evince
Truthmatters
what question asslick?
series: facts republicans ignore, state level preditory lending rules were blocked
- Thread starter evince
- Start date
what question asslick?
evince
Truthmatters
pretending the bank broker rules had nothing to do with the crash makes you a fucking lying sack of evil fuck
evince
Truthmatters
http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/news/sec-jh,pf.aspSEC Bank Broker/Dealer Rules Derail
By Peter E. Feltman, M.A., CCH Washington News Bureau, contributing author, CCH FOCUS and James Hamilton, J.D., LL.M., Senior Writer Analyst, CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter; Co-Author, CCH Federal Privacy Rules for Financial Institutions and Financial Services Modernization - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 - Law and Explanation; contributing author, CCH FOCUS.
he Securities and Exchange Commission moved on July 18, 2001, to postpone enactment of controversial bank broker/dealer rules in the face of criticism from banks, Congress and the federal banking regulators. The top republican on the Senate Banking Committee, Phil Gramm, responded to the SEC’s action by writing to Acting Chair Laura S. Unger to say “I wish to applaud the action of the Securities and Exchange Commission today....” The move was also welcomed by the House Financial Services Committee, which stated that it “helps alleviate some of our concern.”
In May 2001, the SEC issued interim final rules implementing sections 201 and 202 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed a full exception that had allowed banks to engage in securities activities without registering as a broker or dealer and replaced it with new functional exceptions. The SEC interim final rules define terms in the statutory exceptions and grant banks additional exemptions from broker-dealer registration. In response to these rules, banks commented that the SEC requirements would be too cumbersome, and bank regulators questioned the process of implementing interim final rules instead of making a proposal. Based on the adverse response, the SEC has ordered an extension of compliance and comment dates and has committed to work with the banking industry to amend the rules.
CONCERNS
In a letter to the SEC, the federal banking regulators maintained that the SEC rules are contrary to the express provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act bank exemptions. This view was echoed by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley, who expressed both process and substantive concerns regarding the SEC’s rules. “The SEC has overstepped normal regulatory bounds here,” Oxley said. “It’s a salvo in the regulatory turf battle that violates the letter and spirit of what was carefully crafted in Gramm-Leach-Bliley.” The rules are viewed as creating a costly and ultimately unworkable regime that negates the underlying statutory exemptions and congressional intent. Even more, contended the Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the approach embodied in the interim rules is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the bedrock GLB principle of functional regulation.
Specifically, the banking regulators said that implementation of the rules could drive banks out of traditional trust relationships with their customers. The rules require banks to conduct an account-by-account review and establish that the bank is chiefly compensated by specified fees for each individual trust account, an approach the banking regulators deemed “unworkable” given the multi-faceted trust services banks perform and their multi-party trust relationships. Similarly, the SEC’s treatment of the GLB exemption for bank custodial services is contrary to the Act because it excludes ordertaking activities that are part of customary bank activities. In addition, the banking regulators argued that the rules contradict GLB’s networking exemption because they create new limits on referral fees not found in the statute.
In a detailed appendix attached to the letter, federal banking regulators emphasized that it is the SEC’s significant interference with traditional bank trust and fiduciary activities that most concerns them. Gramm-Leach-Bliley provides that the trust and fiduciary exception from SEC registration is available for securities transactions that a bank effects in a trustee or fiduciary capacity. The banking agencies cited a provision from the GLB conference report indicating that Congress expects that the SEC will not disturb traditional bank trust activities
But the SEC rules fail to recognize the fundamental reality of the trust business, in the view of the regulators, and their implementation would ultimately force trust activities out of banks. Very problematic, for example, is the SEC’s assertion that there is uncertainty over whether banks acting as trustees for ERISA plans or IRAs are trustees eligible for the GLB exception. According to the banking agencies, the SEC’s position “casts a cloud” over a wide range of trust relationships that banks have historically offered their customers. The banking regulators see no ambiguity in GLB’s trustee exception and believe it encompasses all relationships in which a bank acts as a trustee under applicable law. The SEC also heard objections that it is unfair to expect banks to comply with the initial SEC rules, since banks would then have to alter their actions in response to any future amending done by the SEC.
