Trump’s bargain with the oligarchs - He was their greatest investment

Scott

Verified User
Great article I just read with the title of this thread. Quoting the introduction and conclusion below:
**

Wessie du Toit

June 4, 2025

Few people have heard of Lee Hanley — or William Lee Hanley Jr, in full — a businessman and political donor from Greenwich, Connecticut. Yet by the time of his death in 2016, just before Donald Trump’s first election as president, Hanley had played a significant role in the evolution of Right-wing politics over more than three decades. Steve Bannon, the original architect of Trump’s MAGA platform, called him one of the “unsung heroes” of American history. “He had a real love of the hobbits, the deplorables,” Bannon said, “and he put his money where his mouth was.”

In a new book, The Haves and Have-Yachts, a collection of essays written for The New Yorker over the past decade, Evan Osnos describes Hanley as “a bon vivant, with a fondness for salmon-coloured slacks, and a ready checkbook for political ventures”. Hanley inherited, and expanded, a family business in construction supplies and oil. In 1980 he campaigned for Ronald Reagan in Connecticut, developing an approach that, Osnos writes, “uncannily prefigured Trump’s electoral strategy” by assembling “a coalition of conservative elites and the white working class”. Over the next decades he funded numerous organisations and initiatives that promoted a low-tax, small-state conservatism, including publishers, non-profits, and a powerful lobbying firm, Black, Manafort and Stone. (Roger Stone had been one of Reagan’s campaign managers; he would also, along with Paul Manafort, advise Trump.)

Then, after Mitt Romney’s defeat in 2012, Hanley commissioned a pollster to look deeper into the underlying mood in the United States. He was informed that “the level of discontent in this country was beyond anything measurable”. Hanley became convinced that Trump was the only politician capable of channelling this energy in a favourable direction, and set about converting other wealthy donors to the cause. It was a canny investment. Even as Trump gave expression to the anger of Bannon’s “hobbits”, his presidency brought immense material rewards for wealthy Americans, most obviously in the form of tax cuts, deregulation, and financial benefits during the Covid pandemic.

Reflecting on the role of figures like Hanley, Osnos concludes: “The story of Trump’s rise is often told as a hostile takeover. In truth, it is something closer to a joint venture, in which members of America’s elite accepted the terms of Trumpism as the price of power.” That bargain is still paying off today. Trump’s latest budget, which cleared the House of Representatives last month, pledges to entrench and expand the tax cuts passed during his first term. By some estimates, those earning above $500,000 will receive more than a trillion dollars in tax cuts over the next decade, while a similar amount will be cut from government health insurance and food assistance programmes. If we add to this the Trump family’s brazen use of office for self-enrichment, the privileges granted in return for financial contributions, and the political powers given to billionaires such as Elon Musk and David Sacks, then surely all but the most gullible can conclude that America’s regime deserves to be called oligarchy — rule by the wealthy few.


[snip]

In truth, more than one of America’s elite groupings have helped to pave the way for the chaos of Trump’s second term. Since the election, many on the Left have acknowledged their own part in making voters feel frustrated and insecure, whether through the condescending tone of cultural institutions or the dysfunction of Democrat-governed cities. It is possible for an irresponsible and exploitative super-rich class to coexist with wasteful and ineffective governments; in fact, this now seems to be the status quo in much of the Western world. Osnos is right, however, to observe that the disillusionment created by elites is now forcing them to embrace unpredictable forms of populism to maintain their power. Trump will surely not be the final iteration of this process.
**

Full article:
 
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Interesting article slanted against Trump.
Now go and expose the left for their treachery. Or, is this just a one way street?
 
Interesting article slanted against Trump.
Now go and expose the left for their treachery. Or, is this just a one way street?

