Property Rights Are Not Natural Freedoms

LOL! No, I have explained mutliple times and in detail that that is not so. YOUR STRAWMAN IS THE ONLY ONE WHO BELIEVES THAT.

Human in isolation is your/Rousseau's state of nature, not mine.

How?

Because Rousseau's definition of the state of nature would require that man exist in isolation. That is he defines it as outside of society. A society exist whenever there is more than one person in a given area. This definition is nonsensical.

In the natural state, there is no isolation from physical coercion, you are subject to the will and physical capability of other creatures.

In what state is there an isolation from physical coercion??? As I have stated numerous times, you are certainly not free from it in your "social state" (or whatever you might call it).

To be free from physical coercion, which is what you state is the essence of rights, is impossible unless the individual is isolated from all other entities and is isolated from physical needs such as hunger/thirst etc.

Well then it is a good thing that my definition is not based on some nonsensical unreality. Rights CAN BE violated in any state and I have not argued otherwise.

My point is that the libertarian concept that we should move towards living in a state without physical coercion is a fantasy.

Well, again, it is a good thing that is not the position and this is only another strawman. Libertarians do not argue for some mystical "social state" where physical coercion is absent, just that it should not be tolerated. From my view, your the one who seems to argue that your "social freedoms" are somehow inviolable.

Because somehow you extrapolated that social freedoms are the groups exercise of will and capability.

Social freedoms overcome will and capability by replacing them with a moral framework.

Based on what? Unreality? You argue that freedoms can only exist where there is will and capability.

Natural rights overcome will and capability as a moral premise.

If, as a society, you make the moral agreement to afford property rights, and then the society breaks that moral agreement, you have a return to natural freedoms, will and capability take over.

It has never left since you argue that freedom is necessarily dependent on will and capability. You are using a stolen concept fallacy here. You are not applying the same conditions to your social freedoms that you do to your natural freedoms.

You might not like this, but it is. A moral agreement is the same as any agreement, and is subject to being violated. I have never claimed that social freedoms cannot be violated, just that natural freedom (ie will and capability) cannot be, as their is no moral agreement involved.

You argue that the social freedoms/agreement violates natural freedoms. What is the basis of the social agreement if not the natural freedoms one possesses, i.e., will and capability.

Quite simply, you seem to wish that certain freedoms are natural because this rhetorically affords them greater significance, but that is beside the point that morality and rights don't exist in the natural state, only in a social environment.

There is a disconnect here because you insist on ignoring the definition of the "state of nature" of natural rights proponents. Again, it does not exclude social interaction, in fact Locke argues that man is a social animal by nature.

LOL! Do you imagine that in your state physical coercion is no longer possible?

You NEVER escape physical coercion, under natural or social freedoms. Escaping physical coercion is a libertarian fantasy, an unattainable absolute.

Again, strawman. Again, if the fact that one cannot avoid the reality of physical coercion is sufficient to tear down "natural rights" or your "natural freedoms" then why is it not sufficient to tear down "social freedoms." That is, your "social freedoms" are just as dependent on will and capability as your "natural freedoms." And it is just as much an abstraction.
 
I understand the position you are taking, but my problem with rights being described as natural by philosophers like Hobbes and Locke is that these rights are created / invented, they aren't innate. They don't exist in nature or anywhere outside of human morality. As I mentioned before, human morality is a consequence/mechanism of social living , not nature.

Man by nature is a moral animal. We have an innate sense of right and wrong.
 
Man by nature is a moral animal. We have an innate sense of right and wrong.

Remove a human from its human social upbringing... ie bring it up as feral, an it has no concept of morality. Morality isn't genetic, it isn't innate. It derives from conditioning within a social environment.

You learn 'right from wrong', you don't innately know it.
 
RS, to avoid long posts, I won't run through replying point by point.. just a few points about your post...

a. Firstly, you state that humans are free from external force in their natural state. In its natural state, if a human comes across another human, and their wills conflict, then external force occurs. The ONLY way for a human to avoid external force is to isolate itself from other humans.

b. That humans have rights by virtue of their nature of being human. This infers that morality (which dictates rights) is innate in humans. As I mentioned above, feral children demonstrate clearly that morality is learnt, is conditioned through exposure to society. The idea that in our natural state we are any more moral than other animals is a fallacy. Man's natural state is that before it becomes socialised, before it learns the morality of the social group it exists in. It has nothing to do with the state, the nation state is only a few hundred years old.

c. You state that morality is found in the state of nature and that humans have an innate sense of right and wrong. We have already discussed the feral child example. If humans have a innate sense of right and wrong, that would make right and wrong set in stone, absolute. The only way for this to occur would be the introduction of an adjudicator, such as a god.

The fact that right and wrong are not fixed, but subjective descriptions, added to the fact that morality isn't innate, negates this notion.

d. You state that Rousseau's definition of the state of nature is flawed because it requires humans to live in isolation, and that society occurs whenever two people come together. This is not necessarily true. If two people come together and follow exclusively their own will, they exist in a state of nature. If the two create a mutual moral understanding and act according to that, they use social freedoms.

A similar scenerio occurs up to any level of size of society. Using the modern concept of 'the state'. Imagine one nation covets its neighbour's natural resources. If the nation abides by international moral agreements (ie protecting national soveriegnty) and doesn't invade, then they exist in a state of social freedom. If the nation follows only its will, and invades to gain the natural resources, then a state of nature occurs between them.

d. I am getting mixed messages with reference to external force. At one stage you state that "(sic) Rights are held in the natural state free of the external force of others." and later that "In what state is there an isolation from physical coercion???" ????

e. You claim that I claim that rights are 'necessarily dependent on will and capability'. This is not what I claim. I claim that in the natural state, you have no rights, only will and capability. It is only under mutual moral agreement, ie social freedoms, that rights occur.


To cut to the chase, Locke/Your argument that there are certain rights that are natural and unalienable is flawed because....

All rights are derived from morality
Morality is socially conditioned. (If morality were innate as you claim then feral children would grow up in a feral environment with fully developed morality. It is also negated by the fact that morality differs between societies.)
If morality isn't innate, then rights cannot be innate.
If rights are derived from morality, and morality is socially conditioned, rights are derived from a mutal moral agreement within society.

Ergo, rights are derived from social agreement, rather than natural innateness.
 
Man by nature is a moral animal. We have an innate sense of right and wrong.

Remove a human from its human social upbringing... ie bring it up as feral, an it has no concept of morality. Morality isn't genetic, it isn't innate. It derives from conditioning within a social environment.

You learn 'right from wrong', you don't innately know it.

It is not natural for humans to be raised by dogs! Any, really this is a stupid line of argument. Animals in captivity, i.e., reared by humans, are not considered to be in their natural state so why on earth would we look to humans reared by animals or without human contact as being the natural state of humanity. That's plainly absurd.

