They dont have any interest in occupying the non russian parts of Ukraine.....they are doing everything possible to avoid doing it, but so far they dying West keeps insisting.
The Darkness Ahead: Where The Ukraine War Is Headed | John Mearsheimer
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They dont have any interest in occupying the non russian parts of Ukraine.....they are doing everything possible to avoid doing it, but so far they dying West keeps insisting.
That's exactly the type of thing I was referring to. I'd forgotten its name, but yes, Transnitria is essentially another exclave of Russia that Russia will certainly defend if it's territorial integrity is breached. Moldova was apparently doing just that last year, and Russia made it clear that Moldova would have a lot more to worry about than Transnitrian anger if they did so. Here's a Reuters article that gets into what Russia was concerned about:
Russia warns Moldova not to threaten its troops in breakaway region | Reuters
I'm not Cypress, but I'll take it as if you were asking this of anyone here. I certainly don't consider myself to be God. I'm a Pantheist, so I consider God to be everything, which would be the universe/multiverse/anything else out there.
I don't believe that means I or anyone else can't have morals though. As I mentioned to you previously, I believe in the line "We do not inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children". I see from your post #20 that you don't for some reason, that you believe that we "exist like any other species". I don't see how your statement and mine have to contradict each other. Yes, we certainly exist like any other species, but like any other species, we can only survive if we respect the fact that if we trash our world sufficiently, our species will die barring relocation to another planet capable of supporting us.
I realize this may seem to have gotten a little off the main subject, which to me was whether or not it's ok to displace people based on whether one has the capability to do so. To me, they're kind of 2 sides of the same coin though. Whether it's displacing humans or other living species, the bottom line is that disruptions of this nature tend to cause problems for everyone. Take the war in Ukraine- not only is it greatly disrupting the lives of humans there, it's disrupting the lives of pretty much every living thing there, and having global effects for humans as well. Can we agree that things would have been much better if the west, led by the U.S., had taken Russia's security concerns more seriously prior to Russia's military intervention there?
Agreed. If Ukraine were to start making overtures to Russia that they'd be interested in a ceasefire, I can easily imagine that Russia would be open to it and I think that this in turn could lead to Russia not wanting to take any more Ukrainian land. Russia basically went into a fairly defensive position a while ago. This may be in part because Ukraine had been talking about a counter offensive for quite some time. But I suspect the larger reason is that Russia has essentially gotten most of the territory that it wanted- that is, the territory that has the most ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. From what I've read, they didn't even want Bakhmut that much. If it wasn't for Prigozhin disobeying orders and fighting offensively there, Ukraine might still have it.
Tranquillus in Exile
New member
If you believe that, I have to say you are mistaken.
Around 25% of Latvia’s population are “ethnic Russians” - about the same as Ukraine and far more than Georgia.
No doubt Putin could get some of those people to say they were being persecuted, that Latvia is run by nazis, etc. But he shows no sign of launching a “special military operation” against Latvia.
There is one important difference between Ukraine and the Baltic states. Look up a list of NATO members.
There's another difference that I see you're ignoring completely. That being that Latvia hasn't been in a civil war with a region in its territory that is predominantly ethnic Russian for the past 8 years. I just finished reading an article from rt.com today, detailing the types of things the Ukrainians have been doing in Lugansk People's Republic over the last 8 years. The article was written by Angelina Latypova, an independent Russian journalist. An excerpt from the article:
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Lugansk
My journey through Donbass started in Lugansk – the city where time froze nine years ago. Unlike in Donetsk, things are peaceful around here. For the residents of Lugansk, the worst is over. Only dull artillery volleys occasionally sound from afar.
Locals still remember the blockade of the city, which occurred in the summer of 2014, with a shudder. Many talk about a “wandering” mortar gun that moved around the city during curfew hours and “terrified” local residents. As it turned out, the mortar was hidden in a garbage truck.
During Ukraine’s airstrikes on Lugansk in 2014, many people hid inside School No. 7. But after an attack on the school by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the building caught fire. By that time, Lugansk was under blockade and there was no water in the city, so the fire could not be extinguished. The school had been in operation since 1927. As a result of the strike five people died, including a child.
[snip]
Last year, Ksenia's son Rostislav died in Popasnaya. He was a citizen of the LPR and like his mother was born locally. When mobilization was announced, he volunteered to help his friends who had been fighting here since 2014.