No, definitely not, in fact the article itself gets into the democrat/progressive side of the coin in its conclusion. I only put in the last paragraph of Wessie du Toit's conclusion last time, which doesn't give as full a picture as putting in more, so here goes:
**
Osnos’ subjects would doubtless dispute his portrayal of their self-interestedness. Tributes to Lee Hanley, for instance, noted his commitment to employees at his business, and many wealthy Americans devote large sums to philanthropy — though the preference for such personal largesse over tax contributions tells its own story about changing notions of public responsibility. More importantly, by treating Trump as the ultimate expression of oligarchic power, Osnos underplays a salient aspect of oligarchy in the American system: its presence on both sides of the political divide, Republican and Democratic. Wealthy elites wield plenty of influence among Trump’s opponents, as some of Osnos’ own vignettes suggest. In 2017, a raft of eminent liberals aboard the yacht of media executive David Geffen included Barack and Michelle Obama, Bruce Springsteen and Oprah Winfrey. Or consider the Getty family, heirs to mid-century America’s greatest fortune. Gordon Getty has hosted fundraisers for Kamala Harris and Gavin Newsom at his mansion in San Francisco, while the “artist-model” Ivy Love Getty had her wedding officiated by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2021. A number of the Getty clan are now major donors to progressive causes, even as they energetically shield their vast trust from tax. Alexandra S. Getty has suggested that, while taxes are “very important”, the problem is that “if the wrong government is in control, then they all go to stuff I don’t support”.

In other words, America’s super-rich are not united in a single faction. This is not to say that their involvement in politics is balanced: while Forbes reported on the eve of the 2024 election that Harris had more billionaire donors than Trump (83 versus 52), Trump received more funding from billionaires in total thanks to the enormous contributions of Musk and Miriam Adelson. Moreover, an analysis by Americans for Tax Fairness claims that, taking last year’s federal elections together, “over two-thirds (70%) of billionaire-family contributions went in support of GOP candidates and conservative causes”. It also reports that billionaire political spending is now an astonishing 160 times higher than in 2010.

Still, while it may be comforting for New Yorker readers to think otherwise, big money alone cannot explain how Trump won two elections — or how the Democrats lost them. Answering that question would require, among other things, a more rounded picture of America’s class system than Osnos provides. By his own admission, he is giving us “the view from the top”, but this creates the illusion of a society that is straightforwardly divided between the many and the few. In fact, private wealth is just one source of elite status in modern society, albeit the most powerful. There are also managerial, political and cultural elites. These divisions matter, because they are central to the aims and methods of Trump’s wealthy supporters.

Many leading MAGA figures have a particular antipathy to the managerial class that runs corporate America and Washington D.C. Musk has taken a slash-and-burn approach to bureaucracy in his companies and now in the federal government. Kevin Roberts, president of the Heritage Foundation, the leading MAGA think tank, has written of the need to revitalise US capitalism by systematically diminishing the influence of university-educated corporate managers. Another prominent Trump backer, the venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, has touted something called the “iron law of oligarchy”, derived from the political theorist James Burnham. As Andreessen explained, “there’s no actual system of democracy, because you always end up with a small minority in charge of a large majority in basically every society in human history.” He portrays the Trump-supporting oligarchy as a “counter-elite”, whose goal is to save American liberty and economic dynamism from the rule of “expert technocrats” aligned with the Left.

Of course, Andreessen’s own remarks show that there is some role for democracy even in an oligarchic system: he is discussing a presidential election after all. Intra-elite conflicts can be waged by mobilising popular anger at institutions perceived to be hostile or ideologically corrupt. This brings us to the Trumpian riddle that Osnos sets out at the start of his book: “to understand why a voter could revile ‘the elite’ and revere the billionaire scion of a New York real estate fortune”. One reason is simply that Trump and his allies do not belong to the same parts of the elite as the people this voter reviles. Yes, when wealthy businessmen with Harvard or Stanford credentials attack elites, it is usually self-serving and often cynical; but what matters politically is that there is a considerable audience which thinks they have a point.

