Governor Ed Gramlich wrote that only one-third of all CRA loans had interest rates high enough to be considered sub-prime and that to the pleasant surprise of commercial banks there were low default rates. Banks that participated in CRA lending had found, he wrote, "that this new lending is good business."

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/53802.html

 

[Little-Acorn]

Pretty good article, except for a couple of desperately deceptive statements, detailed below. Most of it agrees with the Special Report, even while it pretends not to.

F&F inhdeed did not make those subprime loans. They just bought hordes of them from the banks etc. who did. As the summary pointed out, F&F's willingness to buy, gave the banks lots of incentives to make loans to anyone and everyone, regardless of their ability to pay. Natually, they didn't stop making loans to people who COULD pay. Plenty of those went through too. They just made lots more to some who couldn't. F&F bought them by the millions, thus giving the banks back their cash, so the banks etc. could make even more such loans.

Correct, many banks didn't have to follow CRA etc. rules. But if they wanted to sell their newly-made mortgages to F&F, they could sell more by making them according to F&F's new rules - the rules saying that more low-income loands were needed. And so they did, taking broker's fees, loan origination fees, and all the rest, for each one before sellign them to F&F. Not because they "had" to, but because they wanted to, so they could make more and more, sell them to F&F, and get all those nice fees.

The article's statement that the Bush admin never criticized any sort of lending, is true: They criticized the size of F&F and warned that they needed more regulation in general. And their call for more regulation wasn't because F&F weren't putting enough postage stamps on their mail. It was because of their reckless lowering of standards, which was in turn prompted by Democrat congress's and Presidents' direction to lend to low-income borrowers, come what may.Repeated attempts to legislate the regulation Republicans called for, was repeatedly defeated by Democrats, using committee votes when they had a majority, and Senate filibusters when they didn't.

Sorry, leftists. You've been caught with your hand in the cookie jar. Your repeated attempts to pretend it was someone else's hand, are contraddicted by reams of documents, statement,s and video clips showing otherwise. The paper trail leading to your door, is huge and obvious.

The financial crisis is a classic example of why liberalism is bad for a country. Leftist politicians and demagogues tried to "give" housing to people who would then vote for them, putting off into the future any financial reckoning when those voters later coldn't pay their mortgages because interests rates went up, and couldn't sell their houses when the housing bubble burst and house prices fell. The leftists then manipulated government agencies so that huge numbers of such risky loans were concentrated in a few large, govt-sponsored companies and their clients, so that one bad agenda could have huge impact on most of the nation's economy instead of being confined to only a few banks etc. who extended loans by themselves.

 

[Bonestorm]

Pretty good article, except for a couple of desperately deceptive statements, detailed below. Most of it agrees with the Special Report, even while it pretends not to.

F&F inhdeed did not make those subprime loans. They just bought hordes of them from the banks etc. who did. As the summary pointed out, F&F's willingness to buy, gave the banks lots of incentives to make loans to anyone and everyone, regardless of their ability to pay. Natually, they didn't stop making loans to people who COULD pay. Plenty of those went through too. They just made lots more to some who couldn't. F&F bought them by the millions, thus giving the banks back their cash, so the banks etc. could make even more such loans.

Correct, many banks didn't have to follow CRA etc. rules. But if they wanted to sell their newly-made mortgages to F&F, they could sell more by making them according to F&F's new rules - the rules saying that more low-income loands were needed. And so they did, taking broker's fees, loan origination fees, and all the rest, for each one before sellign them to F&F. Not because they "had" to, but because they wanted to, so they could make more and more, sell them to F&F, and get all those nice fees.

The article's statement that the Bush admin never criticized any sort of lending, is true: They criticized the size of F&F and warned that they needed more regulation in general. And their call for more regulation wasn't because F&F weren't putting enough postage stamps on their mail. It was because of their reckless lowering of standards, which was in turn prompted by Democrat congress's and Presidents' direction to lend to low-income borrowers, come what may.Repeated attempts to legislate the regulation Republicans called for, was repeatedly defeated by Democrats, using committee votes when they had a majority, and Senate filibusters when they didn't.

