I only pointed out the lack of such a policy, because Damo said one existed.
Wish me luck...
- Thread starter Jarod
- Start date
I only pointed out the lack of such a policy, because Damo said one existed.
counselor...the medical bills are paid...a plus...but then again the pain remains and the job is lost and the attorney has a holiday...and everything is mo betta?and justified?
I never said the system could take away pain... it merely attempts to compensate for it.
I have no problem taking a vacation with money I earned when hired to do a job. Should a Doctor not take a vacation when he is using money he earned conducting a surgery if the patient still has pain afterward?
Read the thread, the dude was not a truck driver...
It was the official way this business instructed the employees to use the forklift... with the mulch stacked up so high they could not see directly in front of the lift... other wise it took too many trips to more enough mulch.
Jarod, you're a trial lawyer. They would be less outraged if you were a convicted pedophile. That's the kind of value system they hold.
You impede the invisible hand from doing whatever it wants to do, with no consequences.
That is heresy! These are market worshippers here. It is their God.
what I am trying to say is, you might as well as try to explain this to a fencepost. They aren't listening.
I know... its funny, when you fight for justice you are opposed at every corner. Holding people responsable for there own actions is very contraversal.
Were it not for PI attorneys the United States would be a very dangerous place as companies would not be conserned with safety. Also the government would be broke because they would step in and pay for people's medical bills when they are injured by corporations. Insurance companies dont pay unless there is the threat of a lawsuit!
I know, I totally agree.
Battleborne
Terminator
Apples and Oranges..........
albeit ya both are users of the money scam...Doctors and Medical facilities and attorneys rape those in pain and suffering...and justify it by saying we just did our job...how quaint ya are...enjoy your Bahama cruise and the Tequilla Sunrise with the little umbrella thingee...and say: Hey I helped my client...his/her overpriced medical bills were paid to my friend...and he or she can sit home with the TV watching all of us have a great vacation at his/her expense while enjoying the commercials about these lovely places on the boob tube...anyone remember the outrage of Jesus about the 'Money Changers' probably not or else ya would feel guilt...have a nice Holiday Mr.Jr Attorney!
albeit ya both are users of the money scam...Doctors and Medical facilities and attorneys rape those in pain and suffering...and justify it by saying we just did our job...how quaint ya are...enjoy your Bahama cruise and the Tequilla Sunrise with the little umbrella thingee...and say: Hey I helped my client...his/her overpriced medical bills were paid to my friend...and he or she can sit home with the TV watching all of us have a great vacation at his/her expense while enjoying the commercials about these lovely places on the boob tube...anyone remember the outrage of Jesus about the 'Money Changers' probably not or else ya would feel guilt...have a nice Holiday Mr.Jr Attorney!
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You dont make any sense... For most of my clients they would have nuthing were it not for me. I feel very good about my job and what I do for people. I get the medical bills paid and ensure they get money in there pockets, oh and I get paid for doing that. It makes me feel good when I do to bed at night that I am helping these people.
What do you do for a living?
Seriously, if a company has a policy against lifting more than you can see over, then an employee does such a thing, outside of and against the will of the employer, at some point they take responsibility for their own action.
Would it be reasonable to expect the employee to understand not to drive around when he can't see? I think it would, regardless of whatever written policy they have.
As I said before my questions are concerning the law, not this particular case. It has nothing to do with what I think of trial lawyers (I have nothing at all against them BTW), but everything to do with questions about how the law is applied.
If I was on a jury, and I believed that it was not reasonable for the employer to be able to stop the guy from doing what he was doing (as in my scenarios where there is a policy that the employee willfully violates) and that they could not reasonably know that he was or would do such a thing against their policy that he was in full knowledge of, I would certainly rule against the Plaintiff in that case. Although I would rule for them against the employee.
Would it be reasonable to expect the employee to understand not to drive around when he can't see? I think it would, regardless of whatever written policy they have.
As I said before my questions are concerning the law, not this particular case. It has nothing to do with what I think of trial lawyers (I have nothing at all against them BTW), but everything to do with questions about how the law is applied.