SEC RESPONDS
In the face of such objection, the SEC responded in a July 18 order stating its intent to amend the rules, emphasizing that, as such, banks are not expected to develop compliance systems until the amendments are made. The SEC order also extended until May 12, 2002, the compliance dates for banks with respect to the interim final rules. A notice extending the comment period on the interim final rules until September 4, 2001, was simultaneously issued.
According to the SEC, the extension will provide time to explore with banks possible means of reducing compliance costs. The extension also will allow the SEC time to amend its rules while providing banks additional time to seek compliance advice regarding issues under the GLB Act and to explore forming relationships with broker-dealers if necessary.
By Peter E. Feltman, M.A., CCH Washington News Bureau, contributing author, CCH FOCUS and James Hamilton, J.D., LL.M., Senior Writer Analyst, CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter; Co-Author, CCH Federal Privacy Rules for Financial Institutions and Financial Services Modernization - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 - Law and Explanation; contributing author, CCH FOCUS.
he Securities and Exchange Commission moved on July 18, 2001, to postpone enactment of controversial bank broker/dealer rules in the face of criticism from banks, Congress and the federal banking regulators. The top republican on the Senate Banking Committee, Phil Gramm, responded to the SEC’s action by writing to Acting Chair Laura S. Unger to say “I wish to applaud the action of the Securities and Exchange Commission today....” The move was also welcomed by the House Financial Services Committee, which stated that it “helps alleviate some of our concern.”
In May 2001, the SEC issued interim final rules implementing sections 201 and 202 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed a full exception that had allowed banks to engage in securities activities without registering as a broker or dealer and replaced it with new functional exceptions. The SEC interim final rules define terms in the statutory exceptions and grant banks additional exemptions from broker-dealer registration. In response to these rules, banks commented that the SEC requirements would be too cumbersome, and bank regulators questioned the process of implementing interim final rules instead of making a proposal. Based on the adverse response, the SEC has ordered an extension of compliance and comment dates and has committed to work with the banking industry to amend the rules.
CONCERNS
In a letter to the SEC, the federal banking regulators maintained that the SEC rules are contrary to the express provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act bank exemptions. This view was echoed by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley, who expressed both process and substantive concerns regarding the SEC’s rules. “The SEC has overstepped normal regulatory bounds here,” Oxley said. “It’s a salvo in the regulatory turf battle that violates the letter and spirit of what was carefully crafted in Gramm-Leach-Bliley.” The rules are viewed as creating a costly and ultimately unworkable regime that negates the underlying statutory exemptions and congressional intent. Even more, contended the Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the approach embodied in the interim rules is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the bedrock GLB principle of functional regulation.
Specifically, the banking regulators said that implementation of the rules could drive banks out of traditional trust relationships with their customers. The rules require banks to conduct an account-by-account review and establish that the bank is chiefly compensated by specified fees for each individual trust account, an approach the banking regulators deemed “unworkable” given the multi-faceted trust services banks perform and their multi-party trust relationships. Similarly, the SEC’s treatment of the GLB exemption for bank custodial services is contrary to the Act because it excludes ordertaking activities that are part of customary bank activities. In addition, the banking regulators argued that the rules contradict GLB’s networking exemption because they create new limits on referral fees not found in the statute.
In a detailed appendix attached to the letter, federal banking regulators emphasized that it is the SEC’s significant interference with traditional bank trust and fiduciary activities that most concerns them. Gramm-Leach-Bliley provides that the trust and fiduciary exception from SEC registration is available for securities transactions that a bank effects in a trustee or fiduciary capacity. The banking agencies cited a provision from the GLB conference report indicating that Congress expects that the SEC will not disturb traditional bank trust activities
But the SEC rules fail to recognize the fundamental reality of the trust business, in the view of the regulators, and their implementation would ultimately force trust activities out of banks. Very problematic, for example, is the SEC’s assertion that there is uncertainty over whether banks acting as trustees for ERISA plans or IRAs are trustees eligible for the GLB exception. According to the banking agencies, the SEC’s position “casts a cloud” over a wide range of trust relationships that banks have historically offered their customers. The banking regulators see no ambiguity in GLB’s trustee exception and believe it encompasses all relationships in which a bank acts as a trustee under applicable law. The SEC also heard objections that it is unfair to expect banks to comply with the initial SEC rules, since banks would then have to alter their actions in response to any future amending done by the SEC.
