FUCK THE POLICE
911 EVERY DAY
Waterfart, why, that's brilliant. Even Schoolchildren would never think of anything so ingenious.
The PC War Against the CP....
- Thread starter Dixie - In Memoriam
- Start date
Waterfart, why, that's brilliant. Even Schoolchildren would never think of anything so ingenious.
FUCK THE POLICE
911 EVERY DAY
Actually, the figure "half a trillion" belies the true cost, because it isn't inflation adjusted. In modern dollars it's probably somewhere around 1.5 trillion.
FUCK THE POLICE
911 EVERY DAY
Which was actually almost the size of the US budget (before Bush came into power, of course).
Sir Evil
Megalocon, The Evil Dick
LOL, liked that one? I thought it was pretty good! But please feel free at anytime to finish up the imperialism part...........
Sir Evil
Megalocon, The Evil Dick
Oh, and for a guy that calls someone a "scumbag" for an opposing view I thought I was rather nice in my description. Now, anytime you are ready to give that imperialism view I would like to read it, if not just go ahead an follow the mantra around here on opposing views, I'm cool with that.....
AnyOldIron
Atheist Missionary
The US military can handle insergencies or armies. Doesn't matter. Now how the US handles the media and its propaganda messages is another matter. Liberal media and commies like you always twist the truth. But we have freedom of speech so you always get to spout your garbage. But if your going to spout about Vietnam at least read up on the facts.
Yes, Dr Evil, it was people that me that lost the US the Vietnam war...
Nothing to do with losing the battle for the minds of the people of Vietnam, nor the US habit of using sledgehammer style overwhelming force to crack a nut.
People like to spout that 'the US never lost an open battle in VN'... In this shows the misundersanding that lost the war.
An insurgency rarely fights open battles. An insurgency uses hit an run tactics. As Sun Tsu states, let your enemy crawl over you and then attack its soft underbelly. It slowly bleeds the army to death.
When your enemy is losing the fight to win the local population, the enemy has little fear of losses.
By 1972 the majority of the US population realised that the US had started using poor strategic thinking and, when that genie is out of the bottle, it cannot be put back in. The damage is done. They realised that they couldn't win and pulled out. The ARVN was, since the beginning of the war, as ineffective and corrupt as the SV 'government' it represented. By 1972 VN was flooded with weaponry, if the ARVN had any decent fighting capability to combat the forces of the VC and NVA they would have been able to from '72 onwards.
They, like the US, had already lost the war long before '72.
This fundamental misunderstanding of the complexities of fighting an insurgency has continued in US military thinking, the stench still pervades that overwhelming force will always win out.
If only the US had learnt the lessons of Malaysia, * a situation very similar to that in the early days of Vietnam but dealt with properly, it might have had a chance. But the US government is extraordinarily slow at learning from its mistakes and this is evident in its 'battle' against Islamic extremism...
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency
Yes, Dr Evil, it was people that me that lost the US the Vietnam war...
Nothing to do with losing the battle for the minds of the people of Vietnam, nor the US habit of using sledgehammer style overwhelming force to crack a nut.
People like to spout that 'the US never lost an open battle in VN'... In this shows the misundersanding that lost the war.
An insurgency rarely fights open battles. An insurgency uses hit an run tactics. As Sun Tsu states, let your enemy crawl over you and then attack its soft underbelly. It slowly bleeds the army to death.
When your enemy is losing the fight to win the local population, the enemy has little fear of losses.
By 1972 the majority of the US population realised that the US had started using poor strategic thinking and, when that genie is out of the bottle, it cannot be put back in. The damage is done. They realised that they couldn't win and pulled out. The ARVN was, since the beginning of the war, as ineffective and corrupt as the SV 'government' it represented. By 1972 VN was flooded with weaponry, if the ARVN had any decent fighting capability to combat the forces of the VC and NVA they would have been able to from '72 onwards.
They, like the US, had already lost the war long before '72.
This fundamental misunderstanding of the complexities of fighting an insurgency has continued in US military thinking, the stench still pervades that overwhelming force will always win out.
If only the US had learnt the lessons of Malaysia, * a situation very similar to that in the early days of Vietnam but dealt with properly, it might have had a chance. But the US government is extraordinarily slow at learning from its mistakes and this is evident in its 'battle' against Islamic extremism...