On March 12, Ksenia was told that Rostislav had died. At first, she thought it was a mistake and went looking for her son in local hospitals. Eventually, however, the horrific news was confirmed.
After the tragedy, Ksenia joined the Food of Life Foundation and went to help the residents in the settlement of Trekhizbenka in the LPR, where she was shocked to see the inhumane conditions the locals were left in after the retreat of the Ukrainian army.
“The Ukrainians deliberately destroy infrastructure so the people and territories we get are in awful condition. People didn’t have anything necessary for normal life, they came up to me crying and said, ‘We don’t have anything’. I couldn't stay indifferent and started helping.”
[snip]
People like Nikolay were called “terrorists” and “separatists” by the Ukrainian authorities. Nikolay himself says that he went to fight for the sake of his children.
“I went to fight because I didn’t want my children to be taught the nonsense that children in Ukraine are now being taught. [I wanted] them to know that my grandfathers and great-grandfathers captured Berlin, they didn’t sit in the Transcarpathian woods and fight the Muscovites. I stood up against that.”
Following the Minsk I Agreement, the situation in the region didn’t change much – the Ukrainian side mostly didn’t observe the truce. Minsk II didn’t help much either. Nikolay says that the LPR had been expecting Russia’s help for a long time. Based on the Ukrainian army’s preparations, they knew that the forces of their own militia could not handle it.
“Now, people don’t just have hope, they are confident that we will not be abandoned. The status of the fighting has changed, and our status has changed – we are [part of] Russia, we are no longer called ‘self-proclaimed’, we have been recognized, we have been accepted.”
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Source:
“People came up to me crying and said, ‘we have nothing’”: LPR residents on the horrors of wartime | rt.com
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anonymoose
Classical Liberal
And there you go again.
First you claim you’ve never seen Russia have any interest in occupying any other nation. I post a link showing Putin doesn’t
recognize the sovereignty of a sovereign country.
Then you defend Russia’s threat to that country.
As much as you hate the West, NATO, and especially the U.S., at least you can admit we behave more admirably than Russia.
Have you seen any American policy saying we don’t recognize Cuba’s sovereignty if they threaten Guantanamo?
Did we go to war against France when DeGaulle kicked American troops out of France in 1966?
That's what I said in my -first- sentence back in post #17, but it seems you didn't get to the second or the third one. It's up above in the nested quotes, but to make it easier:
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The only possible exception might be if other nations were to give Russia grief in regards to one of its exclaves, such as Kaliningrad. Things have been quiet on those fronts recently as far as I know.
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All this talk of sovereignty, I decided to take a look at its definitions. Here's the non obsolete ones, courtesy of Merriam Webster:
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1a: supreme power especially over a body politic
b: freedom from external control : AUTONOMY
c: controlling influence
2: one that is sovereign
especially : an autonomous state
**
So, as to "recognizing the sovereignty of a sovereign state", the very first question you should be asking is, who determines the borders of a sovereign state? Russia decided to recognize the Donbass Republics as sovereign states and called upon its right to protect them from genocide by the Ukrainian army. By that metric, Russia came to the Donbass Republics' defense from a foreign aggressor, in this case, Ukraine. Soon afterwards, Ukraine had been given a choice to essentially recognize the Donbass Republics as sovereign or at least fairly independent, but they choose not to. The rest, as they say, is history.
I'm simply pointing out that it appears that Russia considers the breakaway state of Transnitria to be a sovereign state. Surely you wouldn't want Moldova to be threatening the Russian peacekeepers stationed there now, would you? And surely you understand that if Moldova were to harm them, Russia might well retaliate in kind? Think of Hawaii. If, say, Hawaii were attacked by, say Japan, you don't honestly think that the U.S. would sit idly by now, would you?
First of all, I have never said that I hate any of the entities you mention, though I'm certainly not fond of NATO. Secondly, I think it would be good to elaborate here that, generally speaking, when I refer to the "West", I mean the powers that run the various nations in western European countries as well as North America. That's much different than the people therein. I have friends and family who live in the west, not to mention a fair amount of people that I know of that I greatly admire, from movie stars to authors and even some politicians like RFK Jr. Thirdly, I'm not sure what you're referring to when you say that I have admitted that they behave more admirably than Russia.