Sorry, leftists. You've been caught with your hand in the cookie jar. Your repeated attempts to pretend it was someone else's hand, are contraddicted by reams of documents, statement,s and video clips showing otherwise. The paper trail leading to your door, is huge and obvious.

The financial crisis is a classic example of why liberalism is bad for a country. Leftist politicians and demagogues tried to "give" housing to people who would then vote for them, putting off into the future any financial reckoning when those voters later coldn't pay their mortgages because interests rates went up, and couldn't sell their houses when the housing bubble burst and house prices fell. The leftists then manipulated government agencies so that huge numbers of such risky loans were concentrated in a few large, govt-sponsored companies and their clients, so that one bad agenda could have huge impact on most of the nation's economy instead of being confined to only a few banks etc. who extended loans by themselves.

1) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not buy subprime loans. The worst loans they purchased were A- loans, not the true crap. Indeed, the term "subprime" means loans that are not Freddie and Fannie compliant.

2) Again, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not buy subprime loans. Banks and other non-"bank" financial institutions made subprime loans because they could bundle them up and sell them to others as AAA rated mortgage backed securities. Fannie and Freddie had nothing to do with it.

3) The regulations pressed on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had nothing to do with their lending standards. Rather, the regulations had to do with their debt-capital ratios. Fannie and Freddie were permitted to carry much more debt that other institutions relative to their capital. Further, the regulations were designed to look not at the loans Fannie and Freddie were buying but the non-loan assets that Fannie and Freddie held.

4) As I demonstrated to Damocles previously, from 2002 through 2006 the Senate Democrats never held a majority in any committee in the Senate. If the Republicans thought this issue were so damned important they coukd have brought it to the floor of the Senate for a vote. They never did. Not once. The Democrats never filibustered any bill because there was never a bill to filibuster. The Republican majority did nothing. Furthermore, a bill passed the House in 2005 with a majority of the Democrats voting in favor and then languished in the Senate as the Republicans chose not to bring the bill up for a vote.

Sorry guy, you're full of shit.

Further, the idea that government and not the lack of government regulation of reckless lenders making shitty loans to people that could not afford them, bundling the loans up and selling them as AAA rated securities to private entities and investment banks that had their credit-debt ratios expanded by the SEC and other is laughable.

 

[Sir Galahad]

BUSH THWARTED EFFORTS TO CURB GREED

States warned about impending mortgage crisis
Bush administration, financial industry thwarted efforts to curb greed

BusinessWeek.com

Updated 9:59 a.m. PT, Sun., Oct. 12, 2008

More than five years ago, in April 2003, the attorneys general of two small states traveled to Washington with a stern warning for the nation's top bank regulator. Sitting in the spacious Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, with its panoramic view of the capital, the AGs from North Carolina and Iowa said lenders were pushing increasingly risky mortgages. Their host, John D. Hawke Jr., expressed skepticism.

Roy Cooper of North Carolina and Tom Miller of Iowa headed a committee of state officials concerned about new forms of "predatory" lending. They urged Hawke to give states more latitude to limit exorbitant interest rates and fine-print fees. "People out there are struggling with oppressive loans," Cooper recalls saying.

Hawke, a veteran banking industry lawyer appointed to head the OCC by President Bill Clinton in 1998, wouldn't budge. He said he would reinforce federal policies that hindered states from reining in lenders. The AGs left the tense hour-long meeting realizing that Washington had become a foe in the nascent fight against reckless real estate finance. The OCC "took 50 sheriffs off the job during the time the mortgage lending industry was becoming the Wild West," Cooper says.

