A philosophical pondering

It could not, however the copy would have the same sense of self. You would have the closest thing to immortality, but it wouldn't be immortality. It is this consciousness that is "you". Any copy would be an entirely different individual no matter how many memories you shared.

I've always been baffled by the term 'consciousness'. It always seems so vague a term.

I agree that the copy would be a seperate individual, at the point of copying it would have the exact same neuro-pathways (experiences etc) but a moment after the point of copying the two would be having different experiences, even if in the same room, and would become two seperate 'selfs'.

It would be like having a child and considering that immortality.

I agree. This is not immortality, it is starting a new individual on the basis of the experiences of another.
 
We don't become a copy, we are the sum of experience. Your consciousness doesn't change because dying cells are replaced, and if it does it simply becomes part of you.

I agree, though without the consciousness argument. Still find the term consciousness to be a little vague. By definition of terms, a copy must be a seperate entity. A copy cannot be the original at the same time as not being. The copying of individual cells doesn't constitute the individual themselves being copied.

When you change your car tyres, have you changed your car?
 
When you change your car tyres, have you changed your car?
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umm that would be more like changing your feet.....
 
I agree with what you're saying; that's why cloning could never recreate an individual; the result would be an entirely new individual with the same "hardware" as the original, but with completely unique life experiences.

I reiterate, however, that dying brain cells are not replaced. This is the problem with such conditions as Parkinson's Disease, for example. We are born with a surfeit of dopamine-containing cells in the midbrain. These begin to die off, gradually, at birth, and this continues throughout our lives. With PD, some catalyst (one of the strong possibilities is insecticides) causes this process to accelerate so that the cells die off much faster than they normally would do. This causes the movement disorders so typical of PD. Those cells (and any others that die within the CNS) are not ever replaced.

Contrast this with, e.g., skin cells, which regenerate it seems constantly. Or with liver cells -- a single lobe transplanted into a patient is capable of regenerating an entirely new organ. Not so with the brain or spinal cord.

With loss of consciousness, which may or may not involve a coma, so long as the brain remains intact and functioning, there would be no loss of "self". Injuries to the brain, however, including endogenous trauma such as stroke, can profoundly alter personality and perception.
 
That was really promising at its time, Damo, but unfortunately it appears not to have gone anywhere beyond the speculation that something might be used to promote new cell growth.

The other processes that are initiated under conditions of stroke, trauma, etc., typically overcome those healing-type procedures (I did stroke research for about a year, actually after this finding was published, and learned quite a bit during that time). The compensatory mechanisms that are launched by such incidents are actually harmful to the surrounding tissue, and the damage that ensues is generally far more extensive than that caused by the initial stroke or injury. It's interesting that new cells were believed to be found in those studies; the absence of further such findings, however, suggests that the observation may have been an artifact, sadly, rather than something else. As careful as the work undoubtedly was, this does happen and this is why subsequent research always begins by attempting to replicate such findings. This would have been a tremendously hopeful breakthrough for PD patients!
 
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