Which means what to you?
The first lower federal court to "interpret"
Miller --
Cases v. U.S, 131 F.2d 916 (1 st Cir. 1942)-- represented
Miller to be a radical and dangerous decision that would in effect negate all gun control and invalidate any claim of the federal government to regulate private citizen's possession and use of any modern arms, including military arms like machine guns, trench mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.
Because of that hyperbolic interpretation, the
Cases court chose to dismiss and ignore SCOTUS without any legal reasoning other than it felt the framers couldn't have intended to bind the government so completely.
The
Cases court then changed the rules . . . They shifted the focus of 2nd Amendment protection from the type of weapon and its function and effectiveness in battle, to the state of mind and intent of the citizen challenging a gun control law.
And thus the "militia right" interpretation of the 2nd Amendment was born . . .
After quoting
Miller's famous paragraph (as you did), the
Cases court said:
"the rule of the Miller case, if intended to be comprehensive and complete would seem to be already outdated, in spite of the fact that it was formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well known fact that in the so called 'Commando Units' some sort of military use seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon. In view of this, if the rule of the Miller case is general and complete, the result would follow that, under present day conditions, the federal government would be empowered only to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus. But to hold that the Second Amendment limits the federal government to regulations concerning only weapons which can be classed as antiques or curiosities,-- almost any other might bear some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia unit of the present day,-- is in effect to hold that the limitation of the Second Amendment is absolute. Another objection to the rule of the Miller case as a full and general statement is that according to it Congress would be prevented by the Second Amendment from regulating the possession or use by private persons not present or prospective members of any military unit, of distinctly military arms, such as machine guns, trench mortars, anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns, even though under the circumstances surrounding such possession or use it would be inconceivable that a private person could have any legitimate reason for having such a weapon. It seems to us unlikely that the framers of the Amendment intended any such result."
Well, it is no wonder they opine now, that Miller formulated no rule. The reason this had to be done was that it actually was a "well known fact" or as the Miller court said, "within judicial notice," that all guns have military usefulness.
The shotgun that the Miller court said, "has no reasonable relationship, . . ." is, truth be told, absolutely an arm beyond the reach of the NFA '34.
Thus, all guns would be protected, including the
Cases appellant's .38 caliber revolver and nearly all gun control laws would be struck down. Expressing how uncomfortable the court was with what it deemed to be the inevitable societal implications of the
Miller rule being applicable at their present time, the
Cases court simply rejected Miller's reasoning and ruling.
But now the judges were faced with a dilemma. The law could afford them no comfort, the law was a bed of nails. This realization, I would go so far as to say it manifested itself as a panic, forced them to turn to their only solace, the facts of the case before them. It was time to make lemonade.
The opinion continues:
"We therefore turn to the record in the case at bar. From it it appears that on or about August 27, 1941, the appellant received into his possession and carried away ten rounds of ammunition, and that on the evening of August 30 of the same year he went to Annadale's Beach Club on Isla Verde in the municipality of Carolina, Puerto Rico, equipped with a .38 caliber Colt type revolver of Spanish make which, when some one turned out the lights, he used, apparently not wholly without effect, upon another patron of the place who in some way seems to have incurred his displeasure. While the weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still there is no evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military organization or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career."
So after recognizing the gun at issue meets the "Miller test" and its possession and use is protected, this court makes the incredible leap of stipulating the
state of mind of the person claiming a Second Amendment right as a condition for exercising the right. The
Cases court changed the rules, they shifted the protection criteria from the military usefulness of the arm being demonstrated to requiring that the person, as a prerequisite to maintaining a Second Amendment claim, have as his intent in actually using the firearm, essentially his paramount concern, the actual maintenance and preservation of the militia!
If the gun isn't used by the military, its use is only protected if that use is "in preparation for a military career." As I said above, this was the genesis of the "militia right" interpretation in the federal court system.
This lower federal court offered absolutely no basis other than personal feelings for its ultimate conclusion about the
Miller decision and its action of ignoring the obvious determinations required by
Miller (that it plainly recognized and explained). No legal justification or substantiation was given for the leap it took, regarding the status of the citizen and the focus of his intent.
The only explanation for the bizarre and disconnected
Cases decision is the court undoubtedly felt that, as a matter of public policy, any meaningful limitation upon the government's power to restrict private ownership of firearms was unacceptable. The court felt the need to sustain the status quo and invented new law to "justify" that overreach.
Now you know what
Miller really means and what it demands.
.