This was but one of many instances of state posses sounding early alarms about the irresponsible lending at the heart of the current financial crisis. Federal officials brushed aside their concerns. The OCC and its sister agency, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), instead sided with lenders. The beneficiaries ranged from now-defunct subprime factories, such as First Franklin Financial, to a savings and loan owned by Lehman Brothers, the collapsed investment bank.

Some states, including North Carolina and Georgia, passed laws aimed at deterring rash loans only to have federal authorities undercut them. In Iowa and other states, mortgage mills arranged to be acquired by nationally regulated banks and in the process fended off more-assertive state supervision. In Ohio the story took a different twist: State lawmakers acting at the behest of lenders squelched an attempt by the Cleveland City Council to slow the subprime frenzy.

A number of factors contributed to the mortgage disaster and credit crunch. Interest rate cuts and unprecedented foreign capital infusions fueled thoughtless lending on Main Street and arrogant gambling on Wall Street. The trading of esoteric derivatives amplified risks it was supposed to mute.

One cause, though, has been largely overlooked: the stifling of prescient state enforcers and legislators who tried to contain the greed and foolishness. They were thwarted in many cases by Washington officials hostile to regulation and a financial industry adept at exploiting this ideology.

The Bush Administration and many banks clung to what is known as "preemption." It is a legal doctrine that can be invoked in court and at the rulemaking table to assert that, when federal and state authority over business conflict, the feds prevail — even if it means little or no regulation.

‘Fundamental disagreement’
"There is no question that preemption was a significant contributor to the subprime meltdown," says Kathleen E. Keest, a former assistant attorney general in Iowa who now works for the Center for Responsible Lending, a nonprofit in Durham, N.C. "It pushed aside state laws and state law enforcement that would have sent the message that there were still standards in place, and it was a big part of the message to the industry that it could regulate itself without rules."

"That's bull----," says Hawke, the former comptroller. He returned to private law practice in late 2004 with the prominent Washington firm Arnold & Porter. Once again representing lenders as clients, he confirms the substance and tone of the April 2003 meeting with the state AGs, saying they "simply had a fundamental disagreement." But he denies that federal preemption played a role in the subprime debacle.

Hawke blames much of the mess on mortgage brokers and originators who, he says, were the responsibility of states. "I can understand why state AGs would try to offload some responsibility here," he adds. "It's important to remember when people are trying to assign blame here that the courts uniformly upheld our position."

His arguments have some merit. The federal judiciary has bolstered preemption in the name of uniform national rules, not just for banks but also for manufacturers of drugs and consumer products. And state oversight alone is no panacea, as the chaotic state-regulated insurance market illustrates. Inadequate supervision of mortgage companies in some states contributed to the subprime explosion. But the hands-off signals sent from Washington only invited complacency. When some state officials fired warning flares, the Administration doused them.

Consider a clash in 2004 between the OCC and regulators in Michigan. In January of that year attorneys working for Hawke filed a brief in federal court in Grand Rapids on behalf of Wachovia, the national bank with $800 billion in assets based in Charlotte, N.C. Michigan wanted to continue to examine a Wachovia-controlled mortgage unit in the state, which the bank had converted to a wholly owned subsidiary. The parent bank sued, claiming Michigan could no longer look at the mortgage lender's books. Citing the threat of unspecified "hostile state interests," the OCC argued in its brief that "states are not at liberty to obstruct, impair, or condition the exercise of national bank powers, including those powers exercised through an operating subsidiary."

Michigan countered that Wachovia Mortgage was not itself a national bank. The Constitution preserves state authority to protect its residents when federal statutes don't explicitly bar such regulation, Michigan contended. Ken Ross, the state's top financial regulator, says his department fought Wachovia all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court in part because it feared a growing subprime mortgage problem: "We knew there needed to be [state] regulation in place or there could be gaps." The OCC, he adds, "did not have robust regulatory provisions over these operating subsidiaries."

