I Need Your Help on an Ethics / Logic Problem

Singer could then counter this by stating that human moral entities could act on behalf of sentient non-human entities, yet the differentiating factor would be the potential for moral decisions. Human children, although possibly not capable of making moral decisions initially, do hold the capacity to make moral judgments, as could those with severe brain damage if a recovery occurred. Non-human sentient animals do not have this potential. A suspension of moral capacity doesn't equate to not holding a moral capacity."

Ok AOI let me have at it as if this was an ongoing thread and I entered the fray.

1. I would challenge the assertion that human beings are the only species capable of making moral decisions. I would point out that many animals with higher level brain functions exhibit behavior that is indicative of holding certain moral values. The behavior of Macaques, Great Apes, Ceteceans and even Dogs could be cited.

2. Along those lines I would challenge the idea that there is a great uncrossable chasm that divides human and non-human. As we both know that which defines humanity is being of the same species and to be within the human species reproduction capability with other humans must be possible. However this point is reached only by segregation of population groups over a long period. Although all of our direct ancestral pre homo sapien ancestors are extinct they should be given consideration. If DNA from a Neanderthal was harvested and cloned would we see this Neanderthal as fair game for consumption simply because our DNA and his cannot produce offspring that can reproduce. I would ask at what point did our evolutionary branch achieve the ability to moralize? Did it only appear in Homo Sapiens or did Homo Erectus or Australopithecus have such an abilty. Regardless we would probably consider any moral calculus they posessed to be less sophisticated than ours but is lack of sophistication grounds to deny that a species is moral. If if moralizing ability is a continuum how can we say that non-human species completely lack this ability and if we do decide to grant a cloned proto-human this recognition why not a great ape, why not a monkey, an elephant, a dog an octopus, a cockroach.

3. We are faced with choosing an arbitrary point of demarcation. Our argument would be weak to limit recognition of moralizing as a limiting factor to humans when we can hypothesize their could be a sitation in which a non-human species clearly has the ability to moralize. However if we include non-humans in our consideration we must artificially create a demarcation in which lifeform go from being amoral to moral. Given evolutionary morphology such a demarcation would be impossible to create.

That would be my strategy. It is unorthodox though and not many in this kind of debate have mentioned it although interestingly yet not surprising Damo views this is a similar fashion.
 
Studies in Switzerland on simple grasses was able to determine that not only did plants react to being pulled, but that when the same person returned to the scene they reacted before being pulled.

I'll see if I can find a link to that one. It may be difficult, it is ooooold.

This is some supporting evidence that plants may suffer too.

However, IMO, that we cannot understand the reaction or hear the voice does not mean that they are not "screaming". They may be "varelse", sentient but without a form that we may communicate to understand them. Would it make it more moral if we simply didn't know and therefore killed sentient beings because we believed all sentience to be contained in grey matter?

Then it would certainly be hypocritical of Singer not to include plants that feel suffering within his sphere of speciesism.

In that case he would argue, in the negative utilitarian manner, that if the benefits of the tree suffering don't outweigh the suffering, it would be speciesism to cause the tree suffering.

To what extent does this balance end? Do the gains made by humans grazing cattle to eat on grass outweigh the suffering of the grasses?

(might sound a strange suggestion but it does follow from Singer's argument.)
 
However, IMO, that we cannot understand the reaction or hear the voice does not mean that they are not "screaming". They may be "varelse", sentient but without a form that we may communicate to understand them. Would it make it more moral if we simply didn't know and therefore killed sentient beings because we believed all sentience to be contained in grey matter?

Although Singer's argument would include any creature with the capacity to suffer, my argument ref the extension of moral expectations to non-moral creatures does still stand.....
 
If we wanted to be as moral as possible we could try to eat only non living things like milk eggs or parts of plants that evolved specifically to be eaten such as fruits (although one could argue that because you are not spreading its seeds by doing so that you are violating the terms of the fruit being offered to you)

But if you operate from a utilitarian position, if the benefits created outweighed the suffering caused to the animal, then it wouldn't be deemed immoral to eat them.

For example, an Inuit will kill a seal to eat, the suffering of the seal is less than the suffering of the human who would starve without eating. The human has a heightened sense of suffering because he has conscious awareness of his suffering and imminent death, whilst the seal could be killed with the minimum of suffering.

In general civilisation, the capacity of humans to produce sufficient fruit etc is limited in relation to the size of the population. If it were not possible to produce sufficient 'non-suffering' foods, would the suffering of the starving masses outweigh the suffering of other animals / plants that have a capaciy to survive?

Your point ref the whale / sardines is very interesting. In a utilitarian position, however, the capacity for suffering must be considered. Does the fact that the whale has a more heightened capacity for suffering due to its more advanced brain mean that to slaughter a whale would create more suffering than killing a few thousand sardines, whose capacity for suffering is less than the whale.
 
1. I would challenge the assertion that human beings are the only species capable of making moral decisions. I would point out that many animals with higher level brain functions exhibit behavior that is indicative of holding certain moral values. The behavior of Macaques, Great Apes, Ceteceans and even Dogs could be cited.

Does a dog pause before pouncing on a rabbit, to evaluate if the suffering it is going to cause the rabbit is outweighed by the benefits it gives the dog?

