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Libya crisis: How Haftar is quietly building forces in the Fezzan
Developments in the southwest region, comprising roughly a third of Libya’s territory, are of major relevance to the warring sides battling in Tripoli
A year ago, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive on Tripoli in a bid to oust Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and its armed allies, ushering in a phase of unprecedented violence.
The siege of Tripoli by Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) continues, remaining the almost exclusive focus of reporting. The Fezzan, Libya’s long-neglected and haphazardly governed southwest, is often seen as a side stage to national conflict dynamics.
Yet, developments there have been of major relevance to the escalation in Tripoli, offering clues about the LAAF’s broader expansion strategy. Comprising roughly a third of Libya’s territory, the Fezzan is also a key asset for warring camps. It holds some of the country’s largest oil and water reserves and is Libya’s gateway to the Sahelo-Saharan zone.
Striking a chord
In a strategic move, Haftar deployed LAAF contingents from the eastern and central region in early 2019, ostensibly targeting “outlaws and foreign armed groups”. The narrative struck a chord among southerners tired of rampant crime and patchy security provision, at a time of overall dissatisfaction with the GNA. Many thus welcomed the arrival of LAAF forces.
The operation was successful in large part due to the LAAF’s gradual penetration of the Fezzan’s security scene over the previous two years. Using tribal politics to his advantage, Haftar had built relationships with certain social leaders and helped them enhance their influence within their communities.
The momentum created by the LAAF’s rapid advances and accompanying propaganda machine led more southern commanders to side with Haftar
As a consequence, he could count on a number of local armed groups in advance of his move and capitalise on the southern army officers' frustrations with the GNA’s lack of leadership and support.
The momentum created by the LAAF’s rapid advances and accompanying propaganda machine led more southern commanders to side with Haftar, as a way to salvage their position or monetise their endorsement.
The GNA scrambled to organise a counter-offensive, relying on marginal actors and hurried decisions with insufficient local buy-in.
In March 2019, most LAAF forces abruptly withdrew from the Fezzan, leaving the maintenance of the “new order” to their local allies. As the LAAF directed all its efforts to seizing the capital, the Fezzan shifted out of focus again.
By this point, it was clear that the Fezzan operation had served as a launchpad for the subsequent Tripoli offensive, bolstering the LAAF’s image and supplying new manpower.
In the Fezzan, stability remained elusive, as local militias reappeared on the streets and smuggling resumed. Ethnic tensions, which had been exacerbated by the LAAF’s entry into Murzuq, escalated into full-blown conflict.
Restructuring the security landscape
But there appears to be more to Haftar’s Fezzan strategy than a short-sighted power play. A closer look suggests he embarked on restructuring the security landscape in view of consolidating the LAAF’s presence throughout the south.
Southern armed groups typically derive their legitimacy from their tribal backbone and how embedded they are within their communities. The LAAF leadership has been reshaping these groups based on wartime priorities and to weaken parallel loyalties.
Small units are being absorbed into larger battalions that the LAAF has built up as privileged partners. Fighters have also been recruited as individuals, wresting them from their previous formations and reshuffling them in a way that breaks with conventional patterns of mobilisation. Though impacted by southern power dynamics, this restructuring process is essentially led from above.
Meanwhile, Haftar has invested in military structures that have been largely dysfunctional since 2011, giving leeway to trusted army officers.
A Gaddafi-era intelligence official and Haftar’s military governor of Kufra in the southeast, Major-General Belgasem Labaaj, is now in charge of all southern military zones. He has been touring the Fezzan since last autumn, strengthening ties with army cadres on the ground, admonishing corrupt local officials, and trying to broker a peace agreement in Murzuq.
Signs of dissatisfaction
In parallel to the LAAF’s military track, affiliated political authorities have stepped up their role. The interim government authorised fuel deliveries to the Fezzan, which has been starved of its usual western Libyan supply because of the war and the GNA cutting off LAAF-controlled areas.