The nation's highest court sided with the Bush Administration, ruling in April 2007 that the OCC had exclusive authority over Wachovia Mortgage. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a five-member majority, pointed to the potential burdens on mortgage lending if there were "duplicative state examination, supervision, and regulation." In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens said that it is "especially troubling that the court so blithely preempts Michigan laws designed to protect consumers."

By the time of the Supreme Court decision last year, Wachovia and its mortgage operations in Michigan and elsewhere were feeling the ill effects of unwise lending. As real estate prices continued to fall this year, pushing many borrowers into default, Wachovia teetered on the edge of failure. In late September the federal government stepped in to arrange a fire sale. On Friday, federal antitrust regulators cleared Wells Fargo's $11.7 billion acquisition of Wachovia, a day after Citigroup Inc. walked away from its own efforts to buy the Charlotte, N.C.-based bank.

Confrontations such as Michigan's battle with Wachovia became far more common after George W. Bush took over the White House in 2001 and instituted a broad deregulatory agenda. The OCC, an arm of the Treasury Dept., has adhered closely to it. The agency oversees more than 1,700 federally chartered banks, controlling two-thirds of all U.S. commercial bank assets. Historically, its examiners have monitored bank capital levels and lending to corporations more attentively than they have the treatment of individual borrowers. "Consumer protection has always been an orphan [among federal bank regulators]," says Adam J. Levitin, a commercial law scholar at Georgetown University Law Center.

The OCC brought 495 enforcement actions against national banks from 2000 through 2006. Thirteen of those actions were consumer-related. Only one involved subprime mortgage lending. OCC spokesman Robert Garsson says the figures could be misinterpreted because the agency addresses many problems informally during bank examinations. He declined to provide any examples.

Beyond the influence of free-market theory, turf concerns have reinforced the Administration's determination to exercise responsibility for as many lenders as possible — and prevent state incursions, notes Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., a professor at George Washington University Law School. Almost all of the funding for the OCC and OTS comes from fees paid by nationally chartered institutions.

The fight in Georgia
Hawke says the OCC seeks only to exercise powers that it has long held under federal law. It is far more efficient for national banks to deal with one set of federal rules than a hodgepodge of state directives, he argues, echoing the Supreme Court's majority view. By the late 1990s, he adds, more state legislatures and AGs were trying to bully national banks by, for example, restricting ATM fees charged to nondepositors. State officials "found it politically advantageous to assert these kinds of initiatives," he says. The OCC's heightened preemption campaign "was occasioned by the fact the states were becoming more aggressive."

The current head of the OCC, John C. Dugan, concurs. "To claim that it is our fault from preemption is just a total smokescreen to shield the fact that the state mortgage brokers and mortgage companies were just not regulated," Dugan says.

Efforts in Georgia to rein in unwise lending provoked a particularly fierce federal reaction. In 2002 the state passed a law that imposed "assignee liability" on the mortgage-finance process. Understanding the significance of this requires a little background.

One of the forces that accelerated the proliferation of dangerous home loans was the Wall Street business of buying up millions of mortgages, bundling them into bonds, and selling the securities to pension funds and other investors. Securitization, which grew to a $7 trillion industry, meant the lenders could pass along the risk of default to a huge universe of investors. Many of those investors, in turn, relied uncritically on reassurances from fee-collecting investment banks and ratings agencies that mortgage-backed securities were high-quality. When many of the reassurances proved hollow, the securitization market collapsed this year.

Assignee liability would radically reshape that market by making everyone involved potentially responsible when things go bad. Investment banks that created mortgage-backed securities and investors who bought them would be liable for financial damage if mortgages turned out to be fraudulent. The financial industry opposed assignee liability, maintaining that it would cripple the market for asset-backed securities. Major ratings agencies later agreed that allowing unlimited damages would be disruptive. The agencies threatened to stop evaluating many bonds tied to mortgages covered by the Georgia law.

