So you obviously don't know what words mean. All you're saying here is that the GSE's were hit hard too. Why were they hit hard? Simple; the Bush Administration forced them to start biuying risky loans in 2004, after reversing a 2000 HUD rule. So again, it was actions you took that caused GSE's to become destabilized.
And how did GSE loans perform anyway? Why better than all other types of loans. Period.
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So you see there on the chart that GSE's had the lowest delinquency rate of all loans, and were the last loans to rise in delinquency. Which means GSE's were not the cause of the collapse, but were a victim of it.
Franklin Raines snowflake; Franklin Raines.
Conclusion
If the affordable housing goals don’t account for the GSEs’ purchases of high risk subprime mortgages and their subsequent financial collapse, what does? The best explanation is the simplest. The GSEs badly misjudged the risk of subprime and Alt-A mortgages. They thought there were large profits to be made in the growing subprime market, and they sought to maintain and expand their share of the home mortgage market. They were not alone in misjudging the risks of subprime mortgages; so did other lenders. Indeed, the GSEs were by no means the first lenders to run into problems with their non-prime portfolios; HSBC and New Century were frontpage news in February 2007. But the GSEs, because they were bigger and were required to hold less capital took the biggest risks and had the most spectacular problems.
The GSEs have made other misjudgments than threatened their solvency. Economists have often analyzed risk for financial institutions along three dimensions:
interest rate risk, credit risk, operations risk. The GSEs have experienced all three.