Electronic Voting vulnerability

[Damocles]

As long as the optical scanner is well inspected and designed to make it tamper proof.

It is nearly impossible. The report to open it lists the ballot count so none of that trickery with Negative for one Positive for the other to give it a zero start. Then the ballots scan and are counted the ballots drop into the drop below. The ones in our area are printed very clearly, easy to understand, and would be very easy to recount if it were necessary.

They are a joy to use and are nearly bullet proof. People can vote, drop in their own ballot and watch and see if it is accepted or not. We don't usually have to handle the ballots once they are taken from the book until the end of the night when we remove them, stack them, and return them for storage to the county clerk.

 

[evince]

http://tinyurl.com/25mecf


the optical scn machines are not really secure either

 

[evince]

Optical scan voting systems are a form of document ballot voting system, meaning that there is a tangible record of the voter's intent (a paper ballot). Like traditional paper ballots these are subject to electoral fraud and ballot stuffing.

One form of wholesale fraud possible with optical scan voting systems is during the recording of votes. Douglas Jones of the University of Iowa that if a potential attacker were to gain access to the voting system configuration files, they would be able to "credit one candidate with votes intended for another." He found these files are exposed in the computer system used to prepare the election, making them vulnerable to anyone setting up the election. The files are then transferred to the voting system using removable media, and "anyone with access to these media could potentially attack the system."[4]

Another form of wholesale fraud is during tabulation. Possible attacks have been demonstrated by Harri Hursti[5] and the University of Connecticut.[6]

If an attacker is able to obtain a blank ballot (by theft, counterfeit, or a legitimate absentee ballot) the attacker can then mark the ballot her chosen candidates and convince (through intimidation or bribery) a voter to take the pre-marked ballot to a polling station, exchange it for the blank ballot issued and return the blank ballot to the attacker. This is known as chain voting/[7]

 

[Damocles]

Optical scan voting systems are a form of document ballot voting system, meaning that there is a tangible record of the voter's intent (a paper ballot). Like traditional paper ballots these are subject to electoral fraud and ballot stuffing.

One form of wholesale fraud possible with optical scan voting systems is during the recording of votes. Douglas Jones of the University of Iowa that if a potential attacker were to gain access to the voting system configuration files, they would be able to "credit one candidate with votes intended for another." He found these files are exposed in the computer system used to prepare the election, making them vulnerable to anyone setting up the election. The files are then transferred to the voting system using removable media, and "anyone with access to these media could potentially attack the system."[4]

Another form of wholesale fraud is during tabulation. Possible attacks have been demonstrated by Harri Hursti[5] and the University of Connecticut.[6]

If an attacker is able to obtain a blank ballot (by theft, counterfeit, or a legitimate absentee ballot) the attacker can then mark the ballot her chosen candidates and convince (through intimidation or bribery) a voter to take the pre-marked ballot to a polling station, exchange it for the blank ballot issued and return the blank ballot to the attacker. This is known as chain voting/[7]

In order to access those files you would need to unplug the machines that we use and remove the processing device, plug that into another machine, change the configuration while keeping the data files, then put it back in, reseal it with a seal exactly of the same type and number of the seal originally on it. Then get away all without being seen by the poll workers (from both parties and some third parties) all standing within three feet of you.

It is more than unlikely. If somebody could do this, they could gain access to the box and change the ballots in a system with manual ballots/counting.

they would also be familiar with the terms "expeliarmus" and "wingardia leviosum", have invisibility cloaks, and sometimes they would use cauldrons in their schoolwork.

Absentee ballots cannot be returned or exchanged at the polling station. If you choose to get absentee, but do not wish to vote absentee you must return to the county clerks office where they can issue a new ballot while scrapping the other, after checking that you were the person the ballot was assigned to originally. The ballots come with little tags that are removed upon counting that we record and use to verify that the amount of votes received match the amount of ballots given out. Ballots cannot be removed from the polling sites.

Chain voting would also be nearly impossible because of those rules, and because we are well-trained judges.