But some banking experts speculate that if Georgia's example had spurred more states to adopt broad assignee liability, greater caution would have prevailed in the mortgage-securities market, possibly preventing the blowups of Lehman, Bear Stearns, and other once-mighty institutions. "If the Georgia law had held, it is possible that other states would have followed and there might have been change earlier," says Ellen Seidman, who headed the OTS from 1997 through 2001.

‘Outgunned’ advocates
Roy Barnes, Georgia's governor in 2002, understood the potential significance of assignee liability when he signed the state's new Fair Lending Act that year. He recalls a breakfast meeting with banking lobbyists during which he admonished the industry to clean up reckless lending. He jokingly threatened to hire "the longest-haired, sandal-wearing bank commissioner you ever saw." But the bankers fought back, seeking to undermine the new law.

The OCC's Hawke assisted the industry by issuing a ruling in July 2003 saying the Georgia law did not apply to national banks or their subsidiaries. A fact sheet prepared at the time — and still available on the OCC's Web site — says: "There is no evidence of predatory lending by national banks or their operating subsidiaries, in Georgia or elsewhere."

The OCC ruling had been requested by Cleveland-based National City Bank on behalf of several of its units, including First Franklin Financial, a subprime lender that operated in Georgia and other states. First Franklin, which was acquired by Merrill Lynch in 2006, has been hit with dozens of suits alleging unfair lending practices. Merrill shut down First Franklin's troubled lending business in March. Itself hobbled by mortgage-securities losses, Merrill agreed last month to be acquired by Bank of America. The bank and Merrill declined to comment.

In August 2004, Hawke went a step further in a letter to the Georgia Banking Dept. He said even state-chartered mortgage brokers and lenders were exempt from the Georgia law — if the loans they handled were funded at closing by a national bank or its subsidiary.

By then support for the Georgia law was already eroding. Barnes, a Democrat, lost his reelection campaign in November 2002, and his Republican successor moved to dilute the lending act. Still, supporters mobilized to defend the legislation. One was William J. Brennan Jr., an Atlanta legal aid attorney who specializes in housing and had testified before the U.S. Congress in 2000 about what he saw as the looming mortgage mess. He told the House Financial Services Committee: "The entry of many prominent national banks into the subprime mortgage-lending business has resulted not in reform, but in the expansion of the abusive practices." Federal regulators, he testified, "have done little to stop" the trend. In early 2003, Brennan and a legal aid colleague, Karen E. Brown, consulted with Georgia legislators trying to block amendments softening the lending law. At a hearing in February, Brennan requested a police escort because he feared that angry mortgage brokers would block his way. "The words that come to mind are 'outgunned' and 'overwhelmed,' " says Brown.

The Georgia legislature sharply curtailed the assignee liability provision in March 2003 and eliminated other elements of the law as well. Subprime lenders such as Ameriquest Mortgage that had halted lending in Georgia in protest of the law resumed marketing high-interest, high-fee mortgages. But by late 2007, Ameriquest had gone out of business after agreeing to a $325 million settlement to resolve suits alleging that it had made fraudulent loans.

Escaping state enforcement
Georgia now has the sixth-highest rate of foreclosure in the country. Consumer advocates and state attorneys general contend the weakening of the state's law was a severe blow to efforts to curb careless lending. "Had the Georgia Fair Lending Act not been watered down, we would be in a very different place right now," says Brown.

In some states, dubious local mortgage firms sold themselves to national banks, gaining protection against state enforcement. The Iowa Division of Banking in 2006 sought to examine a subprime broker called Okoboji Mortgage in the town of Arnolds Park. A borrower had accused the firm (named for an area lake) of duplicitous lending practices. Cheryl Riley, a 52-year-old janitor, told state officials she had not received the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage she thought she had arranged with Okoboji in 2005. Instead of one monthly statement, Riley got two: one for a 9.25 percent adjustable-rate loan and another for a 15-year fixed loan at 12 percent. Both rates were far higher than what Riley and her husband thought they had negotiated. "We were horrified," she says.

