cancel2 2022
Canceled
The final report on the Heathrow crash blames ice buildup in the fuel lines on the Boeing 777, the co-pilot is a goddamned hero because he counter intuitively raised the flaps thus saving the plane and the passengers from far worse consequences.
Pilot of BA jet said goodbye to wife in final moments of Heathrow crash
Jenny Booth (Source)
The captain of the stricken Boeing 777 aircraft which crash-landed at Heathrow two years ago revealed today that he had been convinced he was going to die when the plane hit the ground.
As the British Airways jet, descending far faster than normal, crashed down within the airport perimeter but still a quarter of a mile short of the runway it skidded out of control at high speed, said Captain Peter Burkill in an interview with the BBC.
"We were now in an aircraft on the ground that was sliding uncontrollably and at that point I thought I was going to die so I said goodbye to my wife," said Captain Burkill. He added that he was haunted every day by the accident, and had taken voluntary redundancy last year.
“I always think about it - as well as my wife - it will probably never leave me.”
Related Links
An official accident report into the incident, published today, reveals that the drama happened when the plane lost power after ice restricted the supply of fuel to both of its engines - a risk which investigators said was "unrecognised at the time".
The freak situation occurred after Flight 38 experienced an unusually cold flight from Beijing on January 17 2008.
Captain Burkill described the moment - just 43 seconds away from touchdown - that he realised the plane had lost power as he was descending towards Heathrow airport.
"It naturally became apparent that we were going to crash and we were not going to make the runway," he said.
“My view of that accident from that point was that we were going to start descending very quickly - about an 1,800ft (548.64m) descent rate - and I could see the impact point was going to be around about the Hatton Cross area which includes catering buildings, a Tube station and a petrol station.”
Captain Burkill said the priority was to get the plane over any buildings and away from the Heathrow perimeter road.
He handed the controls to his co-pilot John Coward while he raised the plane’s flaps to reduce the drag from the wings, in a bid to slow the rate of descent.
“When I realised we were coming in far too steeply with the loss of power and we were heading towards the buildings, I had to reduce the drag, and as we were going to crash on ground, I needed the (landing) gear,” he said.
“The gear was going to take most of the brunt of the crash so I daren’t raise that up.”
Luckily for all on board the landing gear did absorb much of the impact before it broke, and the plane remained the right way up, sliding 372 metres before coming to rest. Thirty-four passengers and 12 crew of the 152 people on board suffered minor injuries, mainly to the back and neck.
The left main landing gear collapsed and the right separated from the plane. All the passengers were safely evacuated, with one passenger breaking a leg.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch report recounts how Captain Burkill tried to increase engine thrust as he and his crew noticed the plane losing speed, but there was no response from the engines. They put out a Mayday call three seconds before touchdown.
Related Links
There was not enough time for the flight crew to brief the cabin crew or to issue a command for passengers to brace themselves, the report said.
There was no fire but there was a significant fuel leak, while there was also an oxygen leak caused by part of the landing gear damaging the passenger oxygen bottles.
The AAIB said some passengers attempted to retrieve personal items during the evacuation.
The report concludes that the engine fuel flow restriction was caused by a build-up of ice within the fuel system. The ice had probably formed from water that occurred naturally in the fuel, and the blockage occurred when fuel temperatures were at a “sticky range” when ice crystals were most likely to adhere to their surroundings.
Tests on the engines showed that the fuel oil heat exchanger on the crashed Boeing was susceptible to restriction where presented with soft ice in a high concentration and with a fuel temperature that was below minus 10C (14F).
The AAIB report added that research in the 1950s had identified the problem of ice formation in fuel systems from dissolved or entrained (trapped) water, but did not identify the scenario of accumulated ice release and subsequent restriction to fuel flow. There were no published guidelines or tests on the susceptibility of a fuel system to ice.
On November 28 2008 a Delta Airlines Boeing 777 suffered a similar ice problem while flying over the US, which prompted an investigation by America’s National Transportation Safety Board, with the AAIB having an accredited representative.
In both the BA and Delta incidents the power loss - or “engine rollback” - came when the fuel temperature was minus 22C (minus 7.6F).
Nine safety recommendations were made following the earlier AAIB reports into the BA incident. Boeing and Rolls-Royce took steps to prevent the ice phenomenon from re-occurring.
Today, the AAIB made nine further safety recommendations, including some which address plane “crashworthiness” - the ability of an aircraft to withstand an accident.
A British Airways spokesman said: “We welcome this final report. The crew of BA38 did a fantastic job in extremely difficult circumstances. They displayed the highest levels of professionalism and all crew members were awarded the company’s highest accolade, the BA safety medal."
BA added that although there were no specific safety recommendations for the airline, it had worked with the relevant authorities and manufacturers “to ensure that the highest safety levels are maintained”.
BA went on: “As with other operators of Boeing 777s powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engines, and in accordance with the safety recommendations to the aviation authorities and manufacturers, we have put in place a number of additional operational procedures and checks since the AAIB investigation began in January 2008 to prevent a recurrence.
“We installed the redesigned fuel oil heat exchangers (FOHEs) on all of our Boeing 777s powered by Trent 800 engines by October 2009. At that stage we lifted the remaining operational procedure that had been put in place as a precaution pending the completion of the redesigned FOHEs.
