Rice Defends Bush Administraton Handling of al Qaeda & Terroirism after Cole Incident

P

Prakosh

Senior Member
Rice Defends Bush Administraton Handling of al Qaeda & Terroirism after Cole Incident

But I gotta tell ya, she was certainly a woman of few words here. Now Clinton went through everything he did step-by-step, excruciating detail after excruciating detail. And that isn't to say that Rice can't bullshit with the best of them, she can. Remember her testimony before Congress when she was national security adviser, hey, she could turn a yes or no answer into an good twenty minute tine killer like nothing you have ever witnessed, what with background, and context and fil,ling in all the little pertinent details, until a listener could be forgiven if at the end she had to consult her notes to see what the original question was. In fact Rice began to have a reputation on Capital Hill for her ability to eat the clock without really giving any information out. Here she is much more efficient she only takes a couple of sentences to deny Clinton’s assertions and to say what amounts to "we did too," without any details whatsoever. Like all good conservatives she basically refers people to the 9-11 commission report as if it says that the Bush administration did everything they could rather than that there were so many holes that the commission made no less than 44 recommendations on how to make the country safer. Many of which have still not been implemented 5 years after the fact.


Rice Challenges Clinton on Terror Record

Tue Sep 26, 8:11 AM ET

NEW YORK - Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice challenged former President Clinton's claim that he did more than many of his conservative critics to pursue Osama bin Laden, and she accused President Bush's predecessor of leaving no comprehensive plan to fight al-Qaida.

"What we did in the eight months was at least as aggressive as what the Clinton administration did in the preceding years," Rice said Monday during a meeting with editors and reporters at the New York Post.

The newspaper published her comments Tuesday, after Clinton appeared on "Fox News Sunday" in a combative interview in which he defended his handling of the threat posed by bin Laden and said he "worked hard" to have the al-Qaida leader killed.

"That's the difference in me and some, including all of the right-wingers who are attacking me now," Clinton said in the interview. "They ridiculed me for trying. They had eight months to try, they did not try."

Rice disputed his assessment.

"The notion somehow for eight months the Bush administration sat there and didn't do that is just flatly false — and I think the 9/11 commission understood that," she said.


Full Story
 
Clarke got it... at least before he wrote a convoluted book and wanted to get rich.....

Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02
Wednesday, March 24, 2004

WASHINGTON  The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.

RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.

Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office  issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy -- uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years.

And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent.

And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.

So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda.

The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies  and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.

Over the course of the summer  last point  they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.

And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.

QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.

QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.

QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the  general animus against the foreign policy?

CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.

JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?

CLARKE: All of that's correct.

ANGLE: OK.

QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?

CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues  like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy  that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.

QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...

CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.

ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?

CLARKE: In October of '98.

QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?

CLARKE: Right, which was in September.

QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...

CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.

QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?

CLARKE: There was no new plan.

QUESTION: No new strategy  I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...

CLARKE: Plan, strategy  there was no, nothing new.

QUESTION: 'Til late December, developing ...

CLARKE: What happened at the end of December was that the Clinton administration NSC principals committee met and once again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to the strategy. But they did not at that point make any recommendations.

QUESTIONS: Had those issues evolved at all from October of '98 'til December of 2000?

CLARKE: Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably.

ANGLE: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?

CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?

One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.

ANGLE: And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was ...

CLARKE: No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed  began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.

QUESTION: Had the Clinton administration in any of its work on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else, prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way? What did the Bush administration do with that if they had?

CLARKE: There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that.

(Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.)

ANGLE: So, just to finish up if we could then, so what you're saying is that there was no  one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office?

CLARKE: You got it. That's right.

QUESTION: It was not put into an action plan until September 4, signed off by the principals?

CLARKE: That's right.

QUESTION: I want to add though, that NSPD  the actual work on it began in early April.

CLARKE: There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that were being worked in parallel.

ANGLE: Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert operations against Al Qaeda  did that actually go into effect when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in the next budget year or something?