If I was on a jury, and I believed that it was not reasonable for the employer to be able to stop the guy from doing what he was doing (as in my scenarios where there is a policy that the employee willfully violates) and that they could not reasonably know that he was or would do such a thing against their policy that he was in full knowledge of, I would certainly rule against the Plaintiff in that case. Although I would rule for them against the employee.
Battleborne
Terminator
Me.............
A retired former LE Officer..check my profile!...It is up for grabs for everyone to see...no BS here! Ya are a Counselor with a mission...take-take-take ...give nothing back to society...imho!
A retired former LE Officer..check my profile!...It is up for grabs for everyone to see...no BS here! Ya are a Counselor with a mission...take-take-take ...give nothing back to society...imho!
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Even if the judge instructed you that it is your duty to follow the law and that the law states otherwise?
Cancel 2016.2
The Almighty
Jarod.... just out of complete curiosity (and if you are permitted to discuss).... is your client hard of hearing by chance? how did they not hear the forklift coming? Even the electric powered lifts can still be heard.
What I can say is that I attended a demonstration of the operation of this particular forklift. It was very quiet... also this indicent occured on the side of the store next to the parking lot where cars were driving around!
Check out the below case for a description of the law!
PEDRO R. PEREZ, Appellant, v. MARIO ZAZO, Appellee
No. 85-1844
Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District
498 So. 2d 463; 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9428; 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1818
August 19, 1986, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Herbert M. Klein, Judge.
CASE SUMMARYPROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant landlord sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court for Dade County (Florida) which entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of appellee tenant in appellee's suit for personal injuries he sustained when he was stabbed by appellant's manager.
OVERVIEW: When appellee tenant returned home from work, he told the building manager to put on the hot water. The building manager agreed, but stabbed the tenant in the back when he sat down. Appellee filed suit against appellant landlord, and the jury entered a verdict in appellee's favor. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment, because there was no evidence that the manager's conduct furthered or was motivated by a purpose to serve appellant's interests. The evidence showed only that the manager was angry and resentful, not that it would have furthered appellant's interests to have appellee killed. Thus, appellant could not be held liable for its manager's intentional wrongful act under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment on the jury verdict in favor of appellee tenant in his action against appellant landlord, because appellant could not be held liable for the action of his employee in stabbing appellee as that action would not have furthered appellant's interests.
CORE TERMS: stabbed, hot water, bus, apartment, tenant, sitting, matter of law, manager, assault, chair, door, driver's, happened, night, knife, scope of employment, employer's interests, similar case, elevator man, passenger, newspaper, stabbing, alighted, progress, morning, went inside, watching television, arrived, evening, stomach
LexisNexis® Headnotes Hide
Business & Corporate Law > Agency Relationships > Duties & Liabilities > Unlawful Acts of Agents > Intentional & Willful Injuries
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > General Overview
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Scope of Employment > General Overview
HN1 Responsibility for the intentional wrongful acts of a servant-employee may be visited upon his master-employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior only when that conduct in some way furthers the interests of the master or is at least motivated by a purpose to serve those interests, rather than the employee's own. More Like This Headnote * Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote
COUNSEL: Robert E. Austin, Jr. and Gerri Blair, for Appellant.
DeMeo & Sherman and Thomas Sherman, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Schwartz, C.J., and Baskin and Jorgenson, JJ.
OPINION BY: SCHWARTZ
OPINION
[*464] The defendant-landlord, Pedro Perez, appeals from an adverse jury verdict and judgment in a personal injury action arising from an incident in which his apartment manager, Rodriguez, deliberately stabbed the plaintiff, Mario Zazo, a tenant in the building. We reverse on the holding that the appellant's motions for directed verdict should have been granted because Rodriguez was, as a matter of law, not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time.
Since Rodriguez did not testify, the only version of the incident presented to the jury was that of the only other participant, the plaintiff. According to his testimony -- which, since the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, would have to be accepted even if it were disputed -- he arrived at his building one evening from work. He saw Rodriguez, 1 and, reflecting what was apparently a chronic complaint, "told [**2] him to put on the hot water." Rodriguez answered simply that he "would put it on now" and left. Zazo went into another tenant's apartment and was sitting having a beer when, without warning or explanation, Rodriguez came through the door and stabbed him in the back, stomach and face. 2 This evidence [*465] was insufficient to support the judgment under review.