In truth, more than one of America’s elite groupings have helped to pave the way for the chaos of Trump’s second term. Since the election, many on the Left have acknowledged their own part in making voters feel frustrated and insecure, whether through the condescending tone of cultural institutions or the dysfunction of Democrat-governed cities. It is possible for an irresponsible and exploitative super-rich class to coexist with wasteful and ineffective governments; in fact, this now seems to be the status quo in much of the Western world. Osnos is right, however, to observe that the disillusionment created by elites is now forcing them to embrace unpredictable forms of populism to maintain their power. Trump will surely not be the final iteration of this process.

**

Full article:
 
Given that the Wall Street Mafia/CIA was massively involved in the sabotage of the first Trump administration, that Trumps wealth went down because of his Presidency, and they they tried to kill him at Butler I tend to doubt it.
 
Given that the Wall Street Mafia/CIA was massively involved in the sabotage of the first Trump administration, that Trumps wealth went down because of his Presidency, and they they tried to kill him at Butler I tend to doubt it.

Wessie du Toit, the author of the article I quoted and linked to in the opening post, argues that the oligarchs are firmly in the driver's seat when it comes to American politics, but there are different oligarch factions- one for Trump and one against. I suspect that, at least prior to Trump's second term, there was a faction that actually tried to kill Trump, during the famous incident where he was lucky to survive with only a bleeding ear.
 
Great article I just read with the title of this thread. Quoting the introduction and conclusion below:
**

Wessie du Toit

June 4, 2025

Few people have heard of Lee Hanley — or William Lee Hanley Jr, in full — a businessman and political donor from Greenwich, Connecticut. Yet by the time of his death in 2016, just before Donald Trump’s first election as president, Hanley had played a significant role in the evolution of Right-wing politics over more than three decades. Steve Bannon, the original architect of Trump’s MAGA platform, called him one of the “unsung heroes” of American history. “He had a real love of the hobbits, the deplorables,” Bannon said, “and he put his money where his mouth was.”

In a new book, The Haves and Have-Yachts, a collection of essays written for The New Yorker over the past decade, Evan Osnos describes Hanley as “a bon vivant, with a fondness for salmon-coloured slacks, and a ready checkbook for political ventures”. Hanley inherited, and expanded, a family business in construction supplies and oil. In 1980 he campaigned for Ronald Reagan in Connecticut, developing an approach that, Osnos writes, “uncannily prefigured Trump’s electoral strategy” by assembling “a coalition of conservative elites and the white working class”. Over the next decades he funded numerous organisations and initiatives that promoted a low-tax, small-state conservatism, including publishers, non-profits, and a powerful lobbying firm, Black, Manafort and Stone. (Roger Stone had been one of Reagan’s campaign managers; he would also, along with Paul Manafort, advise Trump.)

Then, after Mitt Romney’s defeat in 2012, Hanley commissioned a pollster to look deeper into the underlying mood in the United States. He was informed that “the level of discontent in this country was beyond anything measurable”. Hanley became convinced that Trump was the only politician capable of channelling this energy in a favourable direction, and set about converting other wealthy donors to the cause. It was a canny investment. Even as Trump gave expression to the anger of Bannon’s “hobbits”, his presidency brought immense material rewards for wealthy Americans, most obviously in the form of tax cuts, deregulation, and financial benefits during the Covid pandemic.

Reflecting on the role of figures like Hanley, Osnos concludes: “The story of Trump’s rise is often told as a hostile takeover. In truth, it is something closer to a joint venture, in which members of America’s elite accepted the terms of Trumpism as the price of power.” That bargain is still paying off today. Trump’s latest budget, which cleared the House of Representatives last month, pledges to entrench and expand the tax cuts passed during his first term. By some estimates, those earning above $500,000 will receive more than a trillion dollars in tax cuts over the next decade, while a similar amount will be cut from government health insurance and food assistance programmes. If we add to this the Trump family’s brazen use of office for self-enrichment, the privileges granted in return for financial contributions, and the political powers given to billionaires such as Elon Musk and David Sacks, then surely all but the most gullible can conclude that America’s regime deserves to be called oligarchy — rule by the wealthy few.