CLARKE: Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which was the next budget year, so it was a month away.

QUESTION: That actually got into the intelligence budget?

CLARKE: Yes it did.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, did that come up in April or later?

CLARKE: No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.

QUESTION: Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct?

CLARKE: No, it was March.

QUESTION: The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground troops  now we haven't completely done that even with a substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan prior to that to go after Al Qaeda?

CLARKE: I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't know what we would have done.
 
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bravo said:
Clarke got it... at least before he wrote a convoluted book and wanted to get rich.....

Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02
Wednesday, March 24, 2004

WASHINGTON The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.



RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.

Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy -- uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years.

And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent.

And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.

So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda.

The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.

Over the course of the summer last point they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.

And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.

QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.

QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.

QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the general animus against the foreign policy?

CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.

JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?

CLARKE: All of that's correct.

ANGLE: OK.

QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?

CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.

QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...

CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.

ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?

CLARKE: In October of '98.

QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?

CLARKE: Right, which was in September.

QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...

CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.

QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?

CLARKE: There was no new plan.

QUESTION: No new strategy I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...

CLARKE: Plan, strategy there was no, nothing new.

QUESTION: 'Til late December, developing ...

CLARKE: What happened at the end of December was that the Clinton administration NSC principals committee met and once again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to the strategy. But they did not at that point make any recommendations.

QUESTIONS: Had those issues evolved at all from October of '98 'til December of 2000?

CLARKE: Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably.

ANGLE: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?

CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?

One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.

ANGLE: And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was ...

CLARKE: No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.

QUESTION: Had the Clinton administration in any of its work on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else, prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way? What did the Bush administration do with that if they had?

CLARKE: There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that.

(Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.)

ANGLE: So, just to finish up if we could then, so what you're saying is that there was no one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office?

CLARKE: You got it. That's right.

QUESTION: It was not put into an action plan until September 4, signed off by the principals?

CLARKE: That's right.

QUESTION: I want to add though, that NSPD the actual work on it began in early April.

CLARKE: There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that were being worked in parallel.

ANGLE: Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert operations against Al Qaeda did that actually go into effect when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in the next budget year or something?

CLARKE: Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which was the next budget year, so it was a month away.

QUESTION: That actually got into the intelligence budget?

CLARKE: Yes it did.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, did that come up in April or later?

CLARKE: No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.

QUESTION: Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct?

CLARKE: No, it was March.

QUESTION: The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground troops now we haven't completely done that even with a substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan prior to that to go after Al Qaeda?

CLARKE: I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't know what we would have done.
Click to expand...


"cyberspace security" he was an expert on al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and had been for roughly 10 years. That was a real promotion wasn't it. Hahahahahahahahahahahahaha

This piece is quite old, it really made the rounds though when Clarke's book came out. In fact that is when it was finally released. If you had read Clarke's book you would why. The main reason was that in his book he refuted most of what he said here. The reason he said much of this was because he was told what to say before he appeared and was trying to save his job by doing what he was told, it wasn’t long after he made this effort that he was summarily dumped by the Bush administration. But that too is in his book.

Sort of like Colin Powell before the United Nations, you remember that performance don’t you??? Where the Secretary of state got up and claimed that Saddam Hussein had nearly 50 different weapons and weapons systems that all turned out to be bunk. This was sort of like that only on a much smaller stage. But nice try!!!!! Always good to read those same old tattered "oldies but goodies" from the righties. Got anything else??? How about the Temptations or the Impressions or Martha and the Vandellas!!!!

At least those oldies have a beat and great vocals, not to mention a great backup band.
 
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your trying to sell a book that can make you rich and you're pissed about getting a demotion ... I'd say thats the time to play the get even game and make a few bucks even if you have to make yourself look like a liar in the process...

I'm more apt to believe this guy when he was a happy camper and didn't stand to make a buck by lieing and selling a convoluted book...

but you can rationalize it anyway you need to, to fit your preconceived beliefs.....and obviously narrow mind..
 
