Executive Summary
I have been asked to comment on the Taiwanese military’s ability to deter, delay, and defeat a crossStrait attack. My overarching assessment is that the Republic of China’s (ROC) armed forces are not
yet optimally manned, trained, equipped, and motivated to defend against an attack on Taiwan. I want
to emphasize “optimally,” because I do not think it is inevitable that an attack by the Peoples’
Liberation Army (PLA) will succeed at a price that Beijing is willing to pay. After all, Taiwan enjoys
formidable natural defenses. 2 Amphibious assaults and large-scale naval blockades are complex
military operations under the best of circumstances, and the PLA has no experience conducting either
under combat conditions. Taiwan’s defensive preparations—even if not ideal—are still substantial and
capable of imposing heavy costs on an invader. Attacking Taiwan therefore remains a risky gamble.
Taiwan can nevertheless do more to enhance its defenses. Deterrence will rest on less-than ideal
foundations until it does.3 Nor is time on Taiwan’s side. The qualitative and quantitative military
balance has already tipped in China’s favor, and the PLAs advantages are growing.
4 For years, defense
experts suggested that Taiwan should redress this imbalance by embracing asymmetry—in other
words, by investing in large numbers of low cost weapons and adopting warfighting concepts that
prioritize anti-access and denial operations over decisive battles to maintain or regain control of the
air, sea, and land.5
President Tsai is thankfully pushing Taiwan’s military in this direction. Unfortunately, she faces two
obstacles. First, defense reforms take time. It will take years to procure new weapons. Meanwhile,
Taiwan’s military must also update its doctrine, training, maintenance, logistics, supply systems, and
culture in order to ensure that these weapons can be effectively employed. Second, the Tsai
Administration’s reform efforts are encountering resistance as some senior generals, admirals, and
defense officials attempt to coopt, dilute, and “slow roll” the transition.
For the rest of my testimony, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss why we should focus on Taiwan’s
military preparations for a full-scale invasion instead of its ability to defend against an attack on an
outlying island, missile strikes, or a naval blockade, even if the Chinese military only seems able to
undertake combat operations short of a worst-case scenario invasion and occupation. Next, I identify
problems and shortcomings in how Taiwan’s military forces are currently trained, manned, equipped,
and motivated to defend against a full-scale invasion. I then discuss both the Tsai Administration’s
defense reform efforts and the obstacles that could prevent it from being quickly realized, after which
I suggest that prioritizing sea denial and ground combat operations will do more to enhance deterrence
than investments in any other area. I conclude with three policy recommendations for Congress to
consider.
