Here is a rather incredible summary of what some of us on the left believe and what some of us here need to think more about. This comes from Francis Fox Piven (and Richard Cloward), of whom, Glenn Beck said she should be killed. I have started reading one book by a woman and one book by a man, and alternating, since making this resolution, I have been reading some really interesting books written by women. It is intellectually invigorating. The perspectives aren't necessarily different but the tone and emphasis is generally much different. Piven is certainly one of my favorites. This short excerpt comes from her important study of Protest Movements: Poor People's Movements Why They Succeed, How They Fail (1977). The following excerpt comes from the opening pages of the Chapter 1, The Structuring of Protest.
Common sense and historical experience combine to suggest that a simple but compelling view of the roots of power in any society. Crudely, but clearly stated, those who control the means of physical coercion, and those who control the means of producing wealth, have power over those who do not. This much is true whether the means of coercion consists in the primitive force of a warrior caste or the technological force of a modern army. And it is true whether the control of production consists in control by priests on the mysteries of the calendar on which agriculture depends, or control by financiers of the large-scale capital on which industrial production depends. Since coercive force can be used to gain control of the means of producing wealth, and since control of wealth can be used to gain coercive force, these two sources of power tend over time to be drawn together within one ruling class.
Common sense and historical experience also combine to suggest that these sources of power are protected and enlarged by the use of that power not only to control the actions of men and women, but also to control their beliefs. What some call superstructure, and what others call culture, includes an elaborate system of beliefs and ritual behaviors which defines for people what is right and what is wrong and why; what is possible and what is impossible; and the behavioral imperatives that follow from those beliefs. Because this superstructure of beliefs and rituals is evolved in the context of unequal power, it is inevitable that beliefs and rituals reinforce inequality, by rendering the powerful divine and the challengers evil. Thus the class struggles that might otherwise be inevitable in sharply unequal societies ordinarily do not seem either possible or right form the perspective of those who live within the structure of belief and ritual fashioned by those societies. People whose only possible recourse in struggle is to defy the beliefs and rituals laid down by their rulers ordinarily do not.
What common sense and historical experience suggest has been true of many societies is no less true of modern capitalist societies, the United States among them. Power is rooted in the control of coercive force and in control of the means of production. However, in capitalist societies this reality is not by rendering the powerful divine, but by obscuring their existence. Thus electoral-representative arrangements proclaim the franchise, not force and wealth, as the basis for the accumulation and use of power. Wealth is, to be sure, unequally distributed, but the franchise is widely and nearly equally distributed, and by exercising the franchise men and women presumably determine who their rulers will be, and therefore what their rulers presumably must do if they are to remain rulers.
Since analysts of power also live within the boundaries of ritual and belief of their society, they have contributed to this obfuscation by arguing that electoral arrangements offset other bases of power. Even the most sophisticated American political scientists have begun with the assumption that there are in fact two systems of power, one based on wealth and one based on votes, and they have devoted themselves to deciphering the relative influence of these two systems. This question has been regarded as intricate and complicated, demanding assiduous investigations in a variety of political settings, and by methods subject to the most rigorous empirical strictures. (“Nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community,” was Polsby famous dictum.) The answer that emerged from these investigations was that electoral-representative procedures accomplished a substantial dispersal of power in a less-than-perfect world. It followed that those who struggled against their rulers by denying the procedures of the liberal democratic state were dangerous troublemakers, or simply fools.
In the 1960s the dominant pluralist tradition was discredited, at least by those on the ideological left who were prodded by outbreaks of defiance among minorities and students to question this perspective. In the critique that emerged it was argued that there were not two systems of power, but that the power rooted in wealth and force overwhelmed the power of the franchise. The pluralists had erred, the critics said, by failing to recognize the manifold ways in which wealth and its concomitants engulfed the electoral-representative procedures, effectively barring many people from participation while deluding and entrapping others into predetermined electoral “choices.” The pluralists had also erred in ignoring the consistent bias toward the interests of the elites inherent in presumably neutral governing structures, no matter what the mandate of the electorate.
We do not mean to summarize the critique, which was by no means simple or all of a piece. We wish only to make the point that the challenge rested in large part on the insight that modes of participation and non-participation in electoral-representative were not, as the pluralists had implied by their narrow empirical strictures, the freely made political choices of free men and women. Rather, modes of participation, and the degree of influence that resulted, were consistently determined by location in the class structure. It was an important insight, and once it had been achieved the conclusion followed not far behind that so long as lower-class groups abided by the norms governing the electoral-representative system, they would have little influence. It therefore became clear, at least to some of us, that protest tactics which defied political norms were not simply the recourse of troublemakers and fools. For the poor, they were the only recourse.
But having come this far, we have gone no further. The insights that illuminated the critiques of the electoral-representative processes have been entirely overlooked in the few studies that have been done on the nature of protest itself. From an intellectual perspective it is a startling oversight; from a political perspective, it is all too easily explained by the overwhelming biases of our traditions. Briefly stated…protest is also not a matter of free choice; it is not available to all groups at all times, and much of the time it is not available to lower-class groups at all. The occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms that it must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in ways which usually diminish its extent and diminish its force. (Italics in original--more to come)
For more on protest movements check back tomorrow and see what Ms Piven is talking about and what the pitfalls are. But for now this is a clearly stated summary of what some of us know, and some of us just can’t get our heads around, but for those of us who grasp this simple summary and what it means, there has been many years of frustration and incomprehensible disgust as we watched year after year the power of the wealthy and their money nearly completely control the political and financial resources of this nation. Case in point, nearly a million people came out to celebrate the Seahawks in a metropolitan area that has between 4-5 million total inhabitants. When was the last time an anti-war demonstration or anti-poverty program attracted such attention and response? When was the last time a million people in the Seattle area gave a shit—the general strike of February 4, 1919, which was still going on today, 96 damn years ago and few people even know it ever happened. It certainly would never happen now. And that’s the rub!