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency
AnyOldIron
Atheist Missionary
How VN could have been won
The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA in this text) was a guerrilla force created by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and, to some extent, led and dominated by ethnic Chinese communists. It was a successor of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), another guerrilla force which the British had secretly trained and equipped with arms during World War II in the fight against the Japanese Occupation. The Communist Party, which had been banned in the pre-war years, was thereafter granted legal recognition by the British after the war as a reward for its wartime effort, but had secretly kept most of the MPAJA's weapons for future clandestine use.
The actual conflict began when the MCP disagreed with the British post-war policy of a Malayan Federation, mainly because the plan was part of a wider strategy of anti-communism. The party's new leader, Chin Peng, decided that an armed conflict would be the only way to bring the communist revolution to Malaya and to dispel the threat to its communist ideals.
MRLA guerrillas killed three British rubber planters at Sungai Siput, Perak on June 16, 1948. The British declared a state of emergency to deal with the insurgents. The enemy was nicknamed "Charlie Tango" - "communist terrorists", or "terrs" or "CTs" for short. This term would later be used again in Rhodesia to describe ZANU or ZAPU guerrillas.
Despite the usage of the term "emergency" it was in actuality a full-scale guerrilla war between the MRLA and British, Commonwealth, and Malayan armed forces; some have gone as far as to characterise it as a civil war. The rubber plantations and tin mining industries had pushed for the use of the term "emergency" since their losses would not have been covered by Lloyds insurers if it had been termed a "war". The MRLA commonly employed hit and run guerrilla tactics, sabotaging installations, attacking rubber plantations and destroying transportation and infrastructure.[1]
Support for the MRLA was mainly based on around 500,000 ethnic Chinese then living in Malaya (there were 3.12 million Chinese in total); the ethnic Malay population for the most part did not support them. The MRLA raised the support of the Chinese because they were denied the equal right to vote in elections, had no land rights to speak of, and were usually very poor. The MRLA's agents within the Chinese community were known as "Min Yuen."
The MRLA had its hideouts in the rather inaccessible tropical jungle with limited infrastructure. Most MRLA guerrillas were ethnic Chinese, though there were some Malays, Indonesians and Indians among its members. They were organized into communist political regiments with political sections, commissars, instructors and secret service. They also had lectures about Marxism-Leninism and had political newsletters to be distributed to the locals. MRLA also stipulated that their soldiers had to get official permission for any romantic involvement with local women.
In the international scene, the emerging Korean War eclipsed the developing conflict in Malaya. Part of the British attempt at resolving the situation was the implementation of the so-called "Briggs' Plan" which meant the resettlement of people - especially 400,000 Chinese - living in jungle areas to the relative safety of new, partially fortified villages with full round-the-clock armed sentries. People resented this at first but some soon became content with the better living standards in the villages. They were given money and ownership of the land they lived on. Removing a population which might be sympathetic to guerrillas was a counter-insurgency technique which the British had used before, notably against the Boer Commandos in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).
At the start of the Emergency, the British had a total of 13 infantry battalions, comprising 7 partially formed Gurkha battalions, 3 British battalions, 2 battalions of the Malay Regiment and a British Artillery Regiment being utilised as infantry. (Defense & Decolonization in South-East Asia By Karl Hack, p 113.) This force was too small to effectively meet the threat of the Communist Terrorists or "Bandits", and more infantry battalions were needed in Malaya.
The British brought in soldiers from units like the Worcester regiment and Royal Marines. Another effort was a re-creation of Special Air Service as a jungle commando unit in 1950. The Permanent Secretary of Defence for Malaya was Sir Robert Thompson who had served as an officer in the Chindits during World War II which meant that his vast experience in jungle warfare may have proved invaluable during these times.
In 1951 some British army units began a "hearts and minds campaign" by giving medical and food aid to Malays and indigenous Sakai tribes. At the same time, they put pressure on MRLA by patrolling the jungle. Units such as the SAS, the Royal Marines and Gurkha Brigades drove MRLA guerrillas deeper into the jungle and denied them resources. The MRLA had to extort food from the Sakai and earned their enmity. Many of the captured guerrillas changed sides. In comparison, the MRLA never released any Britons alive.