SEC RESPONDS
In the face of such objection, the SEC responded in a July 18 order stating its intent to amend the rules, emphasizing that, as such, banks are not expected to develop compliance systems until the amendments are made. The SEC order also extended until May 12, 2002, the compliance dates for banks with respect to the interim final rules. A notice extending the comment period on the interim final rules until September 4, 2001, was simultaneously issued.
According to the SEC, the extension will provide time to explore with banks possible means of reducing compliance costs. The extension also will allow the SEC time to amend its rules while providing banks additional time to seek compliance advice regarding issues under the GLB Act and to explore forming relationships with broker-dealers if necessary.
evince
Truthmatters
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/01/bush-administration-weake_n_147311.html
Bush Administration Weakened Lending Rules Before Crash
AP | By MATT APUZZO
Posted: 01/01/2009 5:12 am EST Updated: 05/25/2011 12:55 pm EDT
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration backed off proposed crackdowns on no-money-down, interest-only mortgages years before the economy collapsed, buckling to pressure from some of the same banks that have now failed. It ignored remarkably prescient warnings that foretold the financial meltdown, according to an Associated Press review of regulatory documents.
"Expect fallout, expect foreclosures, expect horror stories," California mortgage lender Paris Welch wrote to U.S. regulators in January 2006, about one year before the housing implosion cost her a job.
Bowing to aggressive lobbying _ along with assurances from banks that the troubled mortgages were OK _ regulators delayed action for nearly one year. By the time new rules were released late in 2006, the toughest of the proposed provisions were gone and the meltdown was under way.
"These mortgages have been considered more safe and sound for portfolio lenders than many fixed rate mortgages," David Schneider, home loan president of Washington Mutual, told federal regulators in early 2006. Two years later, WaMu became the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
The administration's blind eye to the impending crisis is emblematic of a philosophy that trusted market forces and discounted the need for government intervention in the economy. Its belief ironically has ushered in the most massive government intervention since the 1930s.
"We're going to be feeling the effects of the regulators' failure to address these mortgages for the next several years," said Kevin Stein of the California Reinvestment Coalition, who warned regulators to tighten lending rules before it was too late.
Many of the banks that fought to undermine the proposals by some regulators are now either out of business or accepting billions in federal aid to recover from a mortgage crisis they insisted would never come. Many executives remain in high-paying jobs, even after their assurances were proved false.
In 2005, faced with ominous signs the housing market was in jeopardy, bank regulators proposed new guidelines for banks writing risky loans. Today, in the midst of the worst housing recession in a generation, the proposal reads like a list of what-ifs:
_Regulators told bankers exotic mortgages were often inappropriate for buyers with bad credit.
_Banks would have been required to increase efforts to verify that buyers actually had jobs and could afford houses.
_Regulators proposed a cap on risky mortgages so a string of defaults wouldn't be crippling.
_Banks that bundled and sold mortgages were told to be sure investors knew exactly what they were buying.
_Regulators urged banks to help buyers make responsible decisions and clearly advise them that interest rates might skyrocket and huge payments might be due sooner than expected.
Those proposals all were stripped from the final rules. None required congressional approval or the president's signature.
"In hindsight, it was spot on," said Jeffrey Brown, a former top official at the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, one of the first agencies to raise concerns about risky lending.
Federal regulators were especially concerned about mortgages known as "option ARMs," which allow borrowers to make payments so low that mortgage debt actually increases every month. But banking executives accused the government of overreacting.
Bankers said such loans might be risky when approved with no money down or without ensuring buyers have jobs but such risk could be managed without government intervention.
"An open market will mean that different institutions will develop different methodologies for achieving this goal," Joseph Polizzotto, counsel to now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers, told U.S. regulators in a March 2006.
Countrywide Financial Corp., at the time the nation's largest mortgage lender, agreed. The proposal "appears excessive and will inhibit future innovation in the marketplace," said Mary Jane Seebach, managing director of public affairs.
One of the most contested rules said that before banks purchase mortgages from brokers, they should verify the process to ensure buyers could afford their homes. Some bankers now blame much of the housing crisis on brokers who wrote fraudulent, predatory loans. But in 2006, banks said they shouldn't have to double-check the brokers.
"It is not our role to be the regulator for the third-party lenders," wrote Ruthann Melbourne, chief risk officer of IndyMac Bank.