FOOTNOTES
1 The appellant claims that he employed only Rodriguez's wife, not Rodriguez himself, as the building manager and that he was therefore not liable, as a matter of law, for any of Rodriguez's acts. We find ample evidence, however, to support the resolution of this issue against the defendant and therefore find this position without merit. Accordingly, this opinion assumes Rodriguez's status as an employee of Perez.
2 Zazo's testimony on the circumstances of his injury, in full, was as follows:
Q. If you had a complaint about something that was wrong with your apartment, who would you go to?
A. To him, to Rodriguez.
* * * *
Q. Now, on the night of March 24, 1984, tell us what happened in reference to the event leading up to your being stabbed.
A. March 23rd, around 7:30 in the evening, I arrived home and I took off my shirt and my chains and Rodriguez passed by and so I told him to put on the hot water.
I left -- I sat at Pastora's doorstep in the inside portion of Pastora's house.
Q. Wait one second.
What kind of problem were you having that night with your hot water?
A. There was no hot water. There was no hot water over there. There was never any hot water.
Q. Why did you tell Rodriguez to put on the hot water; who is he?
A. Because he is the manager.
Q. Okay.
When you told him to put on the hot water, what did he say to you?
A. I stayed sitting down at Pastora's door and he went down to his house to get a knife.
Q. Before Rodriguez left to go get the knife, as you say, was there any argument between you and he?
A. We didn't argue about anything.
Q. What did he say to you when you told him you needed hot water?
A. "I would put it on now."
He came with a knife and he stabbed me in my back.
Q. What were you doing before he stabbed you?
A. I was having a beer.
Q. Were you sitting in a chair? Were you standing? How were you positioned?
A. I was sitting in a chair in Pastora Ortega's house.
Q. Was your back to the door or were you facing the door?
A. Back to the door.
Q. Was Pastora Ortega there?
A. Pastora had left to the market and his wife was making coffee.
Q. Okay.
And as you were sitting there in the chair, were you watching television or what were you doing?
A. I was watching television because his wife had told me, "Check the coffee for me because I'm going to the bathroom."
Q. And what happened when Rodriguez came back?
A. He stabbed me three times.
Q. Okay.
The first time he stabbed you, where did he stabbed you?
A. Around the kidneys, around the lungs, around here.
Q. Did he say anything to you before he stabbed you?
A. Nothing. We had no argument about anything.
Q. I'm sorry.
Did you say anything to him?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
After he stabbed you in the back, as you were sitting in the chair, then what happened?
A. I went inside Pastora's house and I took hold of a chair in order to swerve it.
Q. And why did you do that?
A. Because I am inside the house and he went inside the house to stab me.
Q. Okay.
And did he stab you again at that point?
A. Then, he stabbed me in the stomach and once in the face, once in the face. * * * *
Q. Okay.
And what happened after he stabbed you three times; did he leave? Did he stay?
A. No, he ran off.
[**3] It is entirely clear that HN1responsibility for the intentional wrongful acts of a servant-employee may be visited upon his master-employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior 3 only when that conduct in some way furthers the interests of the master or is at least motivated by a purpose to serve those interests, rather than the employee's own. Stinson v. Prevatt, 84 Fla. 416, 94 So. 656 (1922); Williams v. Florida Realty & Management Co., 272 So.2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 235, at 520 (1958) ("An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed."). It is true that the relationship between the employee's wrong and the employer's interests found sufficient to warrant submitting the issue for jury determination seems, in some prior instances, to have been quite attenuated. See Columbia By The Sea, Inc. v. Petty, 157 So.2d 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (restaurant's liability for assault by maitre d' on customer during extended attempt to make extra charge for roquefort dressing properly submitted to jury); Forster v. [**4] Red Top Sedan Service, Inc., 257 So.2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (liability of bus company for driver's assault upon plaintiffs after forcing their vehicle off road because of belief they had delayed bus properly submitted to jury); Gonpere Corp. v. Rebull, 440 So.2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (apartment owner's liability for manager's shooting of tenants during argument over eviction properly submitted to jury; manager stated that he "told them to move and they didn't move"). In this instance, however, that connection is totally non-existent. We are simply unable to discern any indication whatever that any purpose of the apartment owner was being served or could have been intended by the then-silent and now-missing Rodriguez to have been served by the senseless, inexplicable act which injured Zazo. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 67 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1933); DeJesus v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 383 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Nettles v. Thornton, 198 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).