Are you saying that the U.S. would let Cuba retake Guantanamo if it chose to try?
Not that I know of. What's your point?
Tranquillus in Exile
New member
Which of Junior’s views do you admire most?
- Mass shootings are linked to antidepressants like Prozac.
- The CIA was involved in assassinating President Kennedy.
- RFK Sr. wasn’t assassinated by Sirhan Sirhan.
- Covid-19 was clearly a bioweapon.
- Fauci and Gates exaggerated the pandemic to promote vaccines.
- Vaccines can cause autism.
- Other.
I'm not sure I'd call it a view, but I think I like the fact that he's generally been willing to admit that he can be wrong. I remember him saying that in relation to whether or not biological viruses exist. He believes that they are, but he's willing to admit he might be wrong on that.
As to the views you listed above, in order:
I suspect he's right on the Prozac one, the CIA one, I'm almost certain he's right on the Sirhan not being his father's killer.
I don't believe Covid-19 is a bioweapon, because I don't believe that it's caused by a biological virus at all. For the Fauci and Gates one, I guess I kinda of agree with that one, with the truth being that the "pandemic" wasn't caused by a virus at all, but instead caused by a massive PCR testing campaign. Clearly some people are dying, and dying of something novel, as noted by Dr. Kyle Sidell, but I think that's more easily explained by the introduction at around the same time by 5G technology. And I definitely agree with him that vaccines can cause autism.
ukraine has only Ukraine parts. Russia wants the land, all of it. Wars are about money and power.
Ukraine still has most if not all of Western Ukraine. Russia's stated goal from the first was to protect its national security and to help the people of the Donbass region.
John Mearsheimer's elaborates on what he believes are Russia's current goals:
**
Rhetoric about de-Nazifying and demilitarizing Ukraine aside, Russia’s concrete goals involve conquering and annexing a large portion of Ukrainian territory, while simultaneously turning Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state. As such, Ukraine’s ability to wage war against Russia would be greatly reduced and it would be unlikely to qualify for membership in either the EU or NATO. Moreover, a broken Ukraine, would be especially vulnerable to Russian interference in its domestic politics. In short, Ukraine would not be a Western bastion on Russia’s border.
What would that dysfunctional rump state look like? Moscow has officially annexed Crimea and four other Ukrainian oblasts – Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporozhe – which together represent about 23 percent of Ukraine’s total territory before the crisis broke out in February 2014. Russian leaders have emphasized that they have no intention of surrendering that territory, some of which Russia does not yet control. In fact, there is reason to think Russia will annex additional Ukrainian territory if it has the military capability to do so at a reasonable cost. It is difficult, however, to say how much additional Ukrainian territory Moscow will seek to annex, as Putin himself makes clear.8
Russian thinking is likely to be influenced by three calculations. Moscow has a powerful incentive to conquer and permanently annex Ukrainian territory that is heavily populated with ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. It will want to protect them from the Ukrainian government – which has become hostile to all things Russian – and make sure there is no civil war anywhere in Ukraine like the one that took place in the Donbass between February 2014 and February 2022. At the same time, Russia will want to avoid controlling territory largely populated by hostile ethnic Ukrainians, which places significant limits on further Russian expansion. Finally, turning Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state will require Moscow to take substantial amounts of Ukrainian territory so it is well-positioned to do significant damage to its economy. Controlling all of Ukraine’s coastline along the Black Sea, for example, would give Moscow significant economic leverage over Kyiv.
Those three calculations suggest that Russia is likely to attempt to annex the four oblasts – Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odessa – that are immediately to the west of the four oblasts it has already annexed – Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporozhe. If that were to happen, Russia would control approximately 43 percent of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory.9 Dmitri Trenin, a leading Russian strategist estimates that Russian leaders would seek to take even more Ukrainian territory – pushing westward in northern Ukraine to the Dnieper River and taking the part of Kyiv that sits on the east bank of that river. He writes that “A logical next step” after taking all of Ukraine from Kharkiv to Odessa “would be to expand Russian control to all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper River, including the part of Kyiv that lies on the that river’s eastern bank. If that were to happen, the Ukrainian state would shrink to include only the central and western regions of the country.”10
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Full article:
The Darkness Ahead: Where The Ukraine War Is Headed | mearsheimer.substack.com
anonymoose
Classical Liberal
America’s leading ‘realist’ keeps getting Russia wrong
John J. Mearsheimer, the University of Chicago’s realist foreign policy guru, published his latest analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian War on a historic day: June 23, when Russia was roiled by a failed putsch led by the Wagner Group’s Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Just as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fate, as well as that of his regime, hung in the balance, just as a successful coup could have altered the course of the war, led to civil bloodshed and the possible disintegration of the Russian Federation — all scenarios invoked by Putin in his address to the nation — Mearsheimer failed to give any attention whatsoever to Russia’s domestic politics, preferring to focus instead, as he always does, exclusively on the Russia state’s relations with Ukraine and the West.