A preliminary state investigation found that Okoboji's manager had headed a mortgage firm in Nebraska that lost its license for falsifying loan documents. But Okoboji refused Iowa's demand for an examination, forcing the agency to file suit in August 2006. Okoboji responded by announcing that it had been acquired by Wells Fargo, a nationally chartered bank regulated by the OCC. Okoboji handed in its state license, saying it no longer had to comply with Iowa rules. "We'd had red flags but were now blocked from investigating," says Shauna Shields, an Iowa assistant AG.

Okoboji's former manager, Lyda Neuhaus, calls Nebraska's earlier actions "a witch hunt" based on "12 miserable complaints." Her father, Juan Alonso, who owned Okoboji, says he sold his company because he wanted to retire, not to escape state regulation. Both deny any wrongdoing. A Wells Fargo spokesman declined to comment on Iowa's concern about Okoboji and defended the acquisition as benefiting customers and shareholders.

A playing field with no rules
The experience with Okoboji was the sort of thing that Iowa AG Miller had warned about when he joined his counterpart from North Carolina on their visit to OCC chief Hawke in 2003. "Now, we could not do anything with federally chartered banks or subsidiaries," Miller says. In 2006 and 2007 the Iowa legislature shot down proposals by Miller for more-restrictive lending laws. Lax regulatory standards at the federal level helped undermine his efforts, he explains. State-chartered banks insisted that tougher rules in Iowa would put them at a competitive disadvantage with federally chartered banks overseen by the OCC. "We had to acknowledge the [political] environment we were in," Miller says.

The banking industry repeated the argument for regulatory "parity" in many states that tried and failed to tighten supervision of subprime lenders, says Keest of the Center for Responsible Lending: "State institutions then wanted a level playing field, which was a playing field with no rules."

Hawke says that it would have been inappropriate for the states to impose more-stringent standards on federally chartered institutions: "Had they tried to apply those rules to national banks, they clearly would have been preempted."

In Cleveland in 2002, Frank G. Jackson, then a member of the City Council, could see that many lower-income residents were being persuaded by lenders to pile on high-interest debt. "It was pure greed, based on exploitation," he says. "[Some subprime lending] is just the same as organized crime." He started negotiating with mortgage lenders for more-favorable terms. To his surprise, the lenders bypassed him and persuaded the state legislature to enact a less stringent version of an anti-predatory lending act he was drafting. "I figured the good faith had ended, so I passed my law [at the city level]," Jackson says. That law required lenders to register with the city and provided counseling to prospective borrowers.

His accomplishment was short-lived. That same year, the American Financial Services Assn. (AFSA), a national trade group, sued to block Ohio municipalities from passing lending laws that conflicted with state statutes. The Ohio Supreme Court later sided with the industry. AFSA's goal was to ward off conflicts between federal, state, and local rules, says spokesman Bill Himpler. "Different municipalities moving different anti-predatory lending legislation ... would have brought the credit markets to a screeching halt."

Fulfilling Jackson's fears, the Cleveland area has become one of the places worst hit by the mortgage catastrophe. More than 80,000 homes have gone into foreclosure since 2000, the highest per capita rate in the country.

In January, Jackson, elected the city's mayor in 2005, tried a new tactic. He filed suit in state court against Lehman, Wells Fargo, and 19 other lenders, alleging that they sold "toxic subprime mortgages ... under circumstances that made the resulting spike in foreclosures a foreseeable and inevitable result." The city's attorneys based the suit on an Ohio law banning "public nuisances," which is usually used against defendants such as manufacturers whose factories emit pollution. The idea was to steer clear of conventional banking law and head off any claim of federal preemption. The suit is pending; the banks all deny wrongdoing.

 

[Mott the Hoople]

Nice rebuttals guys. Oh where oh where has the litte nut gone? Oh where oh where can he be?

 

[uscitizen]

I hear the feds are after ACORN lately. He must be on the run a lot.