“Our customers can continue to fly with British Airways safe in the knowledge that our aircraft are operated and maintained to the very highest standards. The safety of our customers and staff is always our over-riding priority and we would never do anything to compromise it.”
Pilot of BA jet said goodbye to wife in final moments of Heathrow crash
Jenny Booth (Source)
The captain of the stricken Boeing 777 aircraft which crash-landed at Heathrow two years ago revealed today that he had been convinced he was going to die when the plane hit the ground.
As the British Airways jet, descending far faster than normal, crashed down within the airport perimeter but still a quarter of a mile short of the runway it skidded out of control at high speed, said Captain Peter Burkill in an interview with the BBC.
"We were now in an aircraft on the ground that was sliding uncontrollably and at that point I thought I was going to die so I said goodbye to my wife," said Captain Burkill. He added that he was haunted every day by the accident, and had taken voluntary redundancy last year.
“I always think about it - as well as my wife - it will probably never leave me.”
Related Links
An official accident report into the incident, published today, reveals that the drama happened when the plane lost power after ice restricted the supply of fuel to both of its engines - a risk which investigators said was "unrecognised at the time".
The freak situation occurred after Flight 38 experienced an unusually cold flight from Beijing on January 17 2008.
Captain Burkill described the moment - just 43 seconds away from touchdown - that he realised the plane had lost power as he was descending towards Heathrow airport.
"It naturally became apparent that we were going to crash and we were not going to make the runway," he said.
“My view of that accident from that point was that we were going to start descending very quickly - about an 1,800ft (548.64m) descent rate - and I could see the impact point was going to be around about the Hatton Cross area which includes catering buildings, a Tube station and a petrol station.”
Captain Burkill said the priority was to get the plane over any buildings and away from the Heathrow perimeter road.
He handed the controls to his co-pilot John Coward while he raised the plane’s flaps to reduce the drag from the wings, in a bid to slow the rate of descent.
“When I realised we were coming in far too steeply with the loss of power and we were heading towards the buildings, I had to reduce the drag, and as we were going to crash on ground, I needed the (landing) gear,” he said.
“The gear was going to take most of the brunt of the crash so I daren’t raise that up.”
Luckily for all on board the landing gear did absorb much of the impact before it broke, and the plane remained the right way up, sliding 372 metres before coming to rest. Thirty-four passengers and 12 crew of the 152 people on board suffered minor injuries, mainly to the back and neck.
The left main landing gear collapsed and the right separated from the plane. All the passengers were safely evacuated, with one passenger breaking a leg.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch report recounts how Captain Burkill tried to increase engine thrust as he and his crew noticed the plane losing speed, but there was no response from the engines. They put out a Mayday call three seconds before touchdown.
Related Links
There was not enough time for the flight crew to brief the cabin crew or to issue a command for passengers to brace themselves, the report said.
There was no fire but there was a significant fuel leak, while there was also an oxygen leak caused by part of the landing gear damaging the passenger oxygen bottles.
The AAIB said some passengers attempted to retrieve personal items during the evacuation.
The report concludes that the engine fuel flow restriction was caused by a build-up of ice within the fuel system. The ice had probably formed from water that occurred naturally in the fuel, and the blockage occurred when fuel temperatures were at a “sticky range” when ice crystals were most likely to adhere to their surroundings.
Tests on the engines showed that the fuel oil heat exchanger on the crashed Boeing was susceptible to restriction where presented with soft ice in a high concentration and with a fuel temperature that was below minus 10C (14F).
The AAIB report added that research in the 1950s had identified the problem of ice formation in fuel systems from dissolved or entrained (trapped) water, but did not identify the scenario of accumulated ice release and subsequent restriction to fuel flow. There were no published guidelines or tests on the susceptibility of a fuel system to ice.
On November 28 2008 a Delta Airlines Boeing 777 suffered a similar ice problem while flying over the US, which prompted an investigation by America’s National Transportation Safety Board, with the AAIB having an accredited representative.
In both the BA and Delta incidents the power loss - or “engine rollback” - came when the fuel temperature was minus 22C (minus 7.6F).
Nine safety recommendations were made following the earlier AAIB reports into the BA incident. Boeing and Rolls-Royce took steps to prevent the ice phenomenon from re-occurring.
Today, the AAIB made nine further safety recommendations, including some which address plane “crashworthiness” - the ability of an aircraft to withstand an accident.
A British Airways spokesman said: “We welcome this final report. The crew of BA38 did a fantastic job in extremely difficult circumstances. They displayed the highest levels of professionalism and all crew members were awarded the company’s highest accolade, the BA safety medal."
BA added that although there were no specific safety recommendations for the airline, it had worked with the relevant authorities and manufacturers “to ensure that the highest safety levels are maintained”.
BA went on: “As with other operators of Boeing 777s powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engines, and in accordance with the safety recommendations to the aviation authorities and manufacturers, we have put in place a number of additional operational procedures and checks since the AAIB investigation began in January 2008 to prevent a recurrence.
“We installed the redesigned fuel oil heat exchangers (FOHEs) on all of our Boeing 777s powered by Trent 800 engines by October 2009. At that stage we lifted the remaining operational procedure that had been put in place as a precaution pending the completion of the redesigned FOHEs.
“Our customers can continue to fly with British Airways safe in the knowledge that our aircraft are operated and maintained to the very highest standards. The safety of our customers and staff is always our over-riding priority and we would never do anything to compromise it.”
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