Yeah....I told ya so....long ago

lol....I see you don't even understand your own links....
Its no mystery what the intell was....

anyway...the 2002 NIE contained this...

State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.

In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to concluded that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.
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See anything definite in that assessment? No, of course not....some just admitted the uncertainty of the Nuclear Program.....and I say so what....

You do understand that CHEM and BIO weapons are considered WMD also, don't you..?
Your obviously obsessed with Nuclear side of WMD...
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So from you post...

(U) The uranium text was included only in the body of the NIE(as I just showed you), not in the key judgments section because the interagency consensus was that Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium were not key to the argument that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.(do you understand that sentence? I think not) According to the NIO, the key judgments were drawn from a CIA paper which only highlighted the acquisition of aluminum tubes as the reason Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The NIO said that at the NIE coordination meeting, analysts added other reasons they believed Iraq was reconstituting, such as acquiring magnets, machine tools, and balancing machines, and reestablishing Iraq's nuclear scientists cadre.( how about this part, understand what is being said?) When someone, the NIO was not sure who [7 - eRiposte note: this may have been a DOE analyst per the footnote] suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said that he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution. The NIO said he did not recall anyone else at the coordination meeting who disagreed with the uranium text, but also did not recall anyone really supporting including the uranium issue as part of the judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, so he suggested that the uranium information did not need to part of the key judgments. He told Committee staff he suggested that "We'll leave it in the paper for completeness. Nobody can say we didn't connect the dots. But we don't have to put that dot in the key judgments."
'''''----------------------------------------

Ahhhh...the KEY JUDGEMENTS

Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate

High Confidence:

* Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.

* We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.

* Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.

* Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

Moderate Confidence:

* Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to 2009. (see INR alternative view, page 84).

Low Confidence:

* When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction

* Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland.

* Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.


You oughta just crawl away and lick your wounds, Clarabell....


Once again, our intellectually impotent neocon clown demonstrates his myopic view point:


(U) The uranium text was included only in the body of the NIE(as I just showed you), not in the key judgments section because the interagency consensus was that Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium were not key to the argument that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.(do you understand that sentence? I think not) According to the NIO, the key judgments were drawn from a CIA paper which only highlighted the acquisition of aluminum tubes as the reason Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The NIO said that at the NIE coordination meeting, analysts added other reasons they believed Iraq was reconstituting, such as acquiring magnets, machine tools, and balancing machines, and reestablishing Iraq's nuclear scientists cadre.( how about this part, understand what is being said?) When someone, the NIO was not sure who [7 - eRiposte note: this may have been a DOE analyst per the footnote] suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said that he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution. The NIO said he did not recall anyone else at the coordination meeting who disagreed with the uranium text, but also did not recall anyone really supporting including the uranium issue as part of the judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, so he suggested that the uranium information did not need to part of the key judgments. He told Committee staff he suggested that "We'll leave it in the paper for completeness. Nobody can say we didn't connect the dots. But we don't have to put that dot in the key judgments."

And notice how our dishones neocon ass kiss leaves out this little ditty:

Because INR disagreed with much of the nuclear section of the NIE, it decided to convey its alternative views in text boxes, rather than object to every point throughout the NIE. INR prepared two separate boxes, one for the key judgments section and a two page box for the body of the nuclear section, which included a sentence which stated that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious." [page 52-53]



Funny that this chuckling buffoon accuses me of something he painly demonstrates himself with virtually every post. My point has ALWAYS been that the NIE report itself stated that the information sources was questionable at best. Someone knock some sense into this asshole's, head...BELIEF WITHOUT PROOF IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR INVASION AND OCCUPATION.

He keeps repeating lines of which I previously posted documented proof that OTHER AGENCIES CONTRADICTED AT THE TIME THE NIE 2002 REPORT WAS BEING FORMULATED.

No WMD manufacturing capabilities

No active stockpiles

[ame="http://www.justplainpolitics.com/showpost.php?p=560204&postcount=56"]Just Plain Politics! - View Single Post - Yeah....I told ya so....long ago[/ame]

It's all there, all one has to do is click back and read ALL the information presented and sourced. Bravo still thinks he's a grunt following orders by just regurgitating this myopic review of his ad nauseum....well, someone clue the poor bastard in....Howdy Doody was OLD and OFF THE AIR when I was 2 years old. It would indeed take a "pinhead" to think any reference to that antique has any significance now...as it would take a "pinhead" mentality to think that just focusing on parts of a report and ignoring all else is validation.

But alas, our intellectually impotent neocon service dupe just soldiers on with the party line of insipid stubborness....so much more to pity him. "Bravo", indeed.
 
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