Dung,
I'm typing this from the book on Fannie and that I'm reading. They're describing what went down in 2003. Is this how you recall it happening?
Shortly after Fredie's accounting troubles srufaced in June 2003, Bush administration officials and Representative Baker began talking about the possiblity of legislatin to clamp tighter controls on the companies. By late June, Baker had proposed legislation to move regulation of Fannie and Freddie from Ofheo to a more powerful body, the U.S. Treasury. In late July, three Republican senators - Elizabeth Dole, John Sununu and Chuck Hagel-offered similar legislation.
The Bush administration joined the calls for a stronger regulator, with more power to set minimum capital, among other things. Two Republican congressional leaders, Representative Michael Oxley and Senator Shelby, promised to move swiftly to prepare legislation.
Not so fast, said the Natinal Association of Home Builders. Jerry Howard, the pugnacious executive vice-president of the builders' trade group, told reporters the legislative plans would "severly damage" the goverment's commitment to housing.
Representative Barney Frank, the ranking Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee, also urged caution. "I do not think we are facing any kind of crisis," he said.
One issue was whether the new regulatior would have stronger powers to approve or disapprove any "new product" proposed by Fannie and Freddie. Some financial companies were wary of what they called "mission creep" a tendency of Fannie and Freddie to spread into new areas of the mortgage business.
Fannie warned that its ability to innovate would be stifled if a new regulator began reviewing every new wrinkle in it programs and procedures. Home builders and advocates for low-income houseing fretted that tight regulation would choke off the flow of money from Frannie and Freddie.
Fannie's allies in Congress leaped to the company's defense. At a House hearing, Representative Maxine Waters, A California Democrat, said Congress should "do no harm" to Frannie and Freddie, which she saw as vital sources of mortgage financing for the poor. "We should be enhancing regulation, not making fundamental change." She added, "We do not have a crisis at Freddie Mac. And in particular at Fannie Mae, under the outstanding leadership of Franklin Raines, everything in the 1992 act has worked just fine."
Trying to find a compromise, the House Financial Services Committee drafted legislation that would create a new regulator for Fannie and Freddie inside the Treasury but limit that regulator's authority over new products. The Bush Administration said the regulator would be too weak under the House committee's plan. Wayne Abernathy, an assisstant Treasury secretary, argued that wek legislatin could give investors a false sense of confidence in the way the companies were regulated. Abernathy and other officials made clear that they preferred no legislation to weak legislation. It soon became apparent no bill would pass in 2003.
The momentum generated by Freddie's accounting scandal had dissipated. Despite sporadic hearings and maneuvers to find a compromise, it would take five more years -and the worst economic crisis since the 1930's-before Congress acted. By then it would be too late.