I've often wondered about this Clarke reaction. He spends two years with the suggestion on the Clinton table with nothing at all happening and gets to go to meetings with the important people so he doesn't complain. The next President gets in, immediately starts implementing his ideas, in fact there was a meeting scheduled on 9/12 of the Principles to finalize the plans less than 8 total months after taking office, but he doesn't get to go to meetings with the important people so suddenly its all (simile here Prakosh, not a real quote), "They weren't doing enoughhhhh!" (said in whiney R. Clarke voice)...
 
bravo said:
your trying to sell a book that can make you rich and you're pissed about getting a demotion ... I'd say thats the time to play the get even game and make a few bucks even if you have to make yourself look like a liar in the process...

I'm more apt to believe this guy when he was a happy camper and didn't stand to make a buck by lieing and selling a convoluted book...

but you can rationalize it anyway you need to, to fit your preconceived beliefs.....and obviously narrow mind..
Click to expand...

Here's my long detailed 9-11 Commission Report based rebuttal, in the words of James Brown, "Can you heart handle it"???

Too bad the 9-11 Commission didn't see things the same way Clarke portrays it in the two year old interview, that finally surfaced in 2004 after Clarke’s book appeared, when he wasn't under oath to a gaggle of reporters, and instead took his testimony, under oath, and used that in the 9-11 Report. I guess it is just a coincidence that his testimony under oath and the resulting information in the 9-11 Report based on his testimony and that of others corresponded with what he said in his best-seller Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (2004). Look his book appears in 2004 at about the time this interview surfaces. Using your logic, bravo, Powell was more truthful when he testified before the United Nations even though not one single weapons system that he testified to on that day was found, than he was 3 years later when he said that his testimony on that day and the lies it contained was "the biggest professional regret" of his life. Because he was being more truthful when he was a happy camper and he is being more pained by the obvious and numerous inaccuracies in that one-hour presentation now. You infer that Clarke’s book was motivated by money and so he told what you call his later lies for the money that his best selling book generated. I can't remember how much Clarke got paid for his testimony before the 9-11 Commission but I know it wasn't much [indeed 0].

Let’s look at what the 9-11 Commission said, shall we. I have the 9-11 Commission report right here with a handy dandy little index. Let’s see what they have to say about the Bush administration after the Cole incident and before 9-11. Quite a book that 9-11 Commission Report; over 600 pages in hardback. I bet you haven't read it, have you bravo, no you wouldn't want to do that, better to retrieve 2 year old stories about 4 year old interviews and rather pretend you know what the Report says.

The pertinent information seems to be around page 200, let's see what we can find shall we. According to the Report, "Bush and his principle advisers had all received briefings on terrorism, including bin Laden. In early September 2000, Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin led a team to Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, [now that’s service] and gave him a wide ranging, four hour review of sensitive information.…Ben Bonk, deputy chief of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, used one of the four hours to deal with terrorism….Bonk told Bush that Americans would die from terrorism during the next four years. During the long contest after election day, the CIA set up an office in Crawford [talk about service] to pass intelligence to Bush and some of this key advisers….In December, Bush met with Clinton for a two-hour, one-on-one discussion of national security and foreign policy challenges. Clinton recalled saying to Bush ‘I think that by far your greatest threat is bin Laden and the al Qaeda. Clinton told us he also said, ‘One of the great regrets of my presidency is that I didn’t get him [Bin Laden] for you, because I tried to.’ Bush told the commission that he was sure Clinton mentioned terrorism but he didn’t remember much being said about al Qaeda….In early January Clarke briefed Rice on terrorism" (198-199).

