AnyOldIron
Atheist Missionary
I need your help. This is mostly for those who have picked up errors in my reasoning before, people like Damo, IH8, and AC etc
I am writing a critique of an argument used by a philosopher called Peter Singer in support of animal rights and vegetarianism. I am not personally arguing against animal rights, this is not my opinion, I am just writing the critique as a philosophical exercise. I need your help in identifying inconsistencies and logical errors in my reasoning. I'm sure there are plenty...lol I don't need further arguments against or for Singer's position, just a 'logic-check'
Singer's argument amounts to:
P: We should aim to minimize suffering *1
P: We should give equal consideration to the suffering of animals. *2
P: Animal suffering is involved in enabling us to eat meat.
P: for the majority, the suffering of the animals involved outweighs the minor suffering in our becoming vegetarian. *3
Ergo, most humans should be vegetarian.
*1: (FYI, Singer operates from a negative utilitarian approach)
*2: (on the grounds that not giving equal consideration merely on the grounds that another entity is of another species is speciesism (and thus irrational))
*3: Schopenhaur's argument on suffering.
In response, I am concentrating on only one of these premises, #2....
Here is my response (badly written, just working out the ideas)....
"I shall argue against Singer's underlying reliance on the principle of equal consideration of interests by showing inconsistencies in his application of this principle.
If, as Singer states, we are to consider equally the interests of sentient species, then the moral judgment required to do this should also be expected equally from all groups, human and non-human. It is possible to demonstrate that non-human sentient entities have no capacity or potential for making such moral decisions and as such, the principle of equality cannot be applied equally. Could we expect a lion to pause before attacking a gazelle to consider equality of interests and calculate whether the suffering of the gazelle is outweighed by the benefits of the lion eating it?
Singer could counter this by pointing to the reductio per absurdum argument that severely brain damaged people and children are incapable of making a moral decision and thus as such moral decisions cannot apply to them also. It is possible to counter the argument that children are incapable of moral decisions, and to require Singer to clarify his statement to children under a certain age are incapable. To counter the main thrust of his counter, it is possible to argue that even young children and those incapable of morality through severe illness or disability have individuals caring for them, people with 'power of attorney' to make those decisions for them and such can be encompassed within the sphere of morality.
Singer could then counter this by stating that human moral entities could act on behalf of sentient non-human entities, yet the differentiating factor would be the potential for moral decisions. Human children, although possibly not capable of making moral decisions initially, do hold the capacity to make moral judgments, as could those with severe brain damage if a recovery occurred. Non-human sentient animals do not have this potential. A suspension of moral capacity doesn't equate to not holding a moral capacity."
Your help is appreciated....
I am writing a critique of an argument used by a philosopher called Peter Singer in support of animal rights and vegetarianism. I am not personally arguing against animal rights, this is not my opinion, I am just writing the critique as a philosophical exercise. I need your help in identifying inconsistencies and logical errors in my reasoning. I'm sure there are plenty...lol I don't need further arguments against or for Singer's position, just a 'logic-check'
Singer's argument amounts to:
P: We should aim to minimize suffering *1
P: We should give equal consideration to the suffering of animals. *2
P: Animal suffering is involved in enabling us to eat meat.
P: for the majority, the suffering of the animals involved outweighs the minor suffering in our becoming vegetarian. *3
Ergo, most humans should be vegetarian.
*1: (FYI, Singer operates from a negative utilitarian approach)
*2: (on the grounds that not giving equal consideration merely on the grounds that another entity is of another species is speciesism (and thus irrational))
*3: Schopenhaur's argument on suffering.
In response, I am concentrating on only one of these premises, #2....
Here is my response (badly written, just working out the ideas)....
"I shall argue against Singer's underlying reliance on the principle of equal consideration of interests by showing inconsistencies in his application of this principle.
If, as Singer states, we are to consider equally the interests of sentient species, then the moral judgment required to do this should also be expected equally from all groups, human and non-human. It is possible to demonstrate that non-human sentient entities have no capacity or potential for making such moral decisions and as such, the principle of equality cannot be applied equally. Could we expect a lion to pause before attacking a gazelle to consider equality of interests and calculate whether the suffering of the gazelle is outweighed by the benefits of the lion eating it?
Singer could counter this by pointing to the reductio per absurdum argument that severely brain damaged people and children are incapable of making a moral decision and thus as such moral decisions cannot apply to them also. It is possible to counter the argument that children are incapable of moral decisions, and to require Singer to clarify his statement to children under a certain age are incapable. To counter the main thrust of his counter, it is possible to argue that even young children and those incapable of morality through severe illness or disability have individuals caring for them, people with 'power of attorney' to make those decisions for them and such can be encompassed within the sphere of morality.
Singer could then counter this by stating that human moral entities could act on behalf of sentient non-human entities, yet the differentiating factor would be the potential for moral decisions. Human children, although possibly not capable of making moral decisions initially, do hold the capacity to make moral judgments, as could those with severe brain damage if a recovery occurred. Non-human sentient animals do not have this potential. A suspension of moral capacity doesn't equate to not holding a moral capacity."
Your help is appreciated....
