Pakistan Taliban Leader Killed By US Drone

No "cognitive dissonance" here. Carpet bomb 'em and let Allah sort 'em out. Men, women, kids, dogs, cats and goldfish. It'll be like Dresden or Cologne in WW2. Either that or bring everybody home and make the final decision that terrorist attacks are going to be a fact of life.
 
So Bush, who liberals claim is a "retard", successfully hoodwinked supposedly intelligent Democrats, including Hillary Clinton?


189654d1363885092-hva-lytter-du-til-i-dag-del-3-20120622052737-rofl.gif
 
what is the difference between using a drone to take out an enemy or a ground tactical group doing it?


There was always unwanted damage done in both.


better weapondry that decreases our own peoples harm is not a bad thing.


I objected under Bush because BUSH LIED us into a war.

I didn't trust the MF to kill just the bad guys.
the difference is the psychological terror with drones loitering overhead for days.

I recall one Paki villiager who said "we cannot sleep, we cannot farm, we cannot convene our elders (jirga), we live in terror of being killed all the time."

Drones are NOT more precise then laser guided munitions - they are remote controlled, nothing else.
 
Maybe I should put this in my signature. Or you all could try reading my posts for content, instead of looking for a "gotcha." There's more where this came from.

10-22-2013 07:06 PM #11 | Top
christiefan915
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The irony is you thinking I've ever defended war crimes, droning, etc. no matter who was President.

How's this? Every man, woman and child ever responsible for war crimes, droning, land mines etc. should be prosecuted to the fullest extent.

Mo' betta?

No...thats going over the edge on the other extreme.....war crimes are specific killing of non-combatants on purpose, as in terrorism....
neither extreme is good.
 
Pakistani interior minister "peace process is dead"

Pakistan's interior minister has said the death of Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud has destroyed the country's nascent peace process

This is not just the killing of one person, it's the death of all peace efforts," Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan said.

Pakistan has summoned the US ambassador to protest over Friday's drone strike that killed Mehsud.

It came a day before a Pakistani delegation had been due to fly to North Waziristan to meet Mehsud.

......................................

But BBC diplomatic correspondent James Robbins says that however weakened the Taliban may be by this loss, they will fight on under a new leader.

In a rare interview two weeks ago, Mehsud told the BBC he was open to "serious talks" with the government but said he had not yet been approached.

Mehsud denied carrying out recent deadly attacks in public places, saying his targets were "America and its friends".

He had loose control over more than 30 militant groups in Pakistan's tribal areas

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24787637

So you can say striking the head of the Paki Taliban is a good thing; I think it is not - because the peace procees in Afg,
depends on co-operation by the Paki Taliban; at least those based in N.Wazi.

We cannot kill our way to peace, we cannot war our way to peace - all we can do is war and kill with the drones.

It might be helpful (mindful) to recall that Afg.'s path towards any reconcilliation is not helped by our warring.

Then again I am quite sure the Taliban are not going to cooperate in any meaningful "power sharing" by the Afg. gov't

All of which means we are irrelevant, except the fact we believe we are not.

Afg. will do as it please, US Superpower status or not.
 
what is the difference between using a drone to take out an enemy or a ground tactical group doing it?


There was always unwanted damage done in both.


better weapondry that decreases our own peoples harm is not a bad thing.


I objected under Bush because BUSH LIED us into a war.

I didn't trust the MF to kill just the bad guys.


And its obvious we can't trust Obama to 'just' kill the bad guys either, but he's certainly racked a hell of a lot US dead troops in Afghan. in his short time in office....more than
twice the number of Bush in half the time.
 
Yeah because the entire congress even the Rs were LIED to by Bush and team


that damn Bush was a genius .... or were the Dems that voted for the War Res. just extremely stupid....all those times they said
exactly the same thing as Bush about WMD....
Only they whined about the WMD beginning 6 years before Bush was elected....yet no one ever accused them of lying....how come it only became a lie
when Bush said it.....magic ?
 
No...thats going over the edge on the other extreme.....war crimes are specific killing of non-combatants on purpose, as in terrorism....
neither extreme is good.

Nice buzzkill, bravs. Not that I would ever expect you to give me credit for anything, so my response was directed mainly at Billy and cawacko.

I know what war crimes are. And I know that most of those committing them never pay for their actions. Maybe you should think about how many innocent non-combatants, including fetuses, are killed for no other reason than having the bad luck to be living in a war zone.
 
that damn Bush was a genius .... or were the Dems that voted for the War Res. just extremely stupid....all those times they said
exactly the same thing as Bush about WMD....
Only they whined about the WMD beginning 6 years before Bush was elected....yet no one ever accused them of lying....how come it only became a lie
when Bush said it.....magic ?

It didn't "become" a lie when bush said it. It became an open rather than private lie when the Downing St. memo(s), dated 23 July 2002, were published two years after the war started. Spin that, if you can.

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

http://downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html
 
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