In the end the conflict involved some 35,000 British and 60,000 Commonwealth troops against a possible army of 30,000 communist guerrillas.
On October 7, 1951, the MRLA ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. The killing has been described as a major factor in causing the Malayan psyche to roundly reject the MRLA campaign, and also as leading to widespread fear due to the perception that "if even the High Commissioner was no longer safe, there was little hope of protection and safety for the man-in-the-street in Malaya."[2]
Gurney's successor, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer was instructed by the British government to push for immediate measures to give ethnic Chinese residents the right to vote. He also pursued the Briggs's Plan, installed Malay executives and sped up the formation of a Malayan army. His most important deal was a promise of independence once the insurrection was over. He also instituted financial rewards for detecting guerrillas by any civilians and expanded the intelligence network (Special Branch).
Australia was willing to send troops to help a SEATO ally and the first group of Australian troops arrived in 1955. Realising that his conflict has not come to any fruition, Chin Peng sought a referendum with the ruling British government alongside many Malayan officials at Baling in 1955. The meeting was clearly intended to pursue a mutual end to the conflict but led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, representing the Malayan government at the Baling Talks, all of Chin Peng's demands were dismissed. As a result, the conflict would appear to have been heightened and in response, New Zealand sent NZSAS soldiers, No. 14 Squadron RNZAF and later No. 75 Squadron RNZAF, and other Commonwealth members also sent troops to aid the British.
With the independence of Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on August 31, 1957, the insurrection lost its rationale as a war of colonial liberation. The last serious resistance from MRLA guerrillas ended with a surrender in the Telok Anson marsh area in 1958. The remaining MRLA forces fled to the Thai border and further east.
On July 31, 1960, the Malayan government declared the Emergency was over, and Chin Peng left south Thailand for Beijing where he was accomodated by the Chinese authorities in the International Liaison Bureau, where many other Southeast Asian Communist Party leaders were housed.
During the conflict security forces killed 6,710 MRLA guerrillas and captured 1,287. Of the total number of guerrillas, 2,702 surrendered during the conflict and about 500 at the end of the conflict. There were 1346 Malayan troops and 519 British military personnel killed. 2,478 civilians were killed and 810 recorded missing as a result of the conflict.
Although the conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam differed on many points in so far as the details of their wars, it has been asked time and again by historians as to how a British force of 35,000 succeeded where over a half million soldiers of the U.S. and others failed. One of the main points that differentiated the two was that the MLRA never had a dependable ally close at hand like the Viet Cong did with the North Vietnamese Army.
Another key point was the effectiveness of the Malayan Police Special Branch against the political arm of the guerilla movement.[3] .
The MLRA was also, as mentioned above, a political movement almost entirely limited to ethnic Chinese; support among Muslim Malayans and smaller tribes was scattered if existent at all. The British war effort never suffered from anything approaching the criticism that hammered the U.S. in Vietnam, and the USSR and China were too involved in Korea to give serious aid to the MLRA. Also, many Malayans had fought side by side with the British against the Japanese occupation in World War II, including Chin Peng. This is in contrast to Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) where French colonial officials often operated as proxies and collaborators to the Japanese. This factor of trust between the locals and the colonials was what gave the British an advantage over the French and later, the Americans in Vietnam; Commonwealth troops saw ordinary civilians as allies, not enemies.
The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA in this text) was a guerrilla force created by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and, to some extent, led and dominated by ethnic Chinese communists. It was a successor of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), another guerrilla force which the British had secretly trained and equipped with arms during World War II in the fight against the Japanese Occupation. The Communist Party, which had been banned in the pre-war years, was thereafter granted legal recognition by the British after the war as a reward for its wartime effort, but had secretly kept most of the MPAJA's weapons for future clandestine use.
The actual conflict began when the MCP disagreed with the British post-war policy of a Malayan Federation, mainly because the plan was part of a wider strategy of anti-communism. The party's new leader, Chin Peng, decided that an armed conflict would be the only way to bring the communist revolution to Malaya and to dispel the threat to its communist ideals.
MRLA guerrillas killed three British rubber planters at Sungai Siput, Perak on June 16, 1948. The British declared a state of emergency to deal with the insurgents. The enemy was nicknamed "Charlie Tango" - "communist terrorists", or "terrs" or "CTs" for short. This term would later be used again in Rhodesia to describe ZANU or ZAPU guerrillas.
