Mustafa Amin writes from Cairo: Well, it had to happen and it did: Mohamed Morsi, who represents the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), has won the run-off presidential election in Egypt, beating Ahmed Shafiq, who was the candidate of the old regime. Morsi has received 51.73 per cent of the vote. But he will only be an interim President, as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has already made it clear that after a new constitution is drafted new presidential election will take place. The temporary new head of state would not be influential. He won’t be able to nominate the Minister of Defence, of the Interior and have no say over the military budget. So does this mean that the Egyptian Spring is turning into an Egyptian Winter? SCAF is revealing itself to be politically very astute. It has easily outmanoeuvred the Muslim Brotherhood at every turn. The mystery of why the MB put up a candidate for President after claiming noisily that it would not has been solved: it knew two months ago that parliament would be dissolved. So it had to go for the high profile position of President. However, the MB has alienated secular, liberal and left-wing parties. It was arrogant and thought that it did not need to form a coalition or even negotiate with other parties. SCAF knows that the power struggle in Egypt is between the military and the MB. It judges that the moderate face, which the MB is turning to the people, is only tactical. Its long term goal is an Islamic republic with Sharia as the legal system.
MB has lost a lot of support. Last year it would have won a presidential election by a huge margin. Now, half the voters prefer the old order, represented by Shafiq. When SCAF dissolved parliament there were no huge demonstrations. MB has now declared that its supporters will occupy Tahrir Square until SCAF hands over power to a civilian government. This is mere rhetoric. SCAF would prefer MB supporters to foment violence so that they can be arrested. The military now have the power to arrest civilians and try them in military courts. If the MB does not put on a show of defiance, it will lose more and more support.
Egyptian politics is now dominated by three groups: SCAF, the MB and the secularists. The last group was most prominent during the early post-Mubarak days. They stand to gain more influence as the MB loses momentum. SCAF and the secularists share a common aim: preventing the MB introducing an Islamic republic. SCAF will have a major say in the drafting of the new constitution. Its main aim will be to ensure that the MB cannot seize power through the ballot box. The ideal constitution, from the point of view of SCAF, would be to have a government that would be only responsible for the economy, education, culture, social welfare and so on. Defence, international security, the police and foreign affairs would fall within the remit of the military. The military already control about 40 per cent of the economy. So it would become a state within a state. The MB, almost certainly, would play a prominent role in government. The beauty of this situation for the military is that the Brotherhood would be blamed for all the shortcomings of the economy. Public discontent at the level of poverty and lack of job opportunities would be directed at the MB. When public order breaks down, the military would step in and restore order.
Hence Egypt is heading for dual power: the military in the background and the MB in the foreground. Not exactly what the revolutionaries on Tahrir Square hoped for.
