For Darla... three articles on Krugman from Huffpost...

The above is precisely the nonsense that Krugmanites display time and again. Attacks on Ferguson and now on me. All because Darla cannot refute anything that was written in the articles. Typical liberal nonsense.

Always remember SF; you are arguing with idiots. They do not have a brain. They can only try to drag you down to their level, then beat you with experience in a never ending circle of stupidity.

It's best not to try and reason with them; but mock their ignorance and pity those without a brain. Just sayin...
 
Niall Ferguson did an excellent series of TV programmes called the Ascent of Money, it should be required viewing for the economically challenged.

That would require effort; dimwits hate effort. They think things should be given to them or those they designate as being needy.
 
So where is Darla to call out someone for trying to divert from the thread topic? Oh wait, it is Darla and Co. that are doing so on this thread, so all is well.
 
So where is Darla to call out someone for trying to divert from the thread topic? Oh wait, it is Darla and Co. that are doing so on this thread, so all is well.

I don't have the time now, but later, I think it will be fun to summarize all the shrill leftist dimwit arguments on this thread in one post.

Thanks for sharing Naiil's examination on Krugman. It was a good read.
 
If it makes you happy to think that, feel free to keep your illusion

LMAO... one of us has read the articles, one of us is living in a fantasy world. If you are refusing to read the articles that have referenced each of the points made with Krugmans own words, then it is you that is living with an illusion.

The fact that you think you can state the above while refusing to read what we are discussing just shows how intellectually dishonest you can be when protecting an idol.
 

click on the 'here's' They each link to his discussion on US problems from back in 2006. Again, as he states, he was not correct on everything, but he certainly got more correct than Krugman...

But at least one historian did here and here and here and here and here. And here. I don't claim to be always right.

(above is from link two in OP)
 
(Speaking of boots, they arrived yesterday!)

1991872-p-MOBILETHUMB.jpg



Now back to the topic... Krugman rocks!

Beautiful - are those burgandy? I need a pair of burgandy boots.
 
click on the 'here's' They each link to his discussion on US problems from back in 2006. Again, as he states, he was not correct on everything, but he certainly got more correct than Krugman...



(above is from link two in OP)

The board's two biggest climate science deniers agog over a right wing shill.

Who would have imagined?
 
click on the 'here's' They each link to his discussion on US problems from back in 2006. Again, as he states, he was not correct on everything, but he certainly got more correct than Krugman...

(above is from link two in OP)


What I find most odd is how Ferguson pretends that the Krugman column from August 10, 2007 doesn't exist:

What’s been happening in financial markets over the past few days is something that truly scares monetary economists: liquidity has dried up. That is, markets in stuff that is normally traded all the time — in particular, financial instruments backed by home mortgages — have shut down because there are no buyers.

This could turn out to be nothing more than a brief scare. At worst, however, it could cause a chain reaction of debt defaults.

The origins of the current crunch lie in the financial follies of the last few years, which in retrospect were as irrational as the dot-com mania. The housing bubble was only part of it; across the board, people began acting as if risk had disappeared.

Everyone knows now about the explosion in subprime loans, which allowed people without the usual financial qualifications to buy houses, and the eagerness with which investors bought securities backed by these loans. But investors also snapped up high-yield corporate debt, a k a junk bonds, driving the spread between junk bond yields and U.S. Treasuries down to record lows.

Then reality hit — not all at once, but in a series of blows. First, the housing bubble popped. Then subprime melted down. Then there was a surge in investor nervousness about junk bonds: two months ago the yield on corporate bonds rated B was only 2.45 percent higher than that on government bonds; now the spread is well over 4 percent.

Investors were rattled recently when the subprime meltdown caused the collapse of two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns, the investment bank. Since then, markets have been manic-depressive, with triple-digit gains or losses in the Dow Jones industrial average — the rule rather than the exception for the past two weeks.

But yesterday’s announcement by BNP Paribas, a large French bank, that it was suspending the operations of three of its own funds was, if anything, the most ominous news yet. The suspension was necessary, the bank said, because of “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments” — that is, there are no buyers.

When liquidity dries up, as I said, it can produce a chain reaction of defaults. Financial institution A can’t sell its mortgage-backed securities, so it can’t raise enough cash to make the payment it owes to institution B, which then doesn’t have the cash to pay institution C — and those who do have cash sit on it, because they don’t trust anyone else to repay a loan, which makes things even worse.

And here’s the truly scary thing about liquidity crises: it’s very hard for policy makers to do anything about them.


The Fed normally responds to economic problems by cutting interest rates — and as of yesterday morning the futures markets put the probability of a rate cut by the Fed before the end of next month at almost 100 percent. It can also lend money to banks that are short of cash: yesterday the European Central Bank, the Fed’s trans-Atlantic counterpart, lent banks $130 billion, saying that it would provide unlimited cash if necessary, and the Fed pumped in $24 billion.

