After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Geneva Accords split Vietnam into North (communist) and South (anti-communist). Eisenhower rejected the accords’ call for nationwide elections in 1956, fearing a Ho Chi Minh victory, and instead backed Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime in South Vietnam.
He sent military advisors—starting with a few hundred by the end of his term in 1961—to train South Vietnams' army (ARVN). This was a limited commitment: no combat troops, just support. The escalation into full-scale war came later, under Kennedy and Johnson. So, Eisenhower didn’t "get us in" militarily, but his policies—aid, advisors, and propping up Diem—set the stage.
@Grok
Eisenhower did not start the Vietnam war. LEFTISTS did.
LBJ’s escalation began in earnest in 1965 after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964), which gave him broad authority to ramp up U.S. involvement. Operation Rolling Thunder, a massive bombing campaign, started in March 1965, and U.S. troop levels jumped from about 23,000 advisors in 1964 to 184,000 combat troops by the end of 1965, peaking at over 536,000 by 1968. The goal was to crush the Viet Cong (VC), the communist insurgents in South Vietnam, and prop up the Saigon government.
Did it work in three years? Not really. From 1965 to 1968, the Viet Cong took heavy losses—tens of thousands killed, especially during the 1968 Tet Offensive, where they lost an estimated 30,000-40,000 fighters. U.S. and ARVN forces claimed to have weakened the VC’s infrastructure, with General Westmoreland asserting in 1967 that enemy strength was declining.
But the Tet Offensive in January 1968 proved the VC wasn’t destroyed. They launched a coordinated attack across South Vietnam, hitting over 100 targets, including Saigon. Though it was a military loss for the VC (they didn’t hold ground), it shattered the narrative of U.S. progress, turning American public opinion sharply against the war.
By 1968, the VC wasn’t the same force—its ranks were depleted, and North Vietnamese regulars (NVA) increasingly took over. VC numbers dropped from maybe 80,000 in 1965 to a fraction by 1969, with estimates as low as 30,000-40,000 fighters. But "destroyed as a major force" overstates it.
They adapted, shifted to guerrilla tactics, and relied on NVA support. The war dragged on until 1975, with the VC still active in the final push that took Saigon. LBJ’s escalation hurt them badly but didn’t knock them out in three years—resilience and North Vietnam’s backing kept them in the fight.
So, Eisenhower planted seeds; LBJ escalated but didn’t finish the VC in that timeframe. Historical consensus backs this: initial commitment versus all-out war, and heavy damage versus total defeat.
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