FOOTNOTES
3 This is the only theory upon which the plaintiff relies. He withdrew his allegation and produced no evidence that Rodriguez had been negligently hired. See Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) [11 FLW 1680].
[**5] The only aspect of Rodriguez's job which the appellee even contends may have been implicated by the stabbing was his asserted responsibility to "handle" tenants' complaints about the premises. But even making the quite speculative assumption that Rodriguez was angrily responding to the plaintiff's request for hot water, it can hardly have furthered the employer's interests -- as opposed to some activity in actually dealing with the subject of the complaint or in mollifying the complainer -- to attempt to do away with the tenant entirely. Instead, the stabbing must be viewed as motivated by Rodriguez's personal anger and resentment alone. In this regard, it is clear that the fact that the source and subject matter of what Rodriguez "took personally" was related to his work -- that he got mad over something on his job -- does not mean that his reaction was. Two decisions in particular support our conclusion to this effect. In Reina v. Metropolitan Dade County, 285 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. discharged, 304 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1974), after a heated disagreement with the driver over a bus fare, the passenger alighted, reached the sidewalk and flashed an obscene gesture from [**6] there at the driver. The latter responded to the [*466] insult by stopping and getting off the bus and physically attacking his tormentor. This court held the assault and battery beyond the driver's scope of employment as a matter of law. We distinguished the Forster case, supra, upon which the appellee heavily relies, on the ground that
in the cited case the conduct on the part of the injured party, which was impeding the progress of the bus towards the beach, was likely to continue as the bus proceeded down the expressway. The facts in the instant case are just the opposite. The passenger had alighted the bus and was across the street when he was attacked. His conduct would not have impeded the progress of the bus as it continued on its route. We believe the trial judge was correct in the entry of his order directing a verdict for the County.
Reina, 285 So.2d at 649. In the even more factually similar case of Trebitsch v. Goelet Leasing Co., 226 A.D. 567, 235 N.Y.S. 426 (1929), aff'd, 252 N.Y. 554, 170 N.E. 140 (1929), the plaintiff was a tenant in the defendant's apartment building. It was the duty of the night elevator man in the apartment [**7] house to distribute newspapers each morning to the tenants. One morning, the plaintiff complained that his newspaper had not been delivered. During a dispute over the matter, the elevator man assaulted and struck the plaintiff. The court held the owner not liable as a matter of law because the assault was not committed in the interest of the employer. In this case, as in Reina and Trebitsch, there is nothing to show that the tortious acts could have benefited the tort-feasor's employer; thus, as these decisions demonstrate, it makes no difference that they stemmed from or arose during the employment. In sum, the assault was plainly "neither activated by a purpose to serve the master nor related in any way to the furtherance of [his] business." DeJesus v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 383 So.2d at 274. As in many similar cases, it must therefore be concluded that the employer is not liable as a matter of law. City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 67 F.2d 487; Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Friedman v. Mutual Broadcasting System, 380 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), cert. [**8] denied, 388 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1980); Jones v. City of Hialeah, 368 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1979); Nettles v. Thornton, 198 So.2d 44. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed for entry of judgment in favor of Perez.
Reversed.
PEDRO R. PEREZ, Appellant, v. MARIO ZAZO, Appellee
No. 85-1844
Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District
498 So. 2d 463; 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9428; 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1818
August 19, 1986, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Herbert M. Klein, Judge.
CASE SUMMARYPROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant landlord sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court for Dade County (Florida) which entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of appellee tenant in appellee's suit for personal injuries he sustained when he was stabbed by appellant's manager.