Still, how can one assume that the actions of a feral human are due to a lack of conditioning rather than simply the result of another form of conditioning.

I doubt seriously that even feral humans are without some understanding of right and wrong.
 
RS, to avoid long posts, I won't run through replying point by point.. just a few points about your post...

a. Firstly, you state that humans are free from external force in their natural state. In its natural state, if a human comes across another human, and their wills conflict, then external force occurs. The ONLY way for a human to avoid external force is to isolate itself from other humans.

While force is applied the natural state is interrupted. But that does not mean youd have to be isolated. Further, there is no reason to assume that all disagreement involve external force.

b. That humans have rights by virtue of their nature of being human. This infers that morality (which dictates rights) is innate in humans. As I mentioned above, feral children demonstrate clearly that morality is learnt, is conditioned through exposure to society.

As I noted in response, is it the lack of conditioning by human society or is it due to positive application of another form of conditioning? How is one to know? I can't answer that honestly and I don't believe you can either.

One thing is obvious to me, a feral child is not natural condition for humans. The natural condition is for a child is to be reared by other humans and this is the natural condition for nearly all animals.

Again, I argue that man is a social animal by nature. Do you honestly disagree with that?

The idea that in our natural state we are any more moral than other animals is a fallacy. Man's natural state is that before it becomes socialised, before it learns the morality of the social group it exists in. It has nothing to do with the state, the nation state is only a few hundred years old.

That's what YOU mean by natural state. Whether your definition fits the words better or not is another argument (one I have already addressed, i.e., man's natural condition is not a feral one) and has no real relevance if your goal is to criticize the concept of natural rights. If you are going to attack the natural rights position, then it is dishonest to use the ambiguity of a different definition for "natural state." It is a strawman. Locke was not arguing that man's natural state is a feral one, or that he held rights in a feral state.

The only way for this to occur would be the introduction of an adjudicator, such as a god.

Huh?

d. You state that Rousseau's definition of the state of nature is flawed because it requires humans to live in isolation, and that society occurs whenever two people come together. This is not necessarily true. If two people come together and follow exclusively their own will, they exist in a state of nature. If the two create a mutual moral understanding and act according to that, they use social freedoms.

Fine then, this is not the natural right's or Locke's understanding of an end to the state of nature.

A similar scenerio occurs up to any level of size of society. Using the modern concept of 'the state'. Imagine one nation covets its neighbour's natural resources. If the nation abides by international moral agreements (ie protecting national soveriegnty) and doesn't invade, then they exist in a state of social freedom. If the nation follows only its will, and invades to gain the natural resources, then a state of nature occurs between them.

As defined by Locke, the natural state between the nations would have existed before the attack and the attack would have ended it. He addressed this explicitly.

d. I am getting mixed messages with reference to external force. At one stage you state that "(sic) Rights are held in the natural state free of the external force of others." and later that "In what state is there an isolation from physical coercion???" ????

Okay, what I intended with the second is to ask in what state is there an isolation from the potential of physical force.

e. You claim that I claim that rights are 'necessarily dependent on will and capability'. This is not what I claim. I claim that in the natural state, you have no rights, only will and capability. It is only under mutual moral agreement, ie social freedoms, that rights occur.

If all we have in natural state is will and capability then our rights are dependent on them. You have argued that. This does not change when we join our will and capability with others to create social freedoms. The social freedoms are still dependent on will and capability.
 
Another point...

You state that your definition of man in his "natural state" does not necessarily imply isolation. Yet, you use a feral human as your best example of man in his natural state. Further, you state that when any two huamns come into contact and reach some sort of mutual agreement rather than bashing each others brains in or returning to isolation, then their natural state has ended.

Can you explain that? To me it seems you argue that man's natural state is in isolation or in an "every man for himself" war. Nothing in human history or what we have concluded about prehistory backs that up.
 
Let's do this another way...

You claim that humans have innate rights granted by their innate morality. Let's expand on that......

Firstly, the feral child example was to demonstrate that humans have no innate morality, that morality is learnt through social interaction.

As rights such as 'right to life' or 'right to property' are statements of moral intent, these rights must be derived from the source of morality.

If humans have no innate morality, then rights cannot derive from innate morality, and they must be garnered from elsewhere.

If morality isn't innate, it must be learnt, conditioned from the social arena the individual finds themself in.

Rights are derived from social morality, not a mythical innate morality, ergo such rights being described as anything other than social rights must be a misnomer.

Enough of the rambling syllogism....

The problem Locke etc have with explaining these as natural rights is that the demarkations of what are and aren't rights are entirely arbitory, and their explanation of the right's origins are obscurum per obscurius. The notion of natural rights originated during the enlightenment, and were deemed 'natural' as a rhetorical tool to fight against the oppression of monarchies and the clergy...

Don't get me wrong, I am not arguing against such rights, though I think some ie property rights, can contradict others....
 
Can you explain that? To me it seems you argue that man's natural state is in isolation or in an "every man for himself" war. Nothing in human history or what we have concluded about prehistory backs that up.

In its natural state, humans are 'every man (and his family) for themselves'...

In the hunter/gatherer era of human development, the concept of rights didn't exist, the matriarch and patriarch exercised their will according to their ability to. Women's role as child bearer and hearth tender gave them considerable power, especially during the times when childbirth was misunderstood and mystified. It was only as humans extended their family to form tribal groups that internal social morality arose. To external forces/people, natural freedoms still existed, will and capability was all that mattered. Thus wars...

This internal social rights, combined with external natural freedom, extended into the modern day, and 'tribal' external affairs only came under the influence of social freedom when the moral decision was made to create international law....
 
But the feral child example does not prove morality is entirely learnt. Like I said, how do we know their seeming lack of morality is not simply due to conditioning? We do not. And you have not shown they are completely without morality, just that some of their behavior would be in violation of what is commonly held as moral.

Your insistence that morality is conditional upon social interaction is not anymore or less proven than the idea that it is innate.

Further, when I say it is innate I do not mean that we are hardwired with the answer to all moral questions. Rather we naturally possess the tools to form morality and there is a general sense of right and wrong. Nature and nurture are both a part of it and Social interaction is a natural part of what it means to be a human.


In its natural state, humans are 'every man (and his family) for themselves'...

In the hunter/gatherer era of human development, the concept of rights didn't exist, the matriarch and patriarch exercised their will according to their ability to. Women's role as child bearer and hearth tender gave them considerable power, especially during the times when childbirth was misunderstood and mystified. It was only as humans extended their family to form tribal groups that internal social morality arose. To external forces/people, natural freedoms still existed, will and capability was all that mattered. Thus wars...

This internal social rights, combined with external natural freedom, extended into the modern day, and 'tribal' external affairs only came under the influence of social freedom when the moral decision was made to create international law....