I am banning no one, because I like lively debate.
Common sense and historical experience combine to suggest that a simple but compelling view of the roots of power in any society. Crudely, but clearly stated, those who control the means of physical coercion, and those who control the means of producing wealth, have power over those who do not. This much is true whether the means of coercion consists in the primitive force of a warrior caste or the technological force of a modern army. And it is true whether the control of production consists in control by priests on the mysteries of the calendar on which agriculture depends, or control by financiers of the large-scale capital on which industrial production depends. Since coercive force can be used to gain control of the means of producing wealth, and since control of wealth can be used to gain coercive force, these two sources of power tend over time to be drawn together within one ruling class.
Common sense and historical experience also combine to suggest that these sources of power are protected and enlarged by the use of that power not only to control the actions of men and women, but also to control their beliefs. What some call superstructure, and what others call culture, includes an elaborate system of beliefs and ritual behaviors which defines for people what is right and what is wrong and why; what is possible and what is impossible; and the behavioral imperatives that follow from those beliefs. Because this superstructure of beliefs and rituals is evolved in the context of unequal power, it is inevitable that beliefs and rituals reinforce inequality, by rendering the powerful divine and the challengers evil. Thus the class struggles that might otherwise be inevitable in sharply unequal societies ordinarily do not seem either possible or right form the perspective of those who live within the structure of belief and ritual fashioned by those societies. People whose only possible recourse in struggle is to defy the beliefs and rituals laid down by their rulers ordinarily do not.
What common sense and historical experience suggest has been true of many societies is no less true of modern capitalist societies, the United States among them. Power is rooted in the control of coercive force and in control of the means of production. However, in capitalist societies this reality is not by rendering the powerful divine, but by obscuring their existence. Thus electoral-representative arrangements proclaim the franchise, not force and wealth, as the basis for the accumulation and use of power. Wealth is, to be sure, unequally distributed, but the franchise is widely and nearly equally distributed, and by exercising the franchise men and women presumably determine who their rulers will be, and therefore what their rulers presumably must do if they are to remain rulers.
Since analysts of power also live within the boundaries of ritual and belief of their society, they have contributed to this obfuscation by arguing that electoral arrangements offset other bases of power. Even the most sophisticated American political scientists have begun with the assumption that there are in fact two systems of power, one based on wealth and one based on votes, and they have devoted themselves to deciphering the relative influence of these two systems. This question has been regarded as intricate and complicated, demanding assiduous investigations in a variety of political settings, and by methods subject to the most rigorous empirical strictures. (“Nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community,” was Polsby famous dictum.) The answer that emerged from these investigations was that electoral-representative procedures accomplished a substantial dispersal of power in a less-than-perfect world. It followed that those who struggled against their rulers by denying the procedures of the liberal democratic state were dangerous troublemakers, or simply fools.
In the 1960s the dominant pluralist tradition was discredited, at least by those on the ideological left who were prodded by outbreaks of defiance among minorities and students to question this perspective. In the critique that emerged it was argued that there were not two systems of power, but that the power rooted in wealth and force overwhelmed the power of the franchise. The pluralists had erred, the critics said, by failing to recognize the manifold ways in which wealth and its concomitants engulfed the electoral-representative procedures, effectively barring many people from participation while deluding and entrapping others into predetermined electoral “choices.” The pluralists had also erred in ignoring the consistent bias toward the interests of the elites inherent in presumably neutral governing structures, no matter what the mandate of the electorate.
We do not mean to summarize the critique, which was by no means simple or all of a piece. We wish only to make the point that the challenge rested in large part on the insight that modes of participation and non-participation in electoral-representative were not, as the pluralists had implied by their narrow empirical strictures, the freely made political choices of free men and women. Rather, modes of participation, and the degree of influence that resulted, were consistently determined by location in the class structure. It was an important insight, and once it had been achieved the conclusion followed not far behind that so long as lower-class groups abided by the norms governing the electoral-representative system, they would have little influence. It therefore became clear, at least to some of us, that protest tactics which defied political norms were not simply the recourse of troublemakers and fools. For the poor, they were the only recourse.
But having come this far, we have gone no further. The insights that illuminated the critiques of the electoral-representative processes have been entirely overlooked in the few studies that have been done on the nature of protest itself. From an intellectual perspective it is a startling oversight; from a political perspective, it is all too easily explained by the overwhelming biases of our traditions. Briefly stated…protest is also not a matter of free choice; it is not available to all groups at all times, and much of the time it is not available to lower-class groups at all. The occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms that it must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in ways which usually diminish its extent and diminish its force. (Italics in original--more to come)
For more on protest movements check back tomorrow and see what Ms Piven is talking about and what the pitfalls are. But for now this is a clearly stated summary of what some of us know, and some of us just can’t get our heads around, but for those of us who grasp this simple summary and what it means, there has been many years of frustration and incomprehensible disgust as we watched year after year the power of the wealthy and their money nearly completely control the political and financial resources of this nation. Case in point, nearly a million people came out to celebrate the Seahawks in a metropolitan area that has between 4-5 million total inhabitants. When was the last time an anti-war demonstration or anti-poverty program attracted such attention and response? When was the last time a million people in the Seattle area gave a shit—the general strike of February 4, 1919, which was still going on today, 96 damn years ago and few people even know it ever happened. It certainly would never happen now. And that’s the rub!
I am banning no one, because I like lively debate.