Southern banks are being supplied with cash from the east, supplementing deliveries from the Central Bank in Tripoli. After initially objecting to municipal elections held under the GNA’s auspices last year, the interim government recently announced substantial budgets for southern municipalities - expecting local officials to distance themselves from the GNA.
The interim government has also been training and equipping auxiliary police forces under its interior ministry.
Signs of dissatisfaction are surfacing, however, and persistent crises may erode popular support for the pro-LAAF camp. A quarrel between the interim government and southern MPs about money for the south that went missing has caused outrage.
In a recent social media outburst, the frontman of the Fezzan Anger Movement - a grassroots network with a broad support base - spilled his anger about the “absent” interim government “that serves the east only”, as well as the “liar” Fayez al-Serraj, referencing a one-billion-dinar development fund that the GNA prime minister promised in December 2018 but never delivered.
Most southerners still have no access to subsidised fuel, since the eastern distribution network is overburdened, the east barely has enough to cover its own demand, and thus continue paying exorbitant black-market prices.
Since the start of 2020, the LAAF has taken new measures to contain the black market, but systemic corruption and the smugglers’ social protection limit their impact.
Far-ranging repercussions
The LAAF’s Fezzan expansion is a double-edged sword. Southerners expect the stronger leadership to enhance security and rein in armed groups. At the same time, LAAF patronage enables approved groups to act with greater impunity and to further their own interests.
Sharara oil field in southern Libya
The relationship between the LAAF leadership and its tribal backers is not one-directional, but based on mutual benefits and tradeoffs. This has potentially far-ranging societal repercussions, in terms of tribes, or tribal branches, seeking to further their territorial and political influence at the expense of their neighbours.
There are fears that the LAAF’s reinstatement of Gaddafi-era security officials could come at the cost of sustaining structural discrimination toward non-Arab ethnicities and reviving former mechanisms of social control. The southern fighters’ return from the northern frontlines will likely inflame tensions.
There are fears that the LAAF’s reinstatement of Gaddafi-era security officials could come at the cost of sustaining structural discrimination toward non-Arab ethnicities
Through its actions in the Fezzan, and previously in the east, the LAAF has demonstrated skill in navigating the local landscape, reactivating dormant networks and coopting aggrieved constituencies.
This holds clues to how it will pursue the recruitment of more groups in the northwest to aid its takeover. Yet, these trends are contingent on the trajectory of the conflict.
According to local sources, many southern actors sided with the LAAF because under the circumstances, they saw Haftar as being in the pole position to dominate the country.
But Turkey’s entry into the war strengthened the GNA’s position, and if Haftar is forced to back off from Tripoli, he may well lose ground in the Fezzan, too. Tribal support can be retracted and pro-LAAF figureheads can be replaced.
If the LAAF consolidates its territorial gains, the broader question is whether the ongoing restructuring and realignment processes can pave the way for deeper security sector reform. The national sense of purpose that the LAAF claims to embody is often praised as an antidote to the narrow tribal and localist interests driving conflict in Libya.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opini...De32J8SfY1iOWDMoWRf7iq43_NzshaVtQSmlbJ7GAu-6A
Yet, the LAAF’s hybrid nature and reliance on a broad range of actors with varying agendas constitute an obstacle to professionalising forces under centralised command.
This article draws on field research that the author conducted for a recently released Chatham House paper on the development of Libyan armed groups since 2014.
Developments in the southwest region, comprising roughly a third of Libya’s territory, are of major relevance to the warring sides battling in Tripoli
A year ago, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive on Tripoli in a bid to oust Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and its armed allies, ushering in a phase of unprecedented violence.
The siege of Tripoli by Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) continues, remaining the almost exclusive focus of reporting. The Fezzan, Libya’s long-neglected and haphazardly governed southwest, is often seen as a side stage to national conflict dynamics.
Yet, developments there have been of major relevance to the escalation in Tripoli, offering clues about the LAAF’s broader expansion strategy. Comprising roughly a third of Libya’s territory, the Fezzan is also a key asset for warring camps. It holds some of the country’s largest oil and water reserves and is Libya’s gateway to the Sahelo-Saharan zone.