First off, according to your previous statements forming a family would constitute an end to the natural state and a beginning of society. Unless, one spouse was taken and held as a slave. Otherwise, the union constitutes a mutual agreement. Why is the agreement any more natural? Or why are other agreements unnatural?

Part of human nature is a rational capacity and the ability to reason. No other animal possesses it to the extent we do and it is the primary cause of our dominance. It gives us the capacity to see that cooperation is usually preferrable to war.

Locke's demarcation of what is or is not a natural right is less arbitrary than your demarcation of natural freedoms and social freedoms. I have yet to see you give a clear argument as to how social freedoms are not completely dependent on will and capability. If the group does not have the will and capability to enforce the "agreement" then you claim it reverts to natural freedom which is based on will and capability. In reality there is no distinction. The distinction seems to be nothing more than a rhetorical device.

Locke's demarcation is primarily based around the absence of external force from other humans (also, reality, i.e., you do not have a natural right to flap your arms and fly, or as you might put it, will and capability). That's pretty clear.

As rights such as 'right to life' or 'right to property' are statements of moral intent, these rights must be derived from the source of morality.

They are. The source of morality is man's nature, including his rational capacity which, from a moral perspective, is invalidated only upon the initiation of force. The source of morality is not as some mythical supernatural power of the group. A group of beings without the capacity for morality cannot suddenly gain the capacity anymore than humans can fly if two or more flap their arms. They can only do what is in their nature as humans.
 
But the feral child example does not prove morality is entirely learnt. Like I said, how do we know their seeming lack of morality is not simply due to conditioning? We do not. And you have not shown they are completely without morality, just that some of their behavior would be in violation of what is commonly held as moral.

Morality is a form of knowledge. Knowledge isn't innate, it is learnt.

Your parents probably knew how to drive before you were born but they didn't pass that knowledge to you genetically. You had to learn for yourself and make the same mistakes your parents did years before.

When we bring up children, we teach them our version of what is right and wrong.

Ergo, morality is learnt.



Further, when I say it is innate I do not mean that we are hardwired with the answer to all moral questions. Rather we naturally possess the tools to form morality

This is a bit of a tautology. If we didn't have the capacity to form morality (ie the capacity to learn) we couldn't have formed morality.

and there is a general sense of right and wrong.

Now this is a very bold statement RS. Do you consider right and wrong to be fixed, not subjective? How do you account for variations in what is considered right and wrong?

For eg... I consider smoking weed to be not morally wrong, whilst someone a little more conservative (and square..lol) might consider it morally wrong.


Nature and nurture are both a part of it and Social interaction is a natural part of what it means to be a human.

I hate the comparison because it indicates a form of mind/body dualism junk, but nature provides the hardware, knowledge the software. Without the hardware, the software would be useless and vice versa...

First off, according to your previous statements forming a family would constitute an end to the natural state and a beginning of society. Unless, one spouse was taken and held as a slave. Otherwise, the union constitutes a mutual agreement. Why is the agreement any more natural? Or why are other agreements unnatural?

This all depends on the predominant social grouping. During the time when the family was the predominant social grouping (ie hunter/gatherer era) then the social contract (ie moral agreement) occurred only within the family. When the family came into contact with other family groups, natural freedoms prevailed, and will and capability ruled. As human societies evolved into the tribal era, the social contract occurred within the tribe, when the tribe came into contact with other tribes, natural freedoms occurred.

This continued all the way through to the invention of the notion of the nation state, where the SC occurred within the nation state, but, outside that, natural freedoms occurred. When the will of the nation state clashed with another, war occurred.

Today, we are attempting, with international law, to create a social contract that covers the entire world.

The exchange of natural freedoms (to do as you will, provided you are capable) occurs whenever a moral decision is made to exchange them for protective rights.


Part of human nature is a rational capacity and the ability to reason. No other animal possesses it to the extent we do and it is the primary cause of our dominance. It gives us the capacity to see that cooperation is usually preferrable to war.

Yes, reason is required to make a moral judgement to exchange the freedoms to do as you will for protection from other's will..

Locke's demarcation of what is or is not a natural right is less arbitrary than your demarcation of natural freedoms and social freedoms.

Their is no arbitrariness in the demarcation between natural and social freedoms. The demarcation is defined by the exchange of the right to do as you will for the right to be protected from the free-wheeling will of others.

The fact that Locke creates notions of natural rights such as freedom of life or property based entirely on the obscurum per obscurius argument that they are deemed natural by 'human nature' certainly appears artificial, as if he were attempting (rightly IMO) to rhetorically justify them.


If the group does not have the will and capability to enforce the "agreement" then you claim it reverts to natural freedom which is based on will and capability. In reality there is no distinction. The distinction seems to be nothing more than a rhetorical device.

The difference is the moral agreement between the society. You are right that natural freedom is always underlying, it is the default setting. A moral agreement might be broken, and in such a case natural freedoms are returned to. There is no guarantee of protective rights. It is only man's ability to make and keep moral agreements.

That might not sound pleasant, but life is cold, amoral. It is something humanity overcomes by creating morality.


Locke's demarcation is primarily based around the absence of external force from other humans (also, reality, i.e., you do not have a natural right to flap your arms and fly, or as you might put it, will and capability). That's pretty clear.

Absence of external force on human from other humans??? When is there ever an absence of external force on humans? When human will conflicts with another human's will there will be external force.

If rights are defined by an absence of force from other humans, property rights are negated. If all property is owned, then production methods for innate human needs are owned. Innate human needs are a form of physical force (ask a starving person) This means that property rights create an external force created by (ownership of modes of production by) humans.


The source of morality is man's nature, (sic) The source of morality is not as some mythical supernatural power of the group. (sic) A group of beings without the capacity for morality cannot suddenly gain the capacity anymore than humans can fly if two or more flap their arms.

"Man's nature" is a very ambiguous term. One human's nature is not necessarily akin to another's.

Morality is the mechanism human's have developed to live in social groups. It isn't a supernatural notion (RS, you know my opinions on all concepts of the supernatural) and it certainly isn't mythical. In fact, the notion of a singular 'human nature' is better described as mythical.

Without morality, social living would be impossible and it is from this we derive it.

Your notion that I am suggesting that humans didn't have morality and then suddenly did is as bizarre as the strawman that religious types use about evolution.... " How can a complicated organism just evolve out of another in one leap?"

It is a Mount Improbable scenerio (see R Dawkins fantastic book of this name if you haven't already). Step, by steady step and through trial and error. For example, it wouldn't take long to work out that killing is not conducive to social living, and so eventually societies agree a moral code that killing is 'bad' (in reality, it is just an act. Good or bad are judgement calls made by the person doing the judging)

Morality evolved until it was hijacked by religion (the mysticalisation of unknown phenomenon - the 'god of the gaps') to be used as, not a method of social cohesion, but a mode of social control.

Today, we have complex lines of moral code, honed by trial and error. All moral codes are subjective, and adherence to them are done by mutual agreement.
 
