After the crash in mid-2002 of the "dotcom" stock bubble, Wall Street shifted its bulging investment funds into real estate speculation. Wall Street firms continued to cash in on the property boom by creating and selling mortgaged-backed securities. Traditionally, banks and insurance firms that made housing and real estate development loans carried the mortgages, and acted as investors and credit providers. They managed their own investment risks by screening carefully loan applicants.
In their unrestrained quest for quick profits, however, banks and mortgage companies invented mortgage-backed securities and sold them to banks and "non-bank" firms worldwide. They became increasingly unconcerned over whether mortgage borrowers could make necessary repayments. They shifted the risks to buyers of their mortgage-backed securities. The mortgage credit standards were relaxed and then eliminated. Banks ceased to be the lending institutions and became the "commission retailers" peddling securitized mortgage funds. Many low income families rushed to buy their dream homes without down payments, but at premium interest rates beyond the "promotional" low rates. These questionable housing loans were called "subprime mortgages."
The Fed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Treasury Department all chose to wink at the mushrooming subprime mortgage loans. To hide default-prone subprime mortgages, Wall Street's alchemists sliced them and mixed them up with other bonds and created "securitized mortgage" funds that promised "higher yields." They also sold them to Japan's unsuspecting banks, pension funds, and other firms. The Bank of Japan and the Department of Financial Affairs even encouraged them to purchase American bonds and funds with the hope of propping up the US dollar.