Striking a chord
In a strategic move, Haftar deployed LAAF contingents from the eastern and central region in early 2019, ostensibly targeting “outlaws and foreign armed groups”. The narrative struck a chord among southerners tired of rampant crime and patchy security provision, at a time of overall dissatisfaction with the GNA. Many thus welcomed the arrival of LAAF forces.
The operation was successful in large part due to the LAAF’s gradual penetration of the Fezzan’s security scene over the previous two years. Using tribal politics to his advantage, Haftar had built relationships with certain social leaders and helped them enhance their influence within their communities.
The momentum created by the LAAF’s rapid advances and accompanying propaganda machine led more southern commanders to side with Haftar
As a consequence, he could count on a number of local armed groups in advance of his move and capitalise on the southern army officers' frustrations with the GNA’s lack of leadership and support.
The momentum created by the LAAF’s rapid advances and accompanying propaganda machine led more southern commanders to side with Haftar, as a way to salvage their position or monetise their endorsement.
The GNA scrambled to organise a counter-offensive, relying on marginal actors and hurried decisions with insufficient local buy-in.
In March 2019, most LAAF forces abruptly withdrew from the Fezzan, leaving the maintenance of the “new order” to their local allies. As the LAAF directed all its efforts to seizing the capital, the Fezzan shifted out of focus again.
By this point, it was clear that the Fezzan operation had served as a launchpad for the subsequent Tripoli offensive, bolstering the LAAF’s image and supplying new manpower.
In the Fezzan, stability remained elusive, as local militias reappeared on the streets and smuggling resumed. Ethnic tensions, which had been exacerbated by the LAAF’s entry into Murzuq, escalated into full-blown conflict.
Restructuring the security landscape
But there appears to be more to Haftar’s Fezzan strategy than a short-sighted power play. A closer look suggests he embarked on restructuring the security landscape in view of consolidating the LAAF’s presence throughout the south.
Southern armed groups typically derive their legitimacy from their tribal backbone and how embedded they are within their communities. The LAAF leadership has been reshaping these groups based on wartime priorities and to weaken parallel loyalties.
Small units are being absorbed into larger battalions that the LAAF has built up as privileged partners. Fighters have also been recruited as individuals, wresting them from their previous formations and reshuffling them in a way that breaks with conventional patterns of mobilisation. Though impacted by southern power dynamics, this restructuring process is essentially led from above.
Meanwhile, Haftar has invested in military structures that have been largely dysfunctional since 2011, giving leeway to trusted army officers.
A Gaddafi-era intelligence official and Haftar’s military governor of Kufra in the southeast, Major-General Belgasem Labaaj, is now in charge of all southern military zones. He has been touring the Fezzan since last autumn, strengthening ties with army cadres on the ground, admonishing corrupt local officials, and trying to broker a peace agreement in Murzuq.
Signs of dissatisfaction
In parallel to the LAAF’s military track, affiliated political authorities have stepped up their role. The interim government authorised fuel deliveries to the Fezzan, which has been starved of its usual western Libyan supply because of the war and the GNA cutting off LAAF-controlled areas.
Southern banks are being supplied with cash from the east, supplementing deliveries from the Central Bank in Tripoli. After initially objecting to municipal elections held under the GNA’s auspices last year, the interim government recently announced substantial budgets for southern municipalities - expecting local officials to distance themselves from the GNA.
The interim government has also been training and equipping auxiliary police forces under its interior ministry.
Signs of dissatisfaction are surfacing, however, and persistent crises may erode popular support for the pro-LAAF camp. A quarrel between the interim government and southern MPs about money for the south that went missing has caused outrage.
In a recent social media outburst, the frontman of the Fezzan Anger Movement - a grassroots network with a broad support base - spilled his anger about the “absent” interim government “that serves the east only”, as well as the “liar” Fayez al-Serraj, referencing a one-billion-dinar development fund that the GNA prime minister promised in December 2018 but never delivered.
