YOU HEARD THE MAN, GENERAL. DO AS HE COMMANDS
Deference to senior command is a hard-wired tradition in elite military organizations, and nowhere was that tradition more honored than in the U.S. Marine Corps.
But what happens if a policy coming from the top of the chain of command is insufficiently tested or intrinsically flawed?
Where is it written that a subordinate can set aside deference and demand a second look?
For more than two years many of the Marine Corps’ finest have struggled with this dilemma as they quietly discussed a series of fundamental changes ordered, and in some cases already implemented, by Gen. David "Ham" Berger, the current commandant.
Among Marines there are serious questions about the wisdom and long-term risk of dramatic reductions in force structure, weapon systems and manpower levels in units that would take steady casualties in most combat scenarios.
And it is unclear to just about everyone with experience in military planning what formal review and coordination was required before "Ham" Berger unilaterally announced a policy that would alter so many time-honored contributions of the Marine Corps.
The unique and irreplaceable mission of the Marine Corps is to provide a homogeneous, all-encompassing “force in readiness” that can go anywhere and fight anyone on any level short of nuclear war.
The corps has fought many political battles to preserve that mission but never from within—until now.
Among other decisions, "Ham" Berger’s “Force Structure 2030” plan includes these provisions:
Elimination of three infantry battalions from the current 24, a 14% reduction in frontline combat strength.
• Reduction of each remaining battalion by 200 Marines, taking an additional 4,200 infantry Marines from the frontline combat capabilities.
• Elimination of two reserve-component infantry battalions of the present eight, a 25% reduction of combat strength.
• Elimination of 16 cannon artillery battalions, a 76% reduction, to be replaced by 14 rocket artillery battalions, for use in “successful naval campaigns.”
• Elimination of all the tanks in the Marine Corps, even from the reserves.
• Elimination of three of the current 17 medium tilt-rotor squadrons, three of the eight heavy-lift helicopter squadrons, and “at least” two of the seven light attack helicopter squadrons, which were termed “unsuitable for maritime challenges.”
https://www.wsj.com/articles/momentous-changes-in-the-marine-corps-deserve-debate-reduction-david-berger-general-11648217667