Sandy Burger dropped in on this briefing to emphasize the terror threat and later that day met with Rice himself and told her that "the Bush administration would spend more time on terrorism in general and al Qaeda in particular than on anything else. Rice changed the structure under which Clarke operated, he went from a "de facto principle" to a flunky who would report to "the principles through the deputies" (200). If that isn’t a demotion I don’t know what else you could call it. And even though he retained his former title "of national counterterrorism coordinator…he would no longer be a de facto member of the Principles Committee on his issues" (200). "Clarke was disappointed at what he saw as a demotion." Sure looks like a demotion all the way around doesn’t it. Of course, it really wasn’t because you say so.

But there is more, "within the first few days" after the inauguration "Clarke approached Rice to get her—and the new President—to give terrorism very high priority and to act on the agenda that he had pushed during the last few months of the previous administration" (201). On January 25, 2001, "Clarke submitted an elaborate memorandum" which included "his 1998 Delenda Plan [sounds like a plan doesn’t it] and the December 2000 strategy paper" he also wrote, "We urgently need…a Principals level review on al Qida" (201, italics and elipsis in original). But what was Rice’s response, nothing…in fact the Report says that "The national security adviser did not respond directly to Clarke’s memorandum. No Principals meeting on al Qaeda was held until September 4, 2001" (201). There it is, exactly what the 9-11 Commission found, check it out, word for damn word.

Nothing from January 25 until September 4. But what does Rice say in her little interview with the right wing media yesterday. Well it sure isn’t what the 9-11 Commission says, No siree.

Here’s Rice’s version again if you forgot it. "What we did in the eight months was at least as aggressive as what the Clinton administration did in the preceding years." So there you have it, nothing is as aggressive as the Clinton administration was.

And on the plan, thanks to Jon Stewart who played Rice’s 9-11 Commission appearance tonight I can say she re-asserted "What they left us wasn’t a plan but, a series of actionable ideas." Stewart called this a explanation, "a long euphemism for plan." And I think it was. But let’s look at the FOXSPEWS story of the 2 year old interview. In it we have Clarke saying, "I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration." But we have already seen references in the 9-11 Report to the "Delenda Plan." So does the 9-11 Commission Report deal with this Plan or tell us what it was?

In fact, the 9-11 Report spends two paragraphs talking about the Delenda Plan. For those who didn’t buy or can’t readily find the Plan in the paperback version of the Report, the pertinent information on the Delenda Plan is on page 120. Here we find that the overall goal, according to the paper on the Plan "was to ‘immediately eliminate any significant threat to Americans’ from the ‘Bin Laden network.’ The paper called for diplomacy to deny Bin Laden sanctuary; covert action to disrupt terrorist activities; but above all to capture Bin Laden and his deputies and to bring them to trial; efforts to dry up Bin Laden’s money supply; and preparation for follow-on military action….The military component of Clarke’s plan was its most fully articulated element" (120). There we are. There is more but this is enough to show that there was in fact a plan, the 9-11 Commission called it a "plan" and it appears to have had most of the kinds of aspects that we would most commonly consider as components of a "plan." Whether or not you think it is a plan is of course up to each individual reader. But I think it was a "plan," however imperfect, however described.

So bravo go get yourself lunch and settle in for a long day.
 
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And a fine job...a fine job of spinning...

The Delenda "plan" was written in 1998...

911 Report..Page 120

Members of the samll group found themselves unpersuaded on the merits of rolling attacks..(Delenda 'Plan')

Def. Sec. says the training camps were primitive, rope ladders and Gen. Sheldon called them 'jungle gym sets'... Neither thought them worthwhile targets for expensive missiles

and President Clinton and Berger worried about the Economists point...missing OBL would enhance his stature and win him new recuits...After the US launched air attacks against Iraq in 1998 and against Serbia in 1999 they provoked world wide criticism...

National Sec. Adviser James Steinberg added the argumetn that attacks in Afghanistan offered "little benefit, and lots of blowback against a bomb-happy US

Under Sec. of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe advised that available targets were not promising....

And it goes on...lower level officials instead called for a broad range in national strategy and in the instutional approach of the DOD implying a possible need for large-scale operations across the whole spectrum of military capabilities...
The authors expressed concern that "we have not fundamentally altered our philosophy or our approach" even though the terrorist thread has grown...

