Philosophy of science
Key Concepts:
corroboration: This is philosopher of science Karl Popper's term for theories or hypotheses that have survived serious attempts to refute them. Because Popper insists that corroboration has nothing to do with confirmation, he claims that we have no reason to think corroborated theories more likely to be true than untested ones.
demarcation criterion: A demarcation criterion would provide a basis for distinguishing science from pseudoscience. The search for a demarcation criterion, however, does not look promising. Science probably cannot be done without some kind of metaphysical picture or conception lurking in the background. The inescapability of metaphysics emerges most clearly in notions of categories, kinds, properties, and so on.
determinism: Determinism holds if the state of the universe at a given moment suffices to exclude all outcomes except one. Generally, determinism is understood as causal determinism; the state of the universe at a given moment causally determines the outcome at the next moment. Quantum mechanics suggests that the universe is not deterministic.
empiricism: A wide range of views can lay claim to this label. They all have in common some conception, according to which experience is the source of some cognitive good (for example, evidence, meaningfulness). John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume constitute a tradition united by its empiricism-the idea that experience sets the boundaries of, and provides the justification for, our claims to knowledge.
falsificationism: Karl Popper's demarcation criterion and his conception of scientific testing are generally combined under this term. Science is distinguished from pseudoscience by the readiness with which scientific claims can be falsified. In addition, scientific testing can falsify but can never confirm theories or hypotheses.
inference to the best explanation: This encompasses a range of inferential practices (such terms as abductive inference and explanatory inference are sometimes used to mark differences within this range). The general idea is that a theory's explanatory success provides evidence that the theory is true. This style of argument is crucial to scientific realism but is regarded with some suspicion by empiricists.
logical positivism: In this course, logical positivism and logical empiricism are used interchangeably. These terms refer to an ambitious, language centered version of empiricism that arose in Vienna and Berlin and became the standard view in philosophy of science through the middle of the 20th century. Under the pressure of criticism (largely from within), the positivist program became somewhat more moderate over the years.
metaphysics: This term was generally used pejoratively by the positivists to refer to unscientific inquiries into the nature of reality. These days, most philosophers see room for a philosophical discipline worth calling metaphysics, which addresses such issues as personal identity, the reality of universals, and the nature of causation.
scientific realism: Another idea that comes in several flavors, scientific realism has at its core the claims that scientific theories aim to correctly depict both unobservable and observable reality and that, in general at least, adopting a scientific theory involves believing what it says about all of reality. Realism (roughly) asserts that scientific theories can and sometimes doprovide an accurate picture of reality, including unobservable reality.
teleological explanation: An explanation that makes reference to a purpose is said to be teleological. Such explanations are prevalent in biology (creatures have hearts for the purpose of pumping blood) and psychology (we explain behavior as goal-directed). Philosophers have worked hard to reconcile teleological explanation with non-purposive explanation.
Source credit: Professor Jeffrey Kasser, Colorado State University