This would be like ignoring domestic factors in the U.S. conduct of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan; French and British hopes for appeasement in 1938; the role of power struggles and ideology in the Soviet decisions to invade, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan — and, of course, Putin’s very personal decision to launch a poorly planned all-out attack on Ukraine in 2022.
Prigozhin’s march on Moscow, though unsuccessful, revealed to Russians and the world that the Russian state and regime are brittle, that Putin is increasingly vulnerable, and that the proximate and ultimate outcome of the war depends as much on what Russians do within their state as on what they do to Ukrainians with their state.
Mearsheimer’s oversight is no accident. Domestic factors are irrelevant to his theoretical model. That doesn’t mean that he has no insights to make that are worthy of attention; it does mean that his predictions and policy recommendations are so utterly divorced from anything resembling reality as to be wrong a priori.
Putin, for one, would agree. His fateful decision to invade Ukraine was based exclusively on Mearsheimerian balance of power calculations. Putin, like Mearsheimer, saw that Russia had a larger military, economy and population than Ukraine. Naturally, it would win, and quickly — a view that many policymakers and analysts inspired by Mearsheimer’s realism also shared. Had America’s Founding Fathers been realists of Mearsheimer’s ilk, they would never have dared to declare independence from the reigning global superpower in 1776.
Unsurprisingly, although Mearsheimer’s lengthy paper has 68 endnotes, not a single one references a Russian- or Ukrainian-language source. Given such limitations, Mearsheimer cannot access the views of real Russians or Ukrainians on the left, right, and center — who might have alerted him to the brittleness of the regime and the weakness of Putin — and must therefore rely on and take at face value the foreign-policy statements of Russian leaders and their propagandists.
There is, after all, no other way to buttress his claims about Russia’s supposed fear of NATO and the West. Russian- and Ukrainian-language sources, as well as Sovietologists and post-Sovietologists, might have reminded Mearsheimer that Russian leaders habitually engage in mendacity, a tradition that goes back at least as far as Vladimir Lenin, who promised to liberate non-Russians and instead imposed a colonial yoke on them.
Putin and his comrades see Nazis where there aren’t any: Ukraine. They see militarization where there isn’t any: ditto. They insisted in late 2021 and early 2022 that they would never, ever invade Ukraine — and then did. They deny, still, targeting Ukrainian civilian targets. They deny, still, having destroyed the Kakhovka dam. The list could go on ad infinitum.
And yet, bizarrely, when Russians say they fear Ukrainian membership in NATO and U.S. nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s eastern border, Mearsheimer believes them, when he should be asking himself whether such ostensible fears have any grounding in reality and what the real reasons might be.
I’ve made these points many times. For starters, absolutely no one, including the Russians and Ukrainians, expected Ukraine to become a NATO member for at least 20 years. And in 2014, the year the war actually began, there was no talk of Ukraine’s joining, by either the Ukrainians, the West or the Russians. Ukraine didn’t matter to the West’s perceptions of its security. In contrast, Ukraine mattered to Russian perceptions, not because of any actual military threat — Ukraine had some 6,000 battle-ready troops in 2014 — but because of the ideological threat the democratic Maidan Revolution posed to Putin’s claims to be a legitimate autocrat.
Obviously, official Russian statements would never admit to such an interpretation. Russian-language analysts, and their Ukrainian counterparts, could easily have briefed Mearsheimer and helped correct his myopia.
Mearsheimer notes in his analysis that, “I am attempting to predict the future, which is not easy to do, given that we live in an uncertain world. Thus, I am not arguing that I have the truth; in fact, some of my claims may be proved wrong.”
Indeed, he doesn’t, and indeed, they will.
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”