[snip]

In truth, more than one of America’s elite groupings have helped to pave the way for the chaos of Trump’s second term. Since the election, many on the Left have acknowledged their own part in making voters feel frustrated and insecure, whether through the condescending tone of cultural institutions or the dysfunction of Democrat-governed cities. It is possible for an irresponsible and exploitative super-rich class to coexist with wasteful and ineffective governments; in fact, this now seems to be the status quo in much of the Western world. Osnos is right, however, to observe that the disillusionment created by elites is now forcing them to embrace unpredictable forms of populism to maintain their power. Trump will surely not be the final iteration of this process.
**

Full article:
but his tariffs prove he's a more real populist than most.

I'm happy to consider a more sincere populist.

Bernie could have won in 2016.

but now no dem can win.

the dems were given a chance to show us who they are, and they did.

open borders, lockdowns, mandatory jab, sterilizing your children.
 
but his tariffs prove he's a more real populist than most.

I'm happy to consider a more sincere populist.

Bernie could have won in 2016.

but now no dem can win.

the dems were given a chance to show us who they are, and they did.

open borders, lockdowns, mandatory jab, sterilizing your children.

I had been rooting for Bernie back in 2016, but we know that didn't happen, thanks in no small part to the Democrat machine. I'm not saying Kamala would have been better than Trump- the article shows that both Kamala and Trump were being financed by different oligarch factions. And we certainly agree that the lockdowns and mandatory jabs were terrible. I just think Americans can do better than both Kamala -and- Trump. Hopefully in the next election.
 
I had been rooting for Bernie back in 2016, but we know that didn't happen, thanks in no small part to the Democrat machine. I'm not saying Kamala would have been better than Trump- the article shows that both Kamala and Trump were being financed by different oligarch factions. And we certainly agree that the lockdowns and mandatory jabs were terrible. I just think Americans can do better than both Kamala -and- Trump. Hopefully in the next election.
yes.

an even more sincere populism.
 
I had been rooting for Bernie back in 2016, but we know that didn't happen, thanks in no small part to the Democrat machine. I'm not saying Kamala would have been better than Trump- the article shows that both Kamala and Trump were being financed by different oligarch factions. And we certainly agree that the lockdowns and mandatory jabs were terrible. I just think Americans can do better than both Kamala -and- Trump. Hopefully in the next election.
the evil Clintons destroyed the Democrat party.

good job, dummies.

oh well, lay down with dogs.......
 
No, definitely not, in fact the article itself gets into the democrat/progressive side of the coin in its conclusion. I only put in the last paragraph of Wessie du Toit's conclusion last time, which doesn't give as full a picture as putting in more, so here goes:
**
Osnos’ subjects would doubtless dispute his portrayal of their self-interestedness. Tributes to Lee Hanley, for instance, noted his commitment to employees at his business, and many wealthy Americans devote large sums to philanthropy — though the preference for such personal largesse over tax contributions tells its own story about changing notions of public responsibility. More importantly, by treating Trump as the ultimate expression of oligarchic power, Osnos underplays a salient aspect of oligarchy in the American system: its presence on both sides of the political divide, Republican and Democratic. Wealthy elites wield plenty of influence among Trump’s opponents, as some of Osnos’ own vignettes suggest. In 2017, a raft of eminent liberals aboard the yacht of media executive David Geffen included Barack and Michelle Obama, Bruce Springsteen and Oprah Winfrey. Or consider the Getty family, heirs to mid-century America’s greatest fortune. Gordon Getty has hosted fundraisers for Kamala Harris and Gavin Newsom at his mansion in San Francisco, while the “artist-model” Ivy Love Getty had her wedding officiated by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2021. A number of the Getty clan are now major donors to progressive causes, even as they energetically shield their vast trust from tax. Alexandra S. Getty has suggested that, while taxes are “very important”, the problem is that “if the wrong government is in control, then they all go to stuff I don’t support”.