Most southerners still have no access to subsidised fuel, since the eastern distribution network is overburdened, the east barely has enough to cover its own demand, and thus continue paying exorbitant black-market prices.
Since the start of 2020, the LAAF has taken new measures to contain the black market, but systemic corruption and the smugglers’ social protection limit their impact.
Far-ranging repercussions
The LAAF’s Fezzan expansion is a double-edged sword. Southerners expect the stronger leadership to enhance security and rein in armed groups. At the same time, LAAF patronage enables approved groups to act with greater impunity and to further their own interests.
Sharara oil field in southern Libya
The relationship between the LAAF leadership and its tribal backers is not one-directional, but based on mutual benefits and tradeoffs. This has potentially far-ranging societal repercussions, in terms of tribes, or tribal branches, seeking to further their territorial and political influence at the expense of their neighbours.
There are fears that the LAAF’s reinstatement of Gaddafi-era security officials could come at the cost of sustaining structural discrimination toward non-Arab ethnicities and reviving former mechanisms of social control. The southern fighters’ return from the northern frontlines will likely inflame tensions.
There are fears that the LAAF’s reinstatement of Gaddafi-era security officials could come at the cost of sustaining structural discrimination toward non-Arab ethnicities
Through its actions in the Fezzan, and previously in the east, the LAAF has demonstrated skill in navigating the local landscape, reactivating dormant networks and coopting aggrieved constituencies.
This holds clues to how it will pursue the recruitment of more groups in the northwest to aid its takeover. Yet, these trends are contingent on the trajectory of the conflict.
According to local sources, many southern actors sided with the LAAF because under the circumstances, they saw Haftar as being in the pole position to dominate the country.
But Turkey’s entry into the war strengthened the GNA’s position, and if Haftar is forced to back off from Tripoli, he may well lose ground in the Fezzan, too. Tribal support can be retracted and pro-LAAF figureheads can be replaced.
If the LAAF consolidates its territorial gains, the broader question is whether the ongoing restructuring and realignment processes can pave the way for deeper security sector reform. The national sense of purpose that the LAAF claims to embody is often praised as an antidote to the narrow tribal and localist interests driving conflict in Libya.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opini...De32J8SfY1iOWDMoWRf7iq43_NzshaVtQSmlbJ7GAu-6A
Yet, the LAAF’s hybrid nature and reliance on a broad range of actors with varying agendas constitute an obstacle to professionalising forces under centralised command.
This article draws on field research that the author conducted for a recently released Chatham House paper on the development of Libyan armed groups since 2014.
Libya’s eastern-based forces trying to capture the country's capital bombed civilian homes on Friday, killing at least two people, health authorities in the U.N.-supported government in Tripoli said.
The intensified bombardment of the city by forces under the command of Khalifa Hifter came just days after their unilateral cease-fire declared for the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. The Tripoli-based government rejected the overture, blaming their rivals for sabotaging past peace efforts.
The health ministry in Tripoli also said that three civilians, including a woman, were wounded when rockets crashed through their roofs in the Zinata neihborhood, burying them under the rubble.
Hifter’s so-called Libyan Arab Armed Forces launched their assault on Tripoli last year, backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia. For months his forces, bolstered by shipments of powerful missiles, jets and drones, held an advantage over the coalition of fractious militias defending the beleaguered Tripoli government. But Turkey’s escalating military support for the U.N.-supported administration has recently shifted momentum of the conflict.
Western forces have thwarted Hifter’s advances, recaptured coastal cities near the Tunisian border, attacked Hifter’s key western airbase and tightened their siege on his stronghold of Tarhuna. On Friday, their Facebook page reported launching at least three airstrikes on fuel tankers supplying Hifter’s forces and a bus full of militiamen. It warned humanitarian convoys carrying food and COVID-19 supplies to steer clear of areas of fighting or seek permission for the deliveries.