OVERVIEW: When appellee tenant returned home from work, he told the building manager to put on the hot water. The building manager agreed, but stabbed the tenant in the back when he sat down. Appellee filed suit against appellant landlord, and the jury entered a verdict in appellee's favor. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment, because there was no evidence that the manager's conduct furthered or was motivated by a purpose to serve appellant's interests. The evidence showed only that the manager was angry and resentful, not that it would have furthered appellant's interests to have appellee killed. Thus, appellant could not be held liable for its manager's intentional wrongful act under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment on the jury verdict in favor of appellee tenant in his action against appellant landlord, because appellant could not be held liable for the action of his employee in stabbing appellee as that action would not have furthered appellant's interests.
CORE TERMS: stabbed, hot water, bus, apartment, tenant, sitting, matter of law, manager, assault, chair, door, driver's, happened, night, knife, scope of employment, employer's interests, similar case, elevator man, passenger, newspaper, stabbing, alighted, progress, morning, went inside, watching television, arrived, evening, stomach
LexisNexis® Headnotes Hide
Business & Corporate Law > Agency Relationships > Duties & Liabilities > Unlawful Acts of Agents > Intentional & Willful Injuries
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > General Overview
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Scope of Employment > General Overview
HN1 Responsibility for the intentional wrongful acts of a servant-employee may be visited upon his master-employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior only when that conduct in some way furthers the interests of the master or is at least motivated by a purpose to serve those interests, rather than the employee's own. More Like This Headnote * Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote
COUNSEL: Robert E. Austin, Jr. and Gerri Blair, for Appellant.
DeMeo & Sherman and Thomas Sherman, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Schwartz, C.J., and Baskin and Jorgenson, JJ.
OPINION BY: SCHWARTZ
OPINION
[*464] The defendant-landlord, Pedro Perez, appeals from an adverse jury verdict and judgment in a personal injury action arising from an incident in which his apartment manager, Rodriguez, deliberately stabbed the plaintiff, Mario Zazo, a tenant in the building. We reverse on the holding that the appellant's motions for directed verdict should have been granted because Rodriguez was, as a matter of law, not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time.
Since Rodriguez did not testify, the only version of the incident presented to the jury was that of the only other participant, the plaintiff. According to his testimony -- which, since the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, would have to be accepted even if it were disputed -- he arrived at his building one evening from work. He saw Rodriguez, 1 and, reflecting what was apparently a chronic complaint, "told [**2] him to put on the hot water." Rodriguez answered simply that he "would put it on now" and left. Zazo went into another tenant's apartment and was sitting having a beer when, without warning or explanation, Rodriguez came through the door and stabbed him in the back, stomach and face. 2 This evidence [*465] was insufficient to support the judgment under review.
FOOTNOTES
1 The appellant claims that he employed only Rodriguez's wife, not Rodriguez himself, as the building manager and that he was therefore not liable, as a matter of law, for any of Rodriguez's acts. We find ample evidence, however, to support the resolution of this issue against the defendant and therefore find this position without merit. Accordingly, this opinion assumes Rodriguez's status as an employee of Perez.
2 Zazo's testimony on the circumstances of his injury, in full, was as follows:
Q. If you had a complaint about something that was wrong with your apartment, who would you go to?
A. To him, to Rodriguez.
* * * *
Q. Now, on the night of March 24, 1984, tell us what happened in reference to the event leading up to your being stabbed.
A. March 23rd, around 7:30 in the evening, I arrived home and I took off my shirt and my chains and Rodriguez passed by and so I told him to put on the hot water.
I left -- I sat at Pastora's doorstep in the inside portion of Pastora's house.
Q. Wait one second.
What kind of problem were you having that night with your hot water?
A. There was no hot water. There was no hot water over there. There was never any hot water.
Q. Why did you tell Rodriguez to put on the hot water; who is he?
A. Because he is the manager.
Q. Okay.
When you told him to put on the hot water, what did he say to you?
A. I stayed sitting down at Pastora's door and he went down to his house to get a knife.
Q. Before Rodriguez left to go get the knife, as you say, was there any argument between you and he?
A. We didn't argue about anything.
Q. What did he say to you when you told him you needed hot water?
A. "I would put it on now."
He came with a knife and he stabbed me in my back.