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But the feral child example does not prove morality is entirely learnt. Like I said, how do we know their seeming lack of morality is not simply due to conditioning? We do not. And you have not shown they are completely without morality, just that some of their behavior would be in violation of what is commonly held as moral.

Morality is a form of knowledge. Knowledge isn't innate, it is learnt.

Your parents probably knew how to drive before you were born but they didn't pass that knowledge to you genetically. You had to learn for yourself and make the same mistakes your parents did years before.

When we bring up children, we teach them our version of what is right and wrong.

Ergo, morality is learnt.

It's pretty clear that some knowledge is innate. For instance, a mammal child knows where to get milk and that the milk will satisfy its biological needs.

It's pretty clear that some knowledge is innate. For instance, a mammal child knows where to get milk.
Further, when I say it is innate I do not mean that we are hardwired with the answer to all moral questions. Rather we naturally possess the tools to form morality

This is a bit of a tautology. If we didn't have the capacity to form morality (ie the capacity to learn) we couldn't have formed morality.

and there is a general sense of right and wrong.

Now this is a very bold statement RS. Do you consider right and wrong to be fixed, not subjective? How do you account for variations in what is considered right and wrong?

For eg... I consider smoking weed to be not morally wrong, whilst someone a little more conservative (and square..lol) might consider it morally wrong.

In a general sense, yes, it is fixed. That does not mean you always get the same answer. It's not math.

Smoking weed is immoral if you abuse it, i.e., if it becomes harmful to you.

Nature and nurture are both a part of it and Social interaction is a natural part of what it means to be a human.

I hate the comparison because it indicates a form of mind/body dualism junk, but nature provides the hardware, knowledge the software. Without the hardware, the software would be useless and vice versa...

I don't know what your point is, but okay.

First off, according to your previous statements forming a family would constitute an end to the natural state and a beginning of society. Unless, one spouse was taken and held as a slave. Otherwise, the union constitutes a mutual agreement. Why is the agreement any more natural? Or why are other agreements unnatural?

This all depends on the predominant social grouping. During the time when the family was the predominant social grouping (ie hunter/gatherer era) then the social contract (ie moral agreement) occurred only within the family.

Meaning the members of the family had left the "state of nature." As I said, your state of nature could only exist if man existed in isolation, but since we are social animals that violates our nature and the definition is nonsensical and contradicts itself.

Locke's demarcation of what is or is not a natural right is less arbitrary than your demarcation of natural freedoms and social freedoms.

Their is no arbitrariness in the demarcation between natural and social freedoms. The demarcation is defined by the exchange of the right to do as you will for the right to be protected from the free-wheeling will of others.

Come on! This is non responsive gibberish. The point is, your social freedom's protection from the "free-wheeling will of others" is based upon the society's will and capability. Under your concept of natural freedom, protection from the "free-wheeling will of others" is based upon the individual's will and capability. There is no legitimate distinction or demarcation. In both cases it is might makes right.

If the group does not have the will and capability to enforce the "agreement" then you claim it reverts to natural freedom which is based on will and capability. In reality there is no distinction. The distinction seems to be nothing more than a rhetorical device.

The difference is the moral agreement between the society. You are right that natural freedom is always underlying, it is the default setting.

It is more than that, it is a constant setting.

A moral agreement might be broken, and in such a case natural freedoms are returned to. There is no guarantee of protective rights. It is only man's ability to make and keep moral agreements.

Yes, man's ability. In reality, in your coneptualization, there was never any departure from your natural freedom.


Absence of external force on human from other humans??? When is there ever an absence of external force on humans?

I know you are an evil soccerists, but I doubt you get into a fist fight every time you come into contact with another. I have thusfar assumed your social agreements were entered into peacefully.

When human will conflicts with another human's will there will be external force.

Not necessarily. A disagreement of wills does not imply force.

If rights are defined by an absence of force from other humans, property rights are negated. If all property is owned, then production methods for innate human needs are owned. Innate human needs are a form of physical force (ask a starving person) This means that property rights create an external force created by (ownership of modes of production by) humans.

Nonsense. Human needs are not physical force from others. That is clear.

Morality is the mechanism human's have developed to live in social groups. It isn't a supernatural notion (RS, you know my opinions on all concepts of the supernatural) and it certainly isn't mythical. In fact, the notion of a singular 'human nature' is better described as mythical.

Your concept of morality is a supernatural power you grant to the group. You argue that human nature is amoral (i.e., we lack moral sensibility). Yet a group can form morality. Somehow the group aquired an ability that the individual members do not have even parts. This has nothing to do with evolution.
 
It's pretty clear that some knowledge is innate. For instance, a mammal child knows where to get milk and that the milk will satisfy its biological needs.

There is a difference between a baby's ability to locate milk and knowledge. A baby might have an innate detector that attracts it to its mother's milk, but that isn't knowledge anymore than a person's ability to breathe is knowledge. Is the heart beating, knowledge?

In a general sense, yes, it is fixed. That does not mean you always get the same answer. It's not math.

Smoking weed is immoral if you abuse it, i.e., if it becomes harmful to you.


If morality is fixed, something must has fixed it. Something must be the arbitrator of morality. What do you think is the arbitrator of morality?

If the arbitrator is simply what is bad for you, then driving (pollutions, risk of crashing), eating red meat, drinking coffee, walking to walk (risk of pollution/being hit by car), eating fish and chips (cholesterol) and pretty much everything we do is immoral.

Morality isn't fixed because the universe, life etc are amoral. Morality is subjective and defined by the individual. We may be able to form common opinions on morality but that doesn't indicate that it is fixed.

You might say that certain things are commonly shared by all and this indicates that morality is fixed. Many use killing as an example, but in some societies it is deemed moral. Your own society deems killing prisoners morally acceptable (though some individual moral perspectives in the US oppose this). Some societies deem killing moral if it is done to appease the 'gods'.

In reality, acts are just acts. Whether they are deemed moral or not is up to the person doing the judging.



I don't know what your point is, but okay.

The nature/nurture debate.

Nature provides the hardware to enable morality (ie the mechanics of the brain) whilst nurture provides the software. (the information that runs through the brain and defines morality)

My objection to Cartesian mind/body dualism is that it indicates a seperation between mind and body, as if they were seperate entities, the mind an ethereal entity....


Meaning the members of the family had left the "state of nature." As I said, your state of nature could only exist if man existed in isolation, but since we are social animals that violates our nature and the definition is nonsensical and contradicts itself.

It doesn't necessarily mean that a state of nature only occurs when man exists in isolation. It means that the state of nature occurs when no moral agreement exists between individuals / groups.

As I mentioned, a moral agreement only exists between those that agree. A moral agreement might exist in a family, or tribe or nation, but not necessarily outside this unit.

If there is no moral agreement, for example between two families who have their own internal moral agreements, then natural freedoms ensue. If there is a conflict of wills between the families, conflict ensues....