In other words, America’s super-rich are not united in a single faction. This is not to say that their involvement in politics is balanced: while Forbes reported on the eve of the 2024 election that Harris had more billionaire donors than Trump (83 versus 52), Trump received more funding from billionaires in total thanks to the enormous contributions of Musk and Miriam Adelson. Moreover, an analysis by Americans for Tax Fairness claims that, taking last year’s federal elections together, “over two-thirds (70%) of billionaire-family contributions went in support of GOP candidates and conservative causes”. It also reports that billionaire political spending is now an astonishing 160 times higher than in 2010.

Still, while it may be comforting for New Yorker readers to think otherwise, big money alone cannot explain how Trump won two elections — or how the Democrats lost them. Answering that question would require, among other things, a more rounded picture of America’s class system than Osnos provides. By his own admission, he is giving us “the view from the top”, but this creates the illusion of a society that is straightforwardly divided between the many and the few. In fact, private wealth is just one source of elite status in modern society, albeit the most powerful. There are also managerial, political and cultural elites. These divisions matter, because they are central to the aims and methods of Trump’s wealthy supporters.

Many leading MAGA figures have a particular antipathy to the managerial class that runs corporate America and Washington D.C. Musk has taken a slash-and-burn approach to bureaucracy in his companies and now in the federal government. Kevin Roberts, president of the Heritage Foundation, the leading MAGA think tank, has written of the need to revitalise US capitalism by systematically diminishing the influence of university-educated corporate managers. Another prominent Trump backer, the venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, has touted something called the “iron law of oligarchy”, derived from the political theorist James Burnham. As Andreessen explained, “there’s no actual system of democracy, because you always end up with a small minority in charge of a large majority in basically every society in human history.” He portrays the Trump-supporting oligarchy as a “counter-elite”, whose goal is to save American liberty and economic dynamism from the rule of “expert technocrats” aligned with the Left.

Of course, Andreessen’s own remarks show that there is some role for democracy even in an oligarchic system: he is discussing a presidential election after all. Intra-elite conflicts can be waged by mobilising popular anger at institutions perceived to be hostile or ideologically corrupt. This brings us to the Trumpian riddle that Osnos sets out at the start of his book: “to understand why a voter could revile ‘the elite’ and revere the billionaire scion of a New York real estate fortune”. One reason is simply that Trump and his allies do not belong to the same parts of the elite as the people this voter reviles. Yes, when wealthy businessmen with Harvard or Stanford credentials attack elites, it is usually self-serving and often cynical; but what matters politically is that there is a considerable audience which thinks they have a point.

In truth, more than one of America’s elite groupings have helped to pave the way for the chaos of Trump’s second term. Since the election, many on the Left have acknowledged their own part in making voters feel frustrated and insecure, whether through the condescending tone of cultural institutions or the dysfunction of Democrat-governed cities. It is possible for an irresponsible and exploitative super-rich class to coexist with wasteful and ineffective governments; in fact, this now seems to be the status quo in much of the Western world. Osnos is right, however, to observe that the disillusionment created by elites is now forcing them to embrace unpredictable forms of populism to maintain their power. Trump will surely not be the final iteration of this process.

**

Full article:
MAGA is perfectly predictable.

America great again through rejecting open borders and excessive globalist stupidity.
 
I had been rooting for Bernie back in 2016, but we know that didn't happen, thanks in no small part to the Democrat machine. I'm not saying Kamala would have been better than Trump- the article shows that both Kamala and Trump were being financed by different oligarch factions. And we certainly agree that the lockdowns and mandatory jabs were terrible. I just think Americans can do better than both Kamala -and- Trump. Hopefully in the next election.
Bernie is not a Democrat, he votes with them, but he is not a member of their party. I’ve always asked, why should the party support his run when he’s not even a member of the party? If he wants Democrats to support his run, he needs to switch his party affiliation.
 
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