And I quote from the report...

"The future, they warned, might bring "horrific attacks," in which "we will have no choice nor unfortunally, will we have a plan"

---
So as a fuller reading indicates...the so-called plan, as you refer to it...was rejected by the Clinton Admin....and by the time anything is given to Bush its already 3 years old....
so as Clarke himself describes it...THERE WAS NO PLAN....
and Clinton himself in the now infamous Fox interview calls it ' A comprehensive anti-terrorist stragety'.....
even clinton don't refer to any plan.....
 
bravo said:
And a fine job...a fine job of spinning...

The Delenda "plan" was written in 1998...

911 Report..Page 120

Members of the samll group found themselves unpersuaded on the merits of rolling attacks..(Delenda 'Plan')

Def. Sec. says the training camps were primitive, rope ladders and Gen. Sheldon called them 'jungle gym sets'... Neither thought them worthwhile targets for expensive missiles

and President Clinton and Berger worried about the Economists point...missing OBL would enhance his stature and win him new recuits...After the US launched air attacks against Iraq in 1998 and against Serbia in 1999 they provoked world wide criticism...

National Sec. Adviser James Steinberg added the argumetn that attacks in Afghanistan offered "little benefit, and lots of blowback against a bomb-happy US

Under Sec. of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe advised that available targets were not promising....

And it goes on...lower level officials instead called for a broad range in national strategy and in the instutional approach of the DOD implying a possible need for large-scale operations across the whole spectrum of military capabilities...
The authors expressed concern that "we have not fundamentally altered our philosophy or our approach" even though the terrorist thread has grown...

And I quote from the report...

"The future, they warned, might bring "horrific attacks," in which "we will have no choice nor unfortunally, will we have a plan"

---
So as a fuller reading indicates...the so-called plan, as you refer to it...was rejected by the Clinton Admin....and by the time anything is given to Bush its already 3 years old....
so as Clarke himself describes it...THERE WAS NO PLAN....
and Clinton himself in the now infamous Fox interview calls it ' A comprehensive anti-terrorist stragety'.....
even clinton don't refer to any plan.....
Click to expand...

Too bad you can't relate page numbers when you supposedly quote something, but be that as it may, the 9-11 report refers to it as a "plan," as I showed above and in my dictionary, the OED, "strategy" is defined as "the art or skill of careful planning" and "a plan for successful action." And according to Roget's International Thesaurus, "plan" is a synonym for "strategy" and finally Rodale's Synonym Finder lists "strategy" as a synonym for "plan" and "plan" as a synonym for "strategy." So if I am to believe that what you say here is correct that Clinton didn't call it a "plan" he called it a "strategy" meaning something other than a "plan," I have to disregard and reject the work of these several published and internationally accepted langauge experts and instead accept your claim over their work. Before I do that, please tell me exactly what you have done that makes you more qualified than they are to tell me what words mean. Just the high spots should be enough. Otherwise I'll go with the language experts and assume that when Clinton said "strategy" he meant what most of us would more commonly refer to as a "plan." Since you failed to define it here, what do you think a "strategy" is?

And as to the bolded quotation, a plan for dealing with al Qaeda before an attack which is what everyone is talking about here, is far different than not having a plan for dealing with them in the event of an attack, which is what the bolded quote is talking about, isn't it????
 
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You all are missing the whole point of Rice defending Bush. loyalty above all else is Bush's driver in selecting subordinates.
Of course she would defend Bush, she thinks it is part of her job. when actually her job is to the nation not Bush.
 
uscitizen said:
You all are missing the whole point of Rice defending Bush. loyalty above all else is Bush's driver in selecting subordinates.
Of course she would defend Bush, she thinks it is part of her job. when actually her job is to the nation not Bush.
Click to expand...