Come on! This is non responsive gibberish. The point is, your social freedom's protection from the "free-wheeling will of others" is based upon the society's will and capability. Under your concept of natural freedom, protection from the "free-wheeling will of others" is based upon the individual's will and capability. There is no legitimate distinction or demarcation. In both cases it is might makes right.

No, it is the moral agreement that makes right. If the moral agreement breaks down, then you have a return to natural freedoms and then will and capability are dominant, but as there is no moral agreement, there is no right or wrong. Right or wrong is a moral judgement. Nature and natural states are amoral. Might doesn't make right because there is no right or wrong, only actions.

Protection from the free-wheeling will of others isn't from the individual's will or capacity, but the moral agreement between individuals. The demarcation is the moral agreement that exists within the group.


It is more than that, it is a constant setting.

Will and capability are the setting only when there is no moral agreement to overcome it. It isn't constant as W & C are suspended under such an agreement.

If W&C were the constant setting, I could have overpowered my local newsagent and simply taken my daily newspaper from him. But a moral agreement exists in our society that theft and assault are wrong, so I overcome my W&C. I could break the moral agreement and do it anyway, in which case W&C return. Thus natural freedoms are not the constant, but the default.


Yes, man's ability. In reality, in your coneptualization, there was never any departure from your natural freedom.

How do you figure that?

We depart from natural freedom when we make a moral agreement to exchange the ability to follow W&C for protective rights. We depart from natural freedoms when we agree to, for example, suspend our desire to take what we will (and are capable of taking) for rights that protect us from other people taking from us what they will....


Not necessarily. A disagreement of wills does not imply force.

Force or the threat of force. If an individual knows they don't have the physical capability, they are likely to back down.

Use nations as an example.... If there is a clash of wills between the US and Canada, and there is no moral agreement between the countries, force will be threatened. Canada will likely recognise that it has little chance, and submit to the US will...

The US has, in reality, used, or attempted to use, this many times. The most recent was with Iraq. Any moral agreement between the US and Iraq had broken down, and a return to natural freedoms occurred. There was a clash of wills and the US threatened force. In this case, Iraq didn't submit, so force was used.


Nonsense. Human needs are not physical force from others. That is clear.

If all modes of production are owned (ie land etc), and human needs for the products of that production are physical and inescapable, those that own the modes of production are in a position of physical coercion over those that don't own any. They must submit to the will of the owners to relieve their physical, inescapable needs.

Thus, property rights and ownership of modes of production are physical force.

Can you explain how this is clearly not physical coercion?


Your concept of morality is a supernatural power you grant to the group. You argue that human nature is amoral (i.e., we lack moral sensibility). Yet a group can form morality. Somehow the group aquired an ability that the individual members do not have even parts. This has nothing to do with evolution.

This is a strawman.

I haven't argued that humans are amoral, but that existence itself is amoral, there is no innate morality. Morality is a structure humans create, through, and as a result of, social interaction. That isn't supernatural in the slightest.

Morality evolved (that entities and concepts evolve doesn't automatically equate to genetic evolution. Weapons, for eg, have evolved, and this has nothing to do with genetics.) as human society evolved.

How did you get the notion that, from this, that morality is supernatural?


So, to recap and draw this back to my original argument.

Property rights, the rights to own possessions regardless of other's will and physical capability are not innate.

All rights are a moral agreement. Morality is a human creation, a result of social interaction. Rights are thus created by moral agreement within society*.

Just as with all agreements, they can be broken. Once the agreement is broken, the situation returns to what existed before, ie natural freedom, and will and capability are the only adjudicating factors.


*NB: Society manifests itself in many guises, from the basic family unit up to the nation state...
 
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It's pretty clear that some knowledge is innate. For instance, a mammal child knows where to get milk and that the milk will satisfy its biological needs.

There is a difference between a baby's ability to locate milk and knowledge. A baby might have an innate detector that attracts it to its mother's milk, but that isn't knowledge anymore than a person's ability to breathe is knowledge. Is the heart beating, knowledge?

Well, if you will recall, I stated that we had the capacity for morality, a sense of right and wrong. You are right, that it might not be proper to strictly term it "knowledge." But it is something we know much like the child knows how to seek out mother's milk.

Another example, there seems to be an innate "knowledge" (or whatever word you want to use for it) of music. Baby talk uses it universally to communicate with children before they learn language. The melodies of approval or disapproval cut across language and culture.


In a general sense, yes, it is fixed. That does not mean you always get the same answer. It's not math.

Smoking weed is immoral if you abuse it, i.e., if it becomes harmful to you.



If morality is fixed, something must has fixed it. Something must be the arbitrator of morality. What do you think is the arbitrator of morality?

For the most part, reality. Morality to me is probably different than it is to you as I accept morality as pursuit of happiness or rational self interest.

If the arbitrator is simply what is bad for you, then driving (pollutions, risk of crashing), eating red meat, drinking coffee, walking to walk (risk of pollution/being hit by car), eating fish and chips (cholesterol) and pretty much everything we do is immoral.

That all depends on how you define what is "bad for you." A lot of choices have trade offs but the net is what is important to me. For instance, smoking a joint now and then can be a fun experience and in that case it is a net positive. But when abused it becomes more damaging than it is worth.

The nature/nurture debate.

Nature provides the hardware to enable morality (ie the mechanics of the brain) whilst nurture provides the software. (the information that runs through the brain and defines morality)

Okay, that is pretty much what I am saying about the seeds of knowledge/morality. To extend your analogy though, hardware has to contain a certain amount of "knowledge" of itself (something that might be analogous to consciousness, but it goes a little further than that alone) in order to boot to a point where "software" can load. That is, there is a certain amount of innate software/knowledge embedded in the hardware.

My objection to Cartesian mind/body dualism is that it indicates a seperation between mind and body, as if they were seperate entities, the mind an ethereal entity....

I agree.

Meaning the members of the family had left the "state of nature." As I said, your state of nature could only exist if man existed in isolation, but since we are social animals that violates our nature and the definition is nonsensical and contradicts itself.

It doesn't necessarily mean that a state of nature only occurs when man exists in isolation. It means that the state of nature occurs when no moral agreement exists between individuals / groups.

As I mentioned, a moral agreement only exists between those that agree. A moral agreement might exist in a family, or tribe or nation, but not necessarily outside this unit.

If there is no moral agreement, for example between two families who have their own internal moral agreements, then natural freedoms ensue. If there is a conflict of wills between the families, conflict ensues....

Like I said, you see the state of nature as being one where man is either in isolation or at war with others. I don't agree that that is anything close to a natural state for humans.

No, it is the moral agreement that makes right. If the moral agreement breaks down, then you have a return to natural freedoms and then will and capability are dominant, but as there is no moral agreement, there is no right or wrong. Right or wrong is a moral judgement. Nature and natural states are amoral. Might doesn't make right because there is no right or wrong, only actions.