I recognise your point, rudimentary social morality has been exhibited in other species, I have seen footage of great apes apparently showing compassion to members of its own social group, but have you ever seen any other creature consider a moral position on members of other species?

Point 2 (not reproduced to save space):

Good argument. Very good. Reductio per absurdum... lol

Where do we draw the line? Taking a negative utilitarian position, then if the suffering caused by killing the Neanderthal/ Homo Erectus outweighs the suffering alleviated by the human (sapien) then it would be deemed immoral.

But by natural extension of the negative utilitarian argument you could justify cannablism, if the person being eaten wasn't aware of their imminent death, and didn't suffer greatly during the process of being killed...and eating the individual saves the other human days of a slow suffering death through starvation, it could be deemed moral... lol

But this is a tangent, back to the moral equivilency argument...

It is, obviously, difficult to estimate the moral capacity of contributory species to our own. However, my moral argument stands if the Neanderthal /Erectus is capable of making the moral decision that the dog mentioned above failed to do. If moral equivilency is there, then it would be possible to extend to that species the moral decisions we as a species make. It would largely be dependent on their ability to make that moral decision. [/B]

3. We are faced with choosing an arbitrary point of demarcation. Our argument would be weak to limit recognition of moralizing as a limiting factor to humans when we can hypothesize their could be a sitation in which a non-human species clearly has the ability to moralize. However if we include non-humans in our consideration we must artificially create a demarcation in which lifeform go from being amoral to moral. Given evolutionary morphology such a demarcation would be impossible to create.

Then we would need to find a demarcation that isn't, or is less, arbitrary. I agree, using the ability to exhibit any moral outlook would seem to be arbitrary. Maybe altering my premise to state 'those capable of making the utilitarian moral decision to only cause suffering if that suffering alleviates a greater suffering'?
 
You could always just say life is meaningless, so it's irrelevant whether or not the animal die.

Almost the nihilistic position. Nihilism states that there is no innate meaning, that meaning is a human invention and only found in that that we invest it in.

Morality, in the human sense, may be a false contruction, artificial if you like, but as we are operating within the sphere of human actions, it is relevant. That meaning, and to a degree morality is a human creation (although morality is a product of social existence, and other species exhibit degrees of it, the concept itself it human) slightly helps my argument with reference to the extension of expectations of morality to other species, thus undermining Singer's premise of equality.
 
AnyOldIron said:
However, IMO, that we cannot understand the reaction or hear the voice does not mean that they are not "screaming". They may be "varelse", sentient but without a form that we may communicate to understand them. Would it make it more moral if we simply didn't know and therefore killed sentient beings because we believed all sentience to be contained in grey matter?

Although Singer's argument would include any creature with the capacity to suffer, my argument ref the extension of moral expectations to non-moral creatures does still stand.....
Click to expand...
What would make you believe that a tree is non-moral? Once again, that we do not understand does not mean that it does not exist.
 
I recognise your point, rudimentary social morality has been exhibited in other species, I have seen footage of great apes apparently showing compassion to members of its own social group, but have you ever seen any other creature consider a moral position on members of other species?

Yes Dogs with their human companions. I'm sure you have heard of many of the stories of dogs saving a human being in the case of seizures or even choking.

But by natural extension of the negative utilitarian argument you could justify cannablism, if the person being eaten wasn't aware of their imminent death, and didn't suffer greatly during the process of being killed...and eating the individual saves the other human days of a slow suffering death through starvation, it could be deemed moral... lol

You could but then you could argue that cannibalistic activity has an effect greater than the two parties involeved and that cannibalistic behavior is an impediment to the fostering of a socially cohesive society. From a negative utliitarian viewpoint one could say that cannibalism creates more harm because it harms society as well.

Then we would need to find a demarcation that isn't, or is less, arbitrary. I agree, using the ability to exhibit any moral outlook would seem to be arbitrary. Maybe altering my premise to state 'those capable of making the utilitarian moral decision to only cause suffering if that suffering alleviates a greater suffering'?

And that is exactly where I wanted to lead you. In my paper I argue that the only tenable demarcation to establish is within our own species. The reason for this is more about cannibalism we talked about earlier. Cannibalism has much stronger backing to be forbideen than the eating of any other organism because cannibalistic practices have more severe consequences.

To show this I will use the blending of two ethical ideas. First the categorical imperative and second negative utilitarianism.

First if we were to recommend cannibalism in any instance then we must accept that we are arguing in favor of a society that accepts cannibalism as per the categorical imperative.

Now we must consider the utilitarian merits of a cannibalistic society vs. a non-cannibalistic one. A cannibalist society creates more harm in that a society in which one has no reasonable level of assumed safety from being eaten by their neighbor inhibits the ability for man to form a cohesive society and cooperate amongst one another. Thus we could see that many of the things that create happiness and alleviate suffering in a society such as science, medicine and technology would be put in jeopardy and thus a cannibalistic society violates both postitive and negative utilitarianism.
 
On a side note I've always thought that dogs and cats that are euthanized in our nations shelters should be used for meat sent to nations that have no such aversions to eating them.
 
IH8, cheers for the paper, gonna spend today reading through (in between meetings and sorting out the children (staff)), If cool to discuss on here will respond tomorrow mate... :-)
 
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