Why do rice and rumsfeld still have jobs? They are responsible for the Iraq debacle as much as bush and cheney. Bush can fire them anytime he wants, but chooses not to.
 
They are good and loyal lackeys and probably know stuff on him as well.
Besides he might well honestly think they have done a great job.
 
Prakosh said:
Too bad you can't relate page numbers when you supposedly quote something, but be that as it may, the 9-11 report refers to it as a "plan," as I showed above and in my dictionary, the OED, "strategy" is defined as "the art or skill of careful planning" and "a plan for successful action." And according to Roget's International Thesaurus, "plan" is a synonym for "strategy" and finally Rodale's Synonym Finder lists "strategy" as a synonym for "plan" and "plan" as a synonym for "strategy." So if I am to believe that what you say here is correct that Clinton didn't call it a "plan" he called it a "strategy" meaning something other than a "plan," I have to disregard and reject the work of these several published and internationally accepted langauge experts and instead accept your claim over their work. Before I do that, please tell me exactly what you have done that makes you more qualified than they are to tell me what words mean. Just the high spots should be enough. Otherwise I'll go with the language experts and assume that when Clinton said "strategy" he meant what most of us would more commonly refer to as a "plan." Since you failed to define it here, what do you think a "strategy" is?

And as to the bolded quotation, a plan for dealing with al Qaeda before an attack which is what everyone is talking about here, is far different than not having a plan for dealing with them in the event of an attack, which is what the bolded quote is talking about, isn't it????
Click to expand...



Try the third line from the top.....it reads...
911 Report..Page 120

The commission refers to it as a 'plan'...so what

The author himself DOES NOT
and the President at the time DOES NOT.....

And while you play words games and dig for Synonyms (exactly like Maineman)
The author when questioned directly in an interview states even more directly..:tongout: "THERE WAS NO PLAN"
 
bravo said:
Try the third line from the top.....it reads...
911 Report..Page 120

The commission refers to it as a 'plan'...so what

The author himself DOES NOT
and the President at the time DOES NOT.....

And while you play words games and dig for Synonyms (exactly like Maineman)
The author when questioned directly in an interview states even more directly..:tongout: "THERE WAS NO PLAN"
Click to expand...

The author titled this plan, that you claim he didn't call a plan and wasn't a plan, "Political-Military Plan Delenta" (9-11 Report, 120). Sounds like he thought it was a plan when he titled it, doesn't it?????

As a matter of fact, this particular document isn't mentioned in his book at all which came out in early 2004. It may well be that the document and its name were classified until the 9-11 Comission report and therefor the document (including it's title) was not something he could speak about until he tesitifed about it and the 9-11 Commission wrote about it later in the year. That would explain why he had to deny its existence at this particular press gaggle which you keep referring to.
 
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Did anyone EVER answer why the Bush Administration did NOT RETALLIATE the USS COLE attack?

I don't want to go back and read through this thread, unless someone has come to the Bush Administration's defense for NOT retaliating the uss cole attack...

care
 
So as a fuller reading indicates...the so-called plan, as you refer to it...was rejected by the Clinton Admin....and by the time anything is given to Bush its already 3 years old....
so as Clarke himself describes it...THERE WAS NO PLAN....
and Clinton himself in the now infamous Fox interview calls it ' A comprehensive anti-terrorist stragety'.....
even clinton don't refer to any plan....

I can agree that when Clarke write up this paper, he considered it a plan in 1998....what was given to Bush in 2000 was not a plan, as Clarke makes plain...and as Rice said.....
Clarkes 'plan' was shot down by the Clinton Admin. when it was proposed....so it was in fact, DOA....

So I will concede that when written, Clarke thought it a plan....and DOA...but that is not what you refer to from the start is it...what you refer to is Condi Rice and what was passed on to the Bush Admin....IT was not a plan....just we are on the same page....



RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.
 
Clarkes book ???

Yeah...

When Clarke says what you agree with..hes an authority...
When you don't agree with Clarke...hes got a excuse....

funny how that works for you....
 
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