California-based IndyMac also criticized regulators for not recognizing the track record of interest-only loans and option ARMs, which accounted for 70 percent of IndyMac's 2005 mortgage portfolio. This summer, the government seized IndyMac and will pay an estimated $9 billion to ensure customers don't lose their deposits.
Last week, Downey Savings joined the growing list of failed banks. The problem: About 52 percent of its mortgage portfolio was tied up in risky option ARMs, which in 2006 Downey insisted were safe _ maybe even safer than traditional 30-year mortgages.
"To conclude that 'nontraditional' equates to higher risk does not appropriately balance risk and compensating factors of these products," said Lillian Gavin, the bank's chief credit officer.
At least some regulators didn't buy it. The comptroller of the currency, John C. Dugan, was among the first to sound the alarm in mid-2005. Speaking to a consumer advocacy group, Dugan painted a troublesome picture of option-ARM lending. Many buyers, particularly those with bad credit, would soon be unable to afford their payments, he said. And if housing prices declined, homeowners wouldn't even be able to sell their way out of the mess.
It sounded simple, but "people kind of looked at us regulators as old-fashioned," said Brown, the agency's former deputy comptroller.
Diane Casey-Landry, of the American Bankers Association, said the industry feared a two-tiered system in which banks had to follow rules that mortgage brokers did not. She said opposition was based on the banks' best information.
"You're looking at a decline in real estate values that was never contemplated," she said.
Some saw problems coming. Community groups and even some in the mortgage business, like Welch, warned regulators not to ease their rules.
"We expect to see a huge increase in defaults, delinquencies and foreclosures as a result of the over selling of these products," Stein, the associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, wrote to regulators in 2006. The group advocates on housing and banking issues for low-income and minority residents.
The government's banking agencies spent nearly a year debating the rules, which required unanimous agreement among the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision _ agencies that sometimes don't agree.
The Fed, for instance, was reluctant under Alan Greenspan to heavily regulate lending. Similarly, the Office of Thrift Supervision, an arm of the Treasury Department that regulated many in the subprime mortgage market, worried that restricting certain mortgages would hurt banks and consumers.
Grovetta Gardineer, OTS managing director for corporate and international activities, said the 2005 proposal "attempted to send an alarm bell that these products are bad." After hearing from banks, she said, regulators were persuaded that the loans themselves were not problematic as long as banks managed the risk. She disputes the notion that the rules were weakened.
Marc Savitt, president of the National Association of Mortgage Brokers, said regulators were afraid of stopping a good thing.
"If it seems to be working, if it's not broken don't fix it, if everybody's making money, then the good times are rolling and nobody wants to be the one guy to put the brakes on," he said.
In the past year, with Congress scrambling to stanch the bleeding in the financial industry, regulators have tightened rules on risky mortgages.
Congress is considering further tightening, including some of the same proposals abandoned years ago.
Bush Administration Weakened Lending Rules Before Crash
AP | By MATT APUZZO
Posted: 01/01/2009 5:12 am EST Updated: 05/25/2011 12:55 pm EDT
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration backed off proposed crackdowns on no-money-down, interest-only mortgages years before the economy collapsed, buckling to pressure from some of the same banks that have now failed. It ignored remarkably prescient warnings that foretold the financial meltdown, according to an Associated Press review of regulatory documents.
"Expect fallout, expect foreclosures, expect horror stories," California mortgage lender Paris Welch wrote to U.S. regulators in January 2006, about one year before the housing implosion cost her a job.
Bowing to aggressive lobbying _ along with assurances from banks that the troubled mortgages were OK _ regulators delayed action for nearly one year. By the time new rules were released late in 2006, the toughest of the proposed provisions were gone and the meltdown was under way.
"These mortgages have been considered more safe and sound for portfolio lenders than many fixed rate mortgages," David Schneider, home loan president of Washington Mutual, told federal regulators in early 2006. Two years later, WaMu became the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
The administration's blind eye to the impending crisis is emblematic of a philosophy that trusted market forces and discounted the need for government intervention in the economy. Its belief ironically has ushered in the most massive government intervention since the 1930s.
"We're going to be feeling the effects of the regulators' failure to address these mortgages for the next several years," said Kevin Stein of the California Reinvestment Coalition, who warned regulators to tighten lending rules before it was too late.