Protection from the free-wheeling will of others isn't from the individual's will or capacity, but the moral agreement between individuals. The demarcation is the moral agreement that exists within the group.

So an individual cannot protect himself from the force of others but the group can??? You are not making much sense and you are side stepping the point. To restate, protection from will and capability of others is based on will and capability of the one doing the protection, whether in isolation or in a group. That ends in might makes right.

Yes, man's ability. In reality, in your coneptualization, there was never any departure from your natural freedom.

How do you figure that?

It is what you stated...

It is only man's ability to make and keep moral agreements.

If all modes of production are owned (ie land etc), and human needs for the products of that production are physical and inescapable, those that own the modes of production are in a position of physical coercion over those that don't own any. They must submit to the will of the owners to relieve their physical, inescapable needs.

Nope, they simply cannot force their will on the owner.


This is a strawman.

I haven't argued that humans are amoral, but that existence itself is amoral, there is no innate morality. Morality is a structure humans create, through, and as a result of, social interaction. That isn't supernatural in the slightest.

Then you agree that individuals have a moral capacity? How is that so if there is not something innate about morality in human nature?

Property rights, the rights to own possessions regardless of other's will and physical capability are not innate.

All rights are a moral agreement. Morality is a human creation, a result of social interaction. Rights are thus created by moral agreement within society*.

Just as with all agreements, they can be broken. Once the agreement is broken, the situation returns to what existed before, ie natural freedom, and will and capability are the only adjudicating factors.


*NB: Society manifests itself in many guises, from the basic family unit up to the nation state...

Part of human nature is a rational faculty and more than a part it is the distinguishing characteristic of humanity and the primary tool of survival. Rights are merely a recognition of the moral concept that individuals should be free of the force of others to utilize their rational faculties for the benefit of their own life.
 
Another example, there seems to be an innate "knowledge" (or whatever word you want to use for it) of music. Baby talk uses it universally to communicate with children before they learn language. The melodies of approval or disapproval cut across language and culture.

The question that springs up from this is 'are those melodies learnt through conditioning, or are they innate from birth?'

Baby talk doesn't develop in children for some time (if my memory of my mate's children is correct). The learning of melodic communication can be seen as part of the child's evolution into language.


For the most part, reality. Morality to me is probably different than it is to you as I accept morality as pursuit of happiness or rational self interest.

Morality as the pursuit of happiness or rational self interest? How does that account for moral altruism? If morality is the pursuit of happiness and RSI, why do moral codes place restrictions on happiness? For example, most moral codes place killing as immoral, yet some would take pleasure in killing, or it might be in the self interest of an individual? Wouldn't morality be the pursuit of hedonism in that case?

Okay, that is pretty much what I am saying about the seeds of knowledge/morality. To extend your analogy though, hardware has to contain a certain amount of "knowledge" of itself (something that might be analogous to consciousness, but it goes a little further than that alone) in order to boot to a point where "software" can load. That is, there is a certain amount of innate software/knowledge embedded in the hardware.

This depends if you consider involuntary actions as knowledge, I realise all descriptions are largely arbitrary and dependent on mutal agreement but I find it hard to describe this as knowledge. For eg... I know to breathe and my heart knows to beat, but I didn't need to learn this, it is hardwired. That type of 'knowledge' is innate, it is 'hardwired'. But morality isn't an involuntary action. I don't need to make a conscious decision to breathe, where as I do to make a moral decision. To make a moral decision I need certain inputs, factors to consider.

Like I said, you see the state of nature as being one where man is either in isolation or at war with others. I don't agree that that is anything close to a natural state for humans.

Isolation isn't necessary, and conflict only exists if there is a clash of wills.

This is the crux of the disagreement between us. I believe that the natural state is prior to any moral agreement, that the individual's will is predominant in humans in their natural state, you that a moral agreement is innate within us.

As I mentioned above, it is difficult to describe morality as innate in the manner that, for eg, breathing or heartbeat is...


So an individual cannot protect himself from the force of others but the group can??? You are not making much sense and you are side stepping the point. To restate, protection from will and capability of others is based on will and capability of the one doing the protection, whether in isolation or in a group. That ends in might makes right.

Under natural freedoms, the individual can protect himself from the force of others if they are physically capable. The group can only protect them if/because each member of the group has made a commitment to adhere to the moral agreement between them. If a member breaks this agreement, then a return to the natural state (of will and capability) occurs. The group can enact its right to natural freedom and use force against the individual who has broken the agreement and the individual can use force to defend themselves.

Rights only accur through mutual moral agreement, they don't exist in nature. Does that mean that might makes right? No. Might doesn't make right because 'right' is a moral judgement and in the natural state, such a moral judgement doesn't exist.

Might (W&C) is the underlying force behind it all, if we have no moral agreement to overcome the use of might.

Let's not forget why early proponents of the concept of 'natural rights' created this concept; as a way of containing the will of the strong (ie kings) during the enlightenment period (though the concept is much older - the Magna Carta for eg.) The notion is rhetorical, ie it is designed to create a scenerio, and not a necessary reflection of reality.


AOI: If all modes of production are owned (ie land etc), and human needs for the products of that production are physical and inescapable, those that own the modes of production are in a position of physical coercion over those that don't own any. They must submit to the will of the owners to relieve their physical, inescapable needs.

RS: Nope, they simply cannot force their will on the owner.

Do you consider innate human needs (ie hunger, thirst, need for shelter) physical and inescapable?

If all modes of production for these innate needs are owned, do you think that those people that own the modes of production can use that ownership to coerce those who don't, because the needs are physical and inescapable?

How is this not physical coercion?


Then you agree that individuals have a moral capacity? How is that so if there is not something innate about morality in human nature?

Humans have the capacity to learn to make a car, but the ability to make a car isn't innate. It must be learnt. As is morality.

Part of human nature is a rational faculty and more than a part it is the distinguishing characteristic of humanity and the primary tool of survival.
Rights are merely a recognition of the moral concept that individuals should be free of the force of others to utilize their rational faculties for the benefit of their own life.

Little non-sequiter there... Because humans have a faculty for rational thought doesn't equate to them having any particular innate morality.

All morality utilises this rational ability, but the morality doesn't derive from the rational ability.

The moral concept that humans should be free from the force of others, is an artificial moral construct, one that is created, not that is innate. Without creating this moral scenerio (which would be impossible to enact as humans are never free from the force of others, unless they isolate themselves from others) it wouldn't exist.

We can make the moral decision that we should have the right to try to be free from other's force, but that isn't innate, it is a moral agreement within a social group.

Thus rights are better described as social, than natural.
 
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Well, this could go on forever and I am sure we will not reach any conclusion. But it has been interesting and forced me to reconsider some things and dust off others.