On both sides, fighting has taken a heavy toll on civilians. While Hifter's forces fire into densely populated neighborhoods and even target medical facilities — at least eight times last month, the World Health Organization reported — the forces defending Tripoli have displaced at least 3,100 civilians from Tarhuna and killed over a dozen in Turkish drone attacks last month.
The idea of a meaningful compromise between east and west Libya has become even more far-fetched following Hifter’s dismissal this week of the 2015 U.N.-brokered unity deal.
U.S. Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland said he spoke on Friday to Aguila Saleh, speaker of the east-based parliament, and stressed “the importance of respect for democratic processes" and the U.N.-brokered political process, undermined by Hifter's action.
Meanwhile, as the intractable conflict and the coronavirus pandemic loom over Libya, the migrants who pass through the war-torn coastal country hoping to get to Europe are uniquely vulnerable.
On Friday, the U.N. migration agency said 51 migrants, including three women and two children, were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard in the Mediterranean Sea and returned to the western city of Zawiya. Some 30 people, among them a pregnant woman, were taken to a detention center, while the rest managed to escape, according to IOM spokeswoman Safa Msehli.
Libya, a major conduit for migrants fleeing war and poverty across Africa and the Middle East, is notorious for its crowded detention centers run by militias and rife with abuse. Over 1,500 migrants are currently detained, according to the IOM.
With temperatures rising and the war worsening, the U.N. refugee agency has reported an increase in migrant departures from Libya despite a lack of rescue missions along the precarious central Mediterranean route. All charity rescue vessels have halted operations because of COVID-19 restrictions, while Malta has announced its resources are too strained by the pandemic to conduct rescues.
The intensified bombardment of the city by forces under the command of Khalifa Hifter came just days after their unilateral cease-fire declared for the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. The Tripoli-based government rejected the overture, blaming their rivals for sabotaging past peace efforts.
The health ministry in Tripoli also said that three civilians, including a woman, were wounded when rockets crashed through their roofs in the Zinata neihborhood, burying them under the rubble.
Hifter’s so-called Libyan Arab Armed Forces launched their assault on Tripoli last year, backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia. For months his forces, bolstered by shipments of powerful missiles, jets and drones, held an advantage over the coalition of fractious militias defending the beleaguered Tripoli government. But Turkey’s escalating military support for the U.N.-supported administration has recently shifted momentum of the conflict.
Western forces have thwarted Hifter’s advances, recaptured coastal cities near the Tunisian border, attacked Hifter’s key western airbase and tightened their siege on his stronghold of Tarhuna. On Friday, their Facebook page reported launching at least three airstrikes on fuel tankers supplying Hifter’s forces and a bus full of militiamen. It warned humanitarian convoys carrying food and COVID-19 supplies to steer clear of areas of fighting or seek permission for the deliveries.
On both sides, fighting has taken a heavy toll on civilians. While Hifter's forces fire into densely populated neighborhoods and even target medical facilities — at least eight times last month, the World Health Organization reported — the forces defending Tripoli have displaced at least 3,100 civilians from Tarhuna and killed over a dozen in Turkish drone attacks last month.
The idea of a meaningful compromise between east and west Libya has become even more far-fetched following Hifter’s dismissal this week of the 2015 U.N.-brokered unity deal.
U.S. Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland said he spoke on Friday to Aguila Saleh, speaker of the east-based parliament, and stressed “the importance of respect for democratic processes" and the U.N.-brokered political process, undermined by Hifter's action.
Meanwhile, as the intractable conflict and the coronavirus pandemic loom over Libya, the migrants who pass through the war-torn coastal country hoping to get to Europe are uniquely vulnerable.
On Friday, the U.N. migration agency said 51 migrants, including three women and two children, were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard in the Mediterranean Sea and returned to the western city of Zawiya. Some 30 people, among them a pregnant woman, were taken to a detention center, while the rest managed to escape, according to IOM spokeswoman Safa Msehli.
Libya, a major