One could "Chain-vote" with a manually counted paper ballot the same way if such rules were not in place. The idea that the optical scanner ballots would magically be more susceptible to "threats" is preposterous.

 

[LadyT]

Simple solution. Get rid of Diebold, they clearly are not safe enough to trust a vote to. Thankfully there are good machines out there, with paper trails included, that can be trusted.

Pigs must be flying. I totally agree with you.

 

[evince]

In order to access those files you would need to unplug the machines that we use and remove the processing device, plug that into another machine, change the configuration while keeping the data files, then put it back in, reseal it with a seal exactly of the same type and number of the seal originally on it. Then get away all without being seen by the poll workers (from both parties and some third parties) all standing within three feet of you.

It is more than unlikely. If somebody could do this, they could gain access to the box and change the ballots in a system with manual ballots/counting.

they would also be familiar with the terms "expeliarmus" and "wingardia leviosum", have invisibility cloaks, and sometimes they would use cauldrons in their schoolwork.

Absentee ballots cannot be returned or exchanged at the polling station. If you choose to get absentee, but do not wish to vote absentee you must return to the county clerks office where they can issue a new ballot while scrapping the other, after checking that you were the person the ballot was assigned to originally. The ballots come with little tags that are removed upon counting that we record and use to verify that the amount of votes received match the amount of ballots given out. Ballots cannot be removed from the polling sites.

Chain voting would also be nearly impossible because of those rules, and because we are well-trained judges.

One could "Chain-vote" with a manually counted paper ballot the same way if such rules were not in place. The idea that the optical scanner ballots would magically be more susceptible to "threats" is preposterous.

I understand it may sound nearly impossible to due in your experience but not all counties have honest poll workers.

Some have a lock up on the poll system, this was one of the problems in Ohio.

If the wrong people have access which is unfettered you can have problems.

It can be done and that scares me.

 

[Damocles]

I understand it may sound nearly impossible to due in your experience but not all counties have honest poll workers.

Some have a lock up on the poll system, this was one of the problems in Ohio.

If the wrong people have access which is unfettered you can have problems.

It can be done and that scares me.

Believe me, if I saw that in our county I'd be all over it. I know all I can speak for is where I have worked. The one county I wouldn't work more than one was in Jefferson. They had these push button machines that had no paper trail and little evidence your vote even counted at all.

 

[Annie]

Believe me, if I saw that in our county I'd be all over it. I know all I can speak for is where I have worked. The one county I wouldn't work more than one was in Jefferson. They had these push button machines that had no paper trail and little evidence your vote even counted at all.

I've done poll counting at the country for 6 elections, each group I've been involved with, (1 Dem, 1 Rep, 1 independent have worked well together). The 2004 election we did use optical scanners with paper and they worked fine. While are county government has had partisan issues and corruption, the elections themselves have appeared very clean, unlike some of our neighboring *cough, cough, Cook County, cough* counties.

 

[Damocles]

I've done poll counting at the country for 6 elections, each group I've been involved with, (1 Dem, 1 Rep, 1 independent have worked well together). The 2004 election we did use optical scanners with paper and they worked fine. While are county government has had partisan issues and corruption, the elections themselves have appeared very clean, unlike some of our neighboring *cough, cough, Cook County, cough* counties.

Exactly my experience.

 

[blackascoal]

I've done poll counting at the country for 6 elections, each group I've been involved with, (1 Dem, 1 Rep, 1 independent have worked well together). The 2004 election we did use optical scanners with paper and they worked fine. While are county government has had partisan issues and corruption, the elections themselves have appeared very clean, unlike some of our neighboring *cough, cough, Cook County, cough* counties.

That's the beauty of software. It may "look" clean, but how do you know?

It would be like standing outside of a car and determining that there is nothing wrong with it without ever opening up the hood. Unless you physically examine the software or employ proper auditing oversight, you have no idea what the software is doing. Simply accuracy testing the software does not necessarliy alert you of its functionality. There are a thousand ways, triggers, date-functions, trojan horse programming, test/real time modes, hard coded results, etc., for a good designer to defeat a test.