Another example, there seems to be an innate "knowledge" (or whatever word you want to use for it) of music. Baby talk uses it universally to communicate with children before they learn language. The melodies of approval or disapproval cut across language and culture.

The question that springs up from this is 'are those melodies learnt through conditioning, or are they innate from birth?'

Baby talk doesn't develop in children for some time (if my memory of my mate's children is correct). The learning of melodic communication can be seen as part of the child's evolution into language.

The fact that it is universal across cultures implies that there is a nature aspect. Also, they have found that the biological receptors of sound create pleasant and unpleasant reaction in our brains to the stimulus of different melodies. If you think about it, it even seems to work in dogs.

Like I said, knowledge is probably not a good word for this as knowledge implies understanding. After thinking on it, I think information is probably the best word for it.


For the most part, reality. Morality to me is probably different than it is to you as I accept morality as pursuit of happiness or rational self interest.


Morality as the pursuit of happiness or rational self interest? How does that account for moral altruism? If morality is the pursuit of happiness and RSI, why do moral codes place restrictions on happiness? For example, most moral codes place killing as immoral, yet some would take pleasure in killing, or it might be in the self interest of an individual? Wouldn't morality be the pursuit of hedonism in that case?

It rejects altruism. Rights place the restrictions and I view freedom from the initiation of force as an axiom of ethics, therefore the basis of rights. It cannot be denied whether you reject or accept the ethics of self interest.

This depends if you consider involuntary actions as knowledge, I realise all descriptions are largely arbitrary and dependent on mutal agreement but I find it hard to describe this as knowledge. For eg... I know to breathe and my heart knows to beat, but I didn't need to learn this, it is hardwired. That type of 'knowledge' is innate, it is 'hardwired'. But morality isn't an involuntary action. I don't need to make a conscious decision to breathe, where as I do to make a moral decision. To make a moral decision I need certain inputs, factors to consider.

I agree, knowledge is not the word (see above). But what I am trying to get at I believe is more complicated than breathing.


Like I said, you see the state of nature as being one where man is either in isolation or at war with others. I don't agree that that is anything close to a natural state for humans.


Isolation isn't necessary, and conflict only exists if there is a clash of wills.

Yes, but if there is no isolation or clash of wills then there is a moral agreement and man has left the state of nature. That is why I say... "you see the state of nature as being one where man is either in isolation or at war with others." What am I missing? You even state this below.

This is the crux of the disagreement between us. I believe that the natural state is prior to any moral agreement, that the individual's will is predominant in humans in their natural state, you that a moral agreement is innate within us.

Not really that the agreement is innate. More, that is not outside our nature or does not violate our natural state to make agreements.

So an individual cannot protect himself from the force of others but the group can??? You are not making much sense and you are side stepping the point. To restate, protection from will and capability of others is based on will and capability of the one doing the protection, whether in isolation or in a group. That ends in might makes right.

Under natural freedoms, the individual can protect himself from the force of others if they are physically capable. The group can only protect them if/because each member of the group has made a commitment to adhere to the moral agreement between them.

This would be the will of the group. And as has been noted before, unless you ascribe some magical power to the agreement, then the capability of the group is also a condition. Will and capability are still all that protects the rights same as in your natural freedoms.

If a member breaks this agreement, then a return to the natural state (of will and capability) occurs. The group can enact its right to natural freedom and use force against the individual who has broken the agreement and the individual can use force to defend themselves.

Your distinction is nothing but rhetorical. And it is not reality. The moral agreement does not dissolve whenever a "crime" is committed. Rather, the group is, or their agents are, tested to see if they possess the will and capability to respond. Even in relation to the individual that breaks the law, under any most social contracts (i.e., constitutions) there still exist an agreement (e.g., legal rights).

Rights only accur through mutual moral agreement, they don't exist in nature.

There must be a right as a precondition of any moral agreement. That is, if you have no right to the freedom of your rational capacities (i.e., will) there is no way you can truly make a moral agreement.

Say ten friends and I (in a moral agreement) find you in your natural state (for an evil soccerist this means passed out drunk in a pool of your own filth and sick). We decide we will make you a part of our moral agreement and use you as a tackling dummy to practice real football. So when you come to we tell you can either join or die as you have no rights. We even add in a little torture because we'd rather have you as a slave than have to kill you. So you enter the moral agreement.

Without any natural rights recognized as preceding or as a precondition this is the reality that would ensue. In reality you would not have been in the moral agreement, but you are not capable of practicing your will over ours. So, you are left to submit. Even if you later try to violate the agreement then it would be a matter of our will and capability against yours. Might makes right is the only possible outcome of the notions you have put forth.

AOI: If all modes of production are owned (ie land etc), and human needs for the products of that production are physical and inescapable, those that own the modes of production are in a position of physical coercion over those that don't own any. They must submit to the will of the owners to relieve their physical, inescapable needs.

RS: Nope, they simply cannot force their will on the owner.

Do you consider innate human needs (ie hunger, thirst, need for shelter) physical and inescapable?

Does not matter since they are not applied from others, i.e., they are not external.


Then you agree that individuals have a moral capacity? How is that so if there is not something innate about morality in human nature?


Humans have the capacity to learn to make a car, but the ability to make a car isn't innate. It must be learnt. As is morality.

But could they make a car if their capacity to do so were denied them? How can they make morality if their capacity to do so (i.e., freedom of their rational capcities) is denied them?

Part of human nature is a rational faculty and more than a part it is the distinguishing characteristic of humanity and the primary tool of survival.
Rights are merely a recognition of the moral concept that individuals should be free of the force of others to utilize their rational faculties for the benefit of their own life.

Little non-sequiter there... Because humans have a faculty for rational thought doesn't equate to them having any particular innate morality.


All morality utilises this rational ability, but the morality doesn't derive from the rational ability.

The rights are innate because freedom of our rational ability is necessary to living in accordance with our nature and because it is a precondition of any morality.

The moral concept that humans should be free from the force of others, is an artificial moral construct, one that is created, not that is innate. Without creating this moral scenerio (which would be impossible to enact as humans are never free from the force of others, unless they isolate themselves from others) it wouldn't exist.

It is not a moral construct. It is a necessary preexisting condition for moral constructs.

And I have been over the fact that one may be among others and free from the physical force of them.

We can make the moral decision that we should have the right to try to be free from other's force, but that isn't innate, it is a moral agreement within a social group.

Thus rights are better described as social, than natural.

You cannot make a decision or agreement absent this natural right.
 
Well, this could go on forever and I am sure we will not reach any conclusion. But it has been interesting and forced me to reconsider some things and dust off others.

It's been a cracker of a discussion, just what I wanted when I started the thread. Far better to go deeper than the tit for tat squabbles of general politics and look at the underlying philosophy...

The fact that it is universal across cultures implies that there is a nature aspect. Also, they have found that the biological receptors of sound create pleasant and unpleasant reaction in our brains to the stimulus of different melodies. If you think about it, it even seems to work in dogs.