Many of the banks that fought to undermine the proposals by some regulators are now either out of business or accepting billions in federal aid to recover from a mortgage crisis they insisted would never come. Many executives remain in high-paying jobs, even after their assurances were proved false.
In 2005, faced with ominous signs the housing market was in jeopardy, bank regulators proposed new guidelines for banks writing risky loans. Today, in the midst of the worst housing recession in a generation, the proposal reads like a list of what-ifs:
_Regulators told bankers exotic mortgages were often inappropriate for buyers with bad credit.
_Banks would have been required to increase efforts to verify that buyers actually had jobs and could afford houses.
_Regulators proposed a cap on risky mortgages so a string of defaults wouldn't be crippling.
_Banks that bundled and sold mortgages were told to be sure investors knew exactly what they were buying.
_Regulators urged banks to help buyers make responsible decisions and clearly advise them that interest rates might skyrocket and huge payments might be due sooner than expected.
Those proposals all were stripped from the final rules. None required congressional approval or the president's signature.
"In hindsight, it was spot on," said Jeffrey Brown, a former top official at the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, one of the first agencies to raise concerns about risky lending.
Federal regulators were especially concerned about mortgages known as "option ARMs," which allow borrowers to make payments so low that mortgage debt actually increases every month. But banking executives accused the government of overreacting.
Bankers said such loans might be risky when approved with no money down or without ensuring buyers have jobs but such risk could be managed without government intervention.
"An open market will mean that different institutions will develop different methodologies for achieving this goal," Joseph Polizzotto, counsel to now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers, told U.S. regulators in a March 2006.
Countrywide Financial Corp., at the time the nation's largest mortgage lender, agreed. The proposal "appears excessive and will inhibit future innovation in the marketplace," said Mary Jane Seebach, managing director of public affairs.
One of the most contested rules said that before banks purchase mortgages from brokers, they should verify the process to ensure buyers could afford their homes. Some bankers now blame much of the housing crisis on brokers who wrote fraudulent, predatory loans. But in 2006, banks said they shouldn't have to double-check the brokers.
"It is not our role to be the regulator for the third-party lenders," wrote Ruthann Melbourne, chief risk officer of IndyMac Bank.
California-based IndyMac also criticized regulators for not recognizing the track record of interest-only loans and option ARMs, which accounted for 70 percent of IndyMac's 2005 mortgage portfolio. This summer, the government seized IndyMac and will pay an estimated $9 billion to ensure customers don't lose their deposits.
Last week, Downey Savings joined the growing list of failed banks. The problem: About 52 percent of its mortgage portfolio was tied up in risky option ARMs, which in 2006 Downey insisted were safe _ maybe even safer than traditional 30-year mortgages.
"To conclude that 'nontraditional' equates to higher risk does not appropriately balance risk and compensating factors of these products," said Lillian Gavin, the bank's chief credit officer.
At least some regulators didn't buy it. The comptroller of the currency, John C. Dugan, was among the first to sound the alarm in mid-2005. Speaking to a consumer advocacy group, Dugan painted a troublesome picture of option-ARM lending. Many buyers, particularly those with bad credit, would soon be unable to afford their payments, he said. And if housing prices declined, homeowners wouldn't even be able to sell their way out of the mess.
It sounded simple, but "people kind of looked at us regulators as old-fashioned," said Brown, the agency's former deputy comptroller.
Diane Casey-Landry, of the American Bankers Association, said the industry feared a two-tiered system in which banks had to follow rules that mortgage brokers did not. She said opposition was based on the banks' best information.
"You're looking at a decline in real estate values that was never contemplated," she said.
Some saw problems coming. Community groups and even some in the mortgage business, like Welch, warned regulators not to ease their rules.
"We expect to see a huge increase in defaults, delinquencies and foreclosures as a result of the over selling of these products," Stein, the associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, wrote to regulators in 2006. The group advocates on housing and banking issues for low-income and minority residents.
The government's banking agencies spent nearly a year debating the rules, which required unanimous agreement among the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision _ agencies that sometimes don't agree.
The Fed, for instance, was reluctant under Alan Greenspan to heavily regulate lending. Similarly, the Office of Thrift Supervision, an arm of the Treasury Department that regulated many in the subprime mortgage market, worried that restricting certain mortgages would hurt banks and consumers.