Despite the usage of the term "emergency" it was in actuality a full-scale guerrilla war between the MRLA and British, Commonwealth, and Malayan armed forces; some have gone as far as to characterise it as a civil war. The rubber plantations and tin mining industries had pushed for the use of the term "emergency" since their losses would not have been covered by Lloyds insurers if it had been termed a "war". The MRLA commonly employed hit and run guerrilla tactics, sabotaging installations, attacking rubber plantations and destroying transportation and infrastructure.[1]
Support for the MRLA was mainly based on around 500,000 ethnic Chinese then living in Malaya (there were 3.12 million Chinese in total); the ethnic Malay population for the most part did not support them. The MRLA raised the support of the Chinese because they were denied the equal right to vote in elections, had no land rights to speak of, and were usually very poor. The MRLA's agents within the Chinese community were known as "Min Yuen."
The MRLA had its hideouts in the rather inaccessible tropical jungle with limited infrastructure. Most MRLA guerrillas were ethnic Chinese, though there were some Malays, Indonesians and Indians among its members. They were organized into communist political regiments with political sections, commissars, instructors and secret service. They also had lectures about Marxism-Leninism and had political newsletters to be distributed to the locals. MRLA also stipulated that their soldiers had to get official permission for any romantic involvement with local women.
In the international scene, the emerging Korean War eclipsed the developing conflict in Malaya. Part of the British attempt at resolving the situation was the implementation of the so-called "Briggs' Plan" which meant the resettlement of people - especially 400,000 Chinese - living in jungle areas to the relative safety of new, partially fortified villages with full round-the-clock armed sentries. People resented this at first but some soon became content with the better living standards in the villages. They were given money and ownership of the land they lived on. Removing a population which might be sympathetic to guerrillas was a counter-insurgency technique which the British had used before, notably against the Boer Commandos in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).
At the start of the Emergency, the British had a total of 13 infantry battalions, comprising 7 partially formed Gurkha battalions, 3 British battalions, 2 battalions of the Malay Regiment and a British Artillery Regiment being utilised as infantry. (Defense & Decolonization in South-East Asia By Karl Hack, p 113.) This force was too small to effectively meet the threat of the Communist Terrorists or "Bandits", and more infantry battalions were needed in Malaya.
The British brought in soldiers from units like the Worcester regiment and Royal Marines. Another effort was a re-creation of Special Air Service as a jungle commando unit in 1950. The Permanent Secretary of Defence for Malaya was Sir Robert Thompson who had served as an officer in the Chindits during World War II which meant that his vast experience in jungle warfare may have proved invaluable during these times.
In 1951 some British army units began a "hearts and minds campaign" by giving medical and food aid to Malays and indigenous Sakai tribes. At the same time, they put pressure on MRLA by patrolling the jungle. Units such as the SAS, the Royal Marines and Gurkha Brigades drove MRLA guerrillas deeper into the jungle and denied them resources. The MRLA had to extort food from the Sakai and earned their enmity. Many of the captured guerrillas changed sides. In comparison, the MRLA never released any Britons alive.
In the end the conflict involved some 35,000 British and 60,000 Commonwealth troops against a possible army of 30,000 communist guerrillas.
On October 7, 1951, the MRLA ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. The killing has been described as a major factor in causing the Malayan psyche to roundly reject the MRLA campaign, and also as leading to widespread fear due to the perception that "if even the High Commissioner was no longer safe, there was little hope of protection and safety for the man-in-the-street in Malaya."[2]
Gurney's successor, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer was instructed by the British government to push for immediate measures to give ethnic Chinese residents the right to vote. He also pursued the Briggs's Plan, installed Malay executives and sped up the formation of a Malayan army. His most important deal was a promise of independence once the insurrection was over. He also instituted financial rewards for detecting guerrillas by any civilians and expanded the intelligence network (Special Branch).