Q. What were you doing before he stabbed you?
A. I was having a beer.
Q. Were you sitting in a chair? Were you standing? How were you positioned?
A. I was sitting in a chair in Pastora Ortega's house.
Q. Was your back to the door or were you facing the door?
A. Back to the door.
Q. Was Pastora Ortega there?
A. Pastora had left to the market and his wife was making coffee.
Q. Okay.
And as you were sitting there in the chair, were you watching television or what were you doing?
A. I was watching television because his wife had told me, "Check the coffee for me because I'm going to the bathroom."
Q. And what happened when Rodriguez came back?
A. He stabbed me three times.
Q. Okay.
The first time he stabbed you, where did he stabbed you?
A. Around the kidneys, around the lungs, around here.
Q. Did he say anything to you before he stabbed you?
A. Nothing. We had no argument about anything.
Q. I'm sorry.
Did you say anything to him?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
After he stabbed you in the back, as you were sitting in the chair, then what happened?
A. I went inside Pastora's house and I took hold of a chair in order to swerve it.
Q. And why did you do that?
A. Because I am inside the house and he went inside the house to stab me.
Q. Okay.
And did he stab you again at that point?
A. Then, he stabbed me in the stomach and once in the face, once in the face. * * * *
Q. Okay.
And what happened after he stabbed you three times; did he leave? Did he stay?
A. No, he ran off.
[**3] It is entirely clear that HN1responsibility for the intentional wrongful acts of a servant-employee may be visited upon his master-employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior 3 only when that conduct in some way furthers the interests of the master or is at least motivated by a purpose to serve those interests, rather than the employee's own. Stinson v. Prevatt, 84 Fla. 416, 94 So. 656 (1922); Williams v. Florida Realty & Management Co., 272 So.2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 235, at 520 (1958) ("An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed."). It is true that the relationship between the employee's wrong and the employer's interests found sufficient to warrant submitting the issue for jury determination seems, in some prior instances, to have been quite attenuated. See Columbia By The Sea, Inc. v. Petty, 157 So.2d 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (restaurant's liability for assault by maitre d' on customer during extended attempt to make extra charge for roquefort dressing properly submitted to jury); Forster v. [**4] Red Top Sedan Service, Inc., 257 So.2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (liability of bus company for driver's assault upon plaintiffs after forcing their vehicle off road because of belief they had delayed bus properly submitted to jury); Gonpere Corp. v. Rebull, 440 So.2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (apartment owner's liability for manager's shooting of tenants during argument over eviction properly submitted to jury; manager stated that he "told them to move and they didn't move"). In this instance, however, that connection is totally non-existent. We are simply unable to discern any indication whatever that any purpose of the apartment owner was being served or could have been intended by the then-silent and now-missing Rodriguez to have been served by the senseless, inexplicable act which injured Zazo. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 67 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1933); DeJesus v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 383 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Nettles v. Thornton, 198 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).
FOOTNOTES
3 This is the only theory upon which the plaintiff relies. He withdrew his allegation and produced no evidence that Rodriguez had been negligently hired. See Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) [11 FLW 1680].
[**5] The only aspect of Rodriguez's job which the appellee even contends may have been implicated by the stabbing was his asserted responsibility to "handle" tenants' complaints about the premises. But even making the quite speculative assumption that Rodriguez was angrily responding to the plaintiff's request for hot water, it can hardly have furthered the employer's interests -- as opposed to some activity in actually dealing with the subject of the complaint or in mollifying the complainer -- to attempt to do away with the tenant entirely. Instead, the stabbing must be viewed as motivated by Rodriguez's personal anger and resentment alone. In this regard, it is clear that the fact that the source and subject matter of what Rodriguez "took personally" was related to his work -- that he got mad over something on his job -- does not mean that his reaction was. Two decisions in particular support our conclusion to this effect. In Reina v. Metropolitan Dade County, 285 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. discharged, 304 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1974), after a heated disagreement with the driver over a bus fare, the passenger alighted, reached the sidewalk and flashed an obscene gesture from [**6] there at the driver. The latter responded to the [*466] insult by stopping and getting off the bus and physically attacking his tormentor. This court held the assault and battery beyond the driver's scope of employment as a matter of law. We distinguished the Forster case, supra, upon which the appellee heavily relies, on the ground that
in the cited case the conduct on the part of the injured party, which was impeding the progress of the bus towards the beach, was likely to continue as the bus proceeded down the expressway. The facts in the instant case are just the opposite. The passenger had alighted the bus and was across the street when he was attacked. His conduct would not have impeded the progress of the bus as it continued on its route. We believe the trial judge was correct in the entry of his order directing a verdict for the County.