Grovetta Gardineer, OTS managing director for corporate and international activities, said the 2005 proposal "attempted to send an alarm bell that these products are bad." After hearing from banks, she said, regulators were persuaded that the loans themselves were not problematic as long as banks managed the risk. She disputes the notion that the rules were weakened.
Marc Savitt, president of the National Association of Mortgage Brokers, said regulators were afraid of stopping a good thing.
"If it seems to be working, if it's not broken don't fix it, if everybody's making money, then the good times are rolling and nobody wants to be the one guy to put the brakes on," he said.
In the past year, with Congress scrambling to stanch the bleeding in the financial industry, regulators have tightened rules on risky mortgages.
Congress is considering further tightening, including some of the same proposals abandoned years ago.
evince
Truthmatters
http://www.howtotradestocks.org/the-collapse-of-the-housing-market-and-the-2008-stock-market-crash/
What Caused The 2008 Stock Market Crash?
When examining the causes of the 2008 market crash it is important to see how each component played its unique role in the disaster, and how the fall of the few can cause the suffering of many.
While there has been much finger pointing and speculating in the aftermath of the crisis, the crash served to shine a bright light onto the house of cards that was the housing bubble, and should be a warning to investors to be educated and skeptical in any type of market.
In the Levin-Coburn Report issued by the US Senate after the crash, it was
Others have countered with the argument that the crash was the result of inaccurately priced risk concerning mortgage-related financial products, and a failure on the part of governments to amend their regulatory practices for financial markets in the 21st century.
The first domino to fall in the 2008 stock market crash was the collapse of the US housing bubble, which came to a head in 2005-2006. With default rates already rising on adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and “subprime” loans, and an increase in interest rates in mid 2007, the US housing market saw a decrease in home prices and a snowball effect in foreclosures.
concluded that the crisis was the result of extremely high risk, complicated financial instruments, failure to disclose conflicts of interest, and the lack of regulation in the market itself.
What Caused The 2008 Stock Market Crash?
When examining the causes of the 2008 market crash it is important to see how each component played its unique role in the disaster, and how the fall of the few can cause the suffering of many.
While there has been much finger pointing and speculating in the aftermath of the crisis, the crash served to shine a bright light onto the house of cards that was the housing bubble, and should be a warning to investors to be educated and skeptical in any type of market.
In the Levin-Coburn Report issued by the US Senate after the crash, it was
Others have countered with the argument that the crash was the result of inaccurately priced risk concerning mortgage-related financial products, and a failure on the part of governments to amend their regulatory practices for financial markets in the 21st century.
The first domino to fall in the 2008 stock market crash was the collapse of the US housing bubble, which came to a head in 2005-2006. With default rates already rising on adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and “subprime” loans, and an increase in interest rates in mid 2007, the US housing market saw a decrease in home prices and a snowball effect in foreclosures.
concluded that the crisis was the result of extremely high risk, complicated financial instruments, failure to disclose conflicts of interest, and the lack of regulation in the market itself.
You're the Republican, so you explain why you want more predatory lending. What's up with that?
evince
Truthmatters
dear fucking oblivious idiot,
your fucks did no implement the entire GLBbill as written and signed into law.
That is the whole subject asshole
Cancel 2016.2
The Almighty
AGAIN you retard... WHICH rule do you think would have prevented the crash. State the SPECIFIC rule... then explain WHY YOU think it would have stopped it. You always just state the same thing you did above, but you ALWAYS RUN AWAY FROM ANSWERING SPECIFICALLY
Cancel 2016.2
The Almighty
I never said anything like that you fucking moron. I ASKED YOU to explain which of the rules would have prevented the crisis. AS ALWAYS... YOU REFUSE TO ANSWER.
Why do you keep running away from it desh? You claim you have the FACTS... then point out which fucking rule would have prevented the crisis... and explain WHY you think that.
Republicans make me crazy, you're so nuts. And you're a bunch of racists, you want to stop black people from voting
evince
Truthmatters
go get all my old threads on It super to prove your meaningless claim .
why do you constantly defend what Bush did to our economy in the name of deregulation ?
your fucking economic ideas are fucking trash
they FAIL whenever implemented
you assholes on the right always lie and pretend they didn't fail.
you live on a mountain built on decaes of republican lies
canceled.2021.1
#AMERICAISDEAD
Maybe you should get them. Dig up about 100 and post them in Current Events. I double dog dare ya