In early 2005, Syria came under increased international pressure as evidence mounted linking Damascus to the February 14 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, as well as a February 25 suicide bombing by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Tel Aviv that killed five people. This added international pressure may have influenced Syria’s March decision to arrest and turn over to the new Iraqi government about 30 Iraqi Baathists, including Saddam’s half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan al-Tikriti. The arrests again generated good public relations for Syria. However, Damascus still failed to put forth a good faith effort to shut insurgents and jihadists out of Syrian territory.
In May 2005, Syria’s ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, claimed that Syria had arrested about 1,200 foreign fighters destined for Iraq. When U.S. officials criticized Syria’s efforts as insufficient, Damascus cut off all military and intelligence cooperation with Washington and claimed offense at Washington’s lack of appreciation. As one U.S. military official noted, “our sense is that they protest a bit too much and that they are capable of doing more.”
U.S.-Syrian relations deteriorated further over the summer of 2005 when U.S. Army Rangers found themselves in a firefight with Syrian soldiers while conducting operations to stem the flow of foreign fighters from Syria. Although the U.S. military did not report any casualties, several Syrian soldiers were killed, prompting protests from the Syrian government to the U.S. embassy in Damascus.
Syria continued to be the main transit point for foreign jihadists and a base of operations for Iraqi Baathists. The regime occasionally arrested high profile Iraqi Baathists in Syria, such as Yasir Sabhawi Ibrahim, a nephew of Saddam and “the most dangerous man in the insurgency,” according to one intelligence official. However, documents recovered following the October 2007 killing of an al-Qaeda leader near the Iraq-Syria border revealed a multitude of jihadist activities in Syria. Included among the documents were the names of 500 al-Qaeda members that entered Iraq via Syria, pledges signed by fighters, and even expense reports, revealing the high level of organization made possible by the Syrian safe haven.
In 2006, as sectarian tensions between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis flared, Western attention shifted to the Iran-backed Shiite militias that were dragging Iraq to the brink of civil war. Quietly, Syria’s role in facilitating the Iraq violence continued.
During the first half of 2007, Iraqi insurgents held conferences outside Damascus culminating in the formation of a coalition of seven groups, including the 1920s Revolution Brigades and Ansar al-Sunna, with the explicit goal of opposing and seeking to overthrow the Government of Iraq.
The Pentagon Weighs In
From 2005 to 2008, Syria was cited in successive quarterly Department of Defense reports, titled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” as a factor for instability. The May 2006 report, for example, points directly to Syria as a significant source of foreign fighters in Iraq and highlights “Syrian government assistance [to insurgents] before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom.” The August and November 2006 reports identified Syria, along with Iran, as contributing to ethno-sectarian tensions that undermined the fledgling government in Iraq.
March 2007 provided the most comprehensive criticism of the Syrian role in Iraq’s insurgency:
…Damascus appears unwilling to cooperate fully with the GOI [Government of Iraq] on bilateral security initiatives. Syria continues to provide safe haven, border transit, and limited logistical support to some Iraqi insurgents, especially former Saddam-era Iraqi Baath Party elements. Syria also permits former regime elements to engage in organizational activities, such that Syria has emerged as an important organizational and coordination hub for elements of the former Iraqi regime.
Although Syrian security and intelligence services continue to detain and deport Iraq-bound fighters, Syria remains the primary foreign fighter gateway into Iraq. Despite its heightened scrutiny of extremists and suspected insurgents, Damascus appears to want to appease Islamist extremist groups. Damascus also recognizes that Islamist extremists and elements of the former Iraqi regime share Syria’s desire to undermine Coalition efforts in Iraq.
Two reports later, in the September 2007 installment of “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” the Pentagon provides instructive metrics:
Approximately 90% of suicide bombers in Iraq are foreign fighters, and most continue to use Syria as their main transit route to Iraq. This network funnels about 50 to 80 suicide bombers per month into Iraq to conduct operations. Since January, there have been nearly 280 suicide attacks, accounting for nearly 5,500 deaths, mostly of innocent Iraqi civilians. [authors’ emphasis added]