Reina, 285 So.2d at 649. In the even more factually similar case of Trebitsch v. Goelet Leasing Co., 226 A.D. 567, 235 N.Y.S. 426 (1929), aff'd, 252 N.Y. 554, 170 N.E. 140 (1929), the plaintiff was a tenant in the defendant's apartment building. It was the duty of the night elevator man in the apartment [**7] house to distribute newspapers each morning to the tenants. One morning, the plaintiff complained that his newspaper had not been delivered. During a dispute over the matter, the elevator man assaulted and struck the plaintiff. The court held the owner not liable as a matter of law because the assault was not committed in the interest of the employer. In this case, as in Reina and Trebitsch, there is nothing to show that the tortious acts could have benefited the tort-feasor's employer; thus, as these decisions demonstrate, it makes no difference that they stemmed from or arose during the employment. In sum, the assault was plainly "neither activated by a purpose to serve the master nor related in any way to the furtherance of [his] business." DeJesus v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 383 So.2d at 274. As in many similar cases, it must therefore be concluded that the employer is not liable as a matter of law. City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 67 F.2d 487; Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Friedman v. Mutual Broadcasting System, 380 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), cert. [**8] denied, 388 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1980); Jones v. City of Hialeah, 368 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1979); Nettles v. Thornton, 198 So.2d 44. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed for entry of judgment in favor of Perez.
Reversed.
Cancel 2016.2
The Almighty
ok, that makes more sense then. I was under the (false) impression that it occurred inside the store.
Yes, even if. The reality is, there must be some realistic expectation put in there, otherwise the law is unnecessarily punitive toward employers. I would never hire anybody I didn't absolutely have to if they could simply reject my policy when I couldn't stop them and yet I would still be responsible for their action. I would also immediately move my company elsewhere with laws that don't hold me accountable for actions that I have no ability to stop.
This would be like taking the parent to jail when a 16 year old committed a crime. I could see them being responsible if they never taught them right from wrong.
The delineation in my scenario is that I don't believe it is reasonable to hold the employer accountable for actions taken that were clearly deliterious to the business and against policy. (In my scenario there was a clear policy against driving machinery when you couldn't see, even though I think that this one is again just a reasonable assertion and no specific policy should or would be necessary to see clear responsibility toward the person who chose to operate machinery without the ability to see where they were going).
It is clearly not within the law itself when it negatively effects the company to roll over things you cannot see, regardless if it is product or customers. It is particularly deliterious to run over customers and well outside the "benefit the company" portion.
Thorn
Member
This is a classic "law of negligence" situation, wherein during the action in which the plaintiff was injured, the forklift driver was, legally, acting as an "agent" of his employer. Although he apparently was doing so incompetently, the employer, under these circumstances, is liable.
As illustrated in Jarod's examples, if the forklift driver had left his vehicle and shoved the customer out of the way or beaten him up, then that would have been a personal action not covered by the "agent" classification.
(I took this stuff as part of my Insurance Institute courses a gazillion years ago). Nothing has changed.
As illustrated in Jarod's examples, if the forklift driver had left his vehicle and shoved the customer out of the way or beaten him up, then that would have been a personal action not covered by the "agent" classification.
(I took this stuff as part of my Insurance Institute courses a gazillion years ago). Nothing has changed.
I fully understand where it leads. However at some point, there is a reasonable limit that the employer can do.
It wasn't reached in this case, and I don't suggest it was.
My questions are in relation to "if". If certain things were the case what I would probably vote for or against if I was on a jury.
If the employer has trained them properly, ensured a full understanding of the policy, and done everything they could there should be a reasonable expectation of the employees adherence to what they have learned. Once they pass outside that particular scope of behavior they should be solely liable, not the employer who made it clear that such action was outside any acceptible action.