Like I said, knowledge is probably not a good word for this as knowledge implies understanding. After thinking on it, I think information is probably the best word for it.

The use of language occurs across cultures, it is a universal human trait, and so the use of baby melody does appear to be 'hardwired' information (
I agree with that description to differentiate involuntary information from conditioned knowledge.


It rejects altruism. Rights place the restrictions and I view freedom from the initiation of force as an axiom of ethics, therefore the basis of rights. It cannot be denied whether you reject or accept the ethics of self interest.

In many ways we aren't that different in our perspectives.

You view rights as protection from initiation of force, I believe it is (limited) protection from the will and capability of others. The difference is that I consider that only be found when we suspend our natural freedom to do as we will (provided capable) and call these rights 'social'. You see them as innate and thus natural.

The crux of our argument is whether protective rights are natural or social, underlying this, whether or not the morally-unrestricted use of will and physical is humanity's natural state.


Yes, but if there is no isolation or clash of wills then there is a moral agreement and man has left the state of nature. That is why I say... "you see the state of nature as being one where man is either in isolation or at war with others." What am I missing? You even state this below.

Isolation doesn't necessary occur in natural freedoms, if the two's will differs.

Also isolation under natural freedoms doesn't mean individual isolation. Take for example, a valley, cut off by mountains, with two tribes living there. Within each of the tribes, you have a social contract, an agreement to live by a moral code. Between the two tribes, however, no such agreement exists. The two tribes, although they have internal agreements, exist in a state of natural freedom. If the two tribe's wills conflict, they go to war.


This would be the will of the group. And as has been noted before, unless you ascribe some magical power to the agreement, then the capability of the group is also a condition. Will and capability are still all that protects the rights same as in your natural freedoms.

Nothing protects the rights apart from the moral agreement that exists. This is why rights are so fragile. There are no magical powers involved, there is simply no innate protection.

That is why philosophers such as Locke attempted to enshrine certain rights as natural, to create an ethos that places greater emphasis on the moral agreement.


Your distinction is nothing but rhetorical. And it is not reality. The moral agreement does not dissolve whenever a "crime" is committed. Rather, the group is, or their agents are, tested to see if they possess the will and capability to respond. Even in relation to the individual that breaks the law, under any most social contracts (i.e., constitutions) there still exist an agreement (e.g., legal rights).

If an individual breaks the law, they lose their protective rights. For example, if an individual breaks the protective right of 'right to life' of another individual, in the US in particular, the perpetrators protective rights are forfeit and they are executed.

If an individual breaks the moral agreement and steals, they forfeit their rights to liberty and pursuit of happiness which are enshrined in the moral agreement of the US.

Nothing rhetorical about this, it happens on a daily basis. If an individual breaks the moral agreement, it is revoked.

This occurs up to the level of government. If the government breaks the moral agreement, the moral agreement is suspended and the people return to natural freedoms to protest, riot and forcibly remove the government. Once this is done, the society usually returns to the moral agreement.


Rights only accur through mutual moral agreement, they don't exist in nature.

There must be a right as a precondition of any moral agreement. That is, if you have no right to the freedom of your rational capacities (i.e., will) there is no way you can truly make a moral agreement.

Say ten friends and I (in a moral agreement) find you in your natural state (for an evil soccerist this means passed out drunk in a pool of your own filth and sick). We decide we will make you a part of our moral agreement and use you as a tackling dummy to practice real football. So when you come to we tell you can either join or die as you have no rights. We even add in a little torture because we'd rather have you as a slave than have to kill you. So you enter the moral agreement.

Without any natural rights recognized as preceding or as a precondition this is the reality that would ensue. In reality you would not have been in the moral agreement, but you are not capable of practicing your will over ours. So, you are left to submit. Even if you later try to violate the agreement then it would be a matter of our will and capability against yours. Might makes right is the only possible outcome of the notions you have put forth.

That is the reality that will ensue. Its not pretty, but existence is cold and amoral. Might doesn't mean right (right is a moral judgement) but might and will are always supreme. I always have the option, rather than submitting, to refuse to submit, to retain my natural freedoms, follow my will and fight to the death.

An example of this comes from classical Rome. When Roman armies went to war, and won, they gave their opponents the choice of either retaining their natural freedoms and fight to the death, or submit their will and become slaves. Moral agreements don't necessarily have to be considered morally sound. As I have mentioned, if you don't wish to enter a moral agreement, you can always retain your natural freedoms.

This is why philosophers such as Locke and the founders of the US attempted to describe artificially formed rights as natural and innate, to enshrine good sound moral agreements, and in this, in informing the masses, this is IMO a good thing. But this doesn't detract from the reality that they are artificial, they are moral agreements...


Does not matter since they are not applied from others, i.e., they are not external.

Is a restriction on satisfying innate and inescapable needs caused by a moral agreement (property rights) not inflicting physical coercion simply because it is done by proxy? If I were to kill someone by restricting food and water to them am I still not killing them? If I say to someone 'If you don't follow my will, I will starve you, not physical coercion?

But could they make a car if their capacity to do so were denied them? How can they make morality if their capacity to do so (i.e., freedom of their rational capcities) is denied them?

How do you deny someone their rational capabilities?

The only way I can think is through the rearing of children, by not teaching them the nature of rational thought (hence my claim that religious upbringing of children is child abuse). Once an individual has developed rational thought, it isn't possible to deny that, short of physically injuring their brain. It is possible to deny the expression of rational thought but not the thought itself.

We all (baring physical disability) has the hardwiring in the brain for rational thought, but how we use that is down entirely to conditioning.


The rights are innate because freedom of our rational ability is necessary to living in accordance with our nature and because it is a precondition of any morality.

To say that rights are innate because humans have the underlying ability to reason is non-sequiter. It doesn't follow because although humans have a potential to develop reason it therefore means that rights are innate. A potential to develop cars (which we have) doesn't make car-making innate. We might have the potential but we need to learn (ie conditioned) to utilise that potential.

We learn to use rational thought just as we learn to make cars. The rights were have are based according to our ability to use this reason and form a moral agreement.


It is not a moral construct. It is a necessary preexisting condition for moral constructs.

And I have been over the fact that one may be among others and free from the physical force of them.

Until you have a moral structure in place, it isn't possible to be free from physical force of others. If you have no moral structure, you only have the will of others. Even, then, under a moral agreement, force from others simply moves from direct to proxy.

Being free from external force is only possible under a moral agreement, and then only as long as the moral contains a requisite for the absence of physical coercion and that moral agreement exists and isn't broken by any of those who agreed to it...


You cannot make a decision or agreement absent this natural right.

What makes you think that? Given that human's are never in a state when they are free from physical coercion we would never make a decision or agreement.

Can you give an example of when humans are free from external coercion, either directly or by proxy, that we can test?
 
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