Australia was willing to send troops to help a SEATO ally and the first group of Australian troops arrived in 1955. Realising that his conflict has not come to any fruition, Chin Peng sought a referendum with the ruling British government alongside many Malayan officials at Baling in 1955. The meeting was clearly intended to pursue a mutual end to the conflict but led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, representing the Malayan government at the Baling Talks, all of Chin Peng's demands were dismissed. As a result, the conflict would appear to have been heightened and in response, New Zealand sent NZSAS soldiers, No. 14 Squadron RNZAF and later No. 75 Squadron RNZAF, and other Commonwealth members also sent troops to aid the British.
With the independence of Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on August 31, 1957, the insurrection lost its rationale as a war of colonial liberation. The last serious resistance from MRLA guerrillas ended with a surrender in the Telok Anson marsh area in 1958. The remaining MRLA forces fled to the Thai border and further east.
On July 31, 1960, the Malayan government declared the Emergency was over, and Chin Peng left south Thailand for Beijing where he was accomodated by the Chinese authorities in the International Liaison Bureau, where many other Southeast Asian Communist Party leaders were housed.
During the conflict security forces killed 6,710 MRLA guerrillas and captured 1,287. Of the total number of guerrillas, 2,702 surrendered during the conflict and about 500 at the end of the conflict. There were 1346 Malayan troops and 519 British military personnel killed. 2,478 civilians were killed and 810 recorded missing as a result of the conflict.
Although the conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam differed on many points in so far as the details of their wars, it has been asked time and again by historians as to how a British force of 35,000 succeeded where over a half million soldiers of the U.S. and others failed. One of the main points that differentiated the two was that the MLRA never had a dependable ally close at hand like the Viet Cong did with the North Vietnamese Army.
Another key point was the effectiveness of the Malayan Police Special Branch against the political arm of the guerilla movement.[3] .
The MLRA was also, as mentioned above, a political movement almost entirely limited to ethnic Chinese; support among Muslim Malayans and smaller tribes was scattered if existent at all. The British war effort never suffered from anything approaching the criticism that hammered the U.S. in Vietnam, and the USSR and China were too involved in Korea to give serious aid to the MLRA. Also, many Malayans had fought side by side with the British against the Japanese occupation in World War II, including Chin Peng. This is in contrast to Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) where French colonial officials often operated as proxies and collaborators to the Japanese. This factor of trust between the locals and the colonials was what gave the British an advantage over the French and later, the Americans in Vietnam; Commonwealth troops saw ordinary civilians as allies, not enemies.
Gaffer
Sanctimonious Prick
pigiron that was a totally different war.
The VC in vietnam ceased to exist in 1968 when they were virtually wiped out with the 68 tet offensive. Vietnam was a propaganda war. and not fought to win but to simply contain. That sounds like a liberal plan I have heard before.
And as I repeatedly said the congress cut off all funding to SV. Without the equipment to fight with it doesn't matter how good or poor your troops are they will lose.
The brits know so much about insergent fighting and you have been battling it out in Ireland for how long? If you took all the troops out of NI and cut off all funding and support for it, how long would it remain seperate from the rest of Ireland? especially if the Irish army moved in.
The malasian thing and vietnam were two different events. Britain supported their allies their. the US stopped supporting SV after 1972. You took a long time and effort to support an apples and oranges comparison. You obviously read a lot and are familiar with British military history. You need to look into some of the Vietnam books written by American Vets who were there. They include interviews with high ranking communist commanders of the time. They will give you a different perspective on the war then you currently have.
But we need to take it to another thread instead of hijacking this one.
The VC in vietnam ceased to exist in 1968 when they were virtually wiped out with the 68 tet offensive. Vietnam was a propaganda war. and not fought to win but to simply contain. That sounds like a liberal plan I have heard before.
And as I repeatedly said the congress cut off all funding to SV. Without the equipment to fight with it doesn't matter how good or poor your troops are they will lose.
The brits know so much about insergent fighting and you have been battling it out in Ireland for how long? If you took all the troops out of NI and cut off all funding and support for it, how long would it remain seperate from the rest of Ireland? especially if the Irish army moved in.
The malasian thing and vietnam were two different events. Britain supported their allies their. the US stopped supporting SV after 1972. You took a long time and effort to support an apples and oranges comparison. You obviously read a lot and are familiar with British military history. You need to look into some of the Vietnam books written by American Vets who were there. They include interviews with high ranking communist commanders of the time. They will give you a different perspective on the war then you currently have.
But we need to take it to another thread instead of hijacking this one.