But when liquidity dries up, the normal tools of policy lose much of their effectiveness. Reducing the cost of money doesn’t do much for borrowers if nobody is willing to make loans. Ensuring that banks have plenty of cash doesn’t do much if the cash stays in the banks’ vaults.

There are other, more exotic things the Fed and, more important, the executive branch of the U.S. government could do to contain the crisis if the standard policies don’t work. But for a variety of reasons, not least the current administration’s record of incompetence, we’d really rather not go there.

Let’s hope, then, that this crisis blows over as quickly as that of 1998. But I wouldn’t count on it.


Maybe Ferguson was too busy patting himself on the back.


http://select.nytimes.com/2007/08/10/opinion/10krugman.html?hp&pagewanted=print
 
The board's two biggest climate science deniers agog over a right wing shill.

Who would have imagined?

The boards biggest baby killer supporter and genetic science denier whining over her idiot left wing 'economist' being bashed and then trying to change the topic of the thread.
 
What I find most odd is how Ferguson pretends that the Krugman column from August 10, 2007 doesn't exist:




Maybe Ferguson was too busy patting himself on the back.


http://select.nytimes.com/2007/08/10/opinion/10krugman.html?hp&pagewanted=print

LMAO... try reading what Ferguson wrote. Where in it does he 'pretend' that Krugman never discussed it. Had you bothered reading the articles in the OP, you will see that Ferguson DID recognize the number of times Krugman wrote about the sub prime crisis prior to the fall of 2008. He then also commented on all the other articles Krugman wrote that were wrong about what would happen and why. But you ignore that... don't you dung...

In 2006, the year before the financial crisis began, Krugman had a twice-weekly New York Times column. What a perfect opportunity, one might have thought, for the infallible Nobel laureate and author of Depression Economics to warn his readers about the gathering storm. Retrospectively, Krugman pats himself on the back. "How did I do?" And the answer is, not too badly. ... I've had a pretty good stretch."

In fact, only eight of Krugman's more than a hundred columns in 2006 referred to the bubble in the U.S. housing market and the danger posed by its bursting. The key word "subprime" did not appear in his column until March 2007. Nearly everything else was a partisan rant of one sort or another against the policies of the administration of George W. Bush.


As an economist honored by the Swedish central bank for his work on trade theory, and as someone who had also cut his teeth as a commentator on the 1997-8 Asian Crisis, Krugman made the mistake of thinking the trade deficit and therefore the dollar were crucial. Here is a revealing passage from a column he wrote in February 2006:

By August 2006, Krugman's diagnosis of the risk of a coming recession was correct in only one respect: that he thought there was a risk. In every other respect he was wrong:

The forces that caused a recession five years ago never went away. Business spending hasn't really recovered from the slump it went into after the technology bubble burst: nonresidential investment as a share of GDP, though up a bit from its low point, is still far below its levels in the late 1990's. Also, the trade deficit has doubled since 2000, diverting a lot of demand away from goods produced in the United States. ... [But] now, for the first time, problems in the housing market are starting to seriously reduce economic growth: the latest GDP data show real residential investment falling at an accelerating pace. ... based on what we know now, there's an economic slowdown coming. This slowdown might not be sharp enough to be formally declared a recession.​
Once again, he was looking at the wrong dials on the dashboard, completely missing the financial implications of falling house prices.

nd when Krugman tried to imagine how the crisis would play out, with a piece published in March 2007 under the dateline "Feb. 27, 2008", his predictions were laughable. According to the man who would come to be known as the Invincible Krugtron:
1. The crisis would begin with a stock market crash ... in China.
2. Then it would spread to the junk bond market.
3. Then would come the defaults on subprime mortgages.
4. But the crisis would only be really big if "large market players, hedge funds in particular, [had] taken on so much leverage - borrowing to buy risky assets - that the falling prices of those assets would set off a chain reaction of defaults and bankruptcies".

As late as January 2008 - again looking myopically at trade data - he was arguing that the U.S. economy had "dodged a bullet ... which is why I haven't been as sure about a looming recession as, say, Larry Summers or Marty Feldstein, let alone Nouriel Roubini ... I'm actually uncertain about where things go this year." Nor was he "nearly as pessimistic" as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, whose seminal paper on the likely huge macroeconomic impact of the subprime crisis appeared that February. It was only in March that Krugman finally grasped the financial nature of the crisis. "A lot of people", he wrote, "saw that there was a huge housing bubble":
What's going on now, however, is beyond that: the "financial accelerator," with deleveraging causing a credit crunch that forces further deleveraging, and now threatens to produce a sort of pancake collapse of the whole system, was not, I think, so widely foreseen. I don't think many people saw how much the system itself would break down.​
No, not many economists did see the complex interrelationships between the subprime mortgage market, collateralized debt obligations, highly leveraged banks and international derivatives markets that were the key to the scale of the crisis and its macroeconomic impact. But at least one historian did here and here and here and here and here. And here. I don't claim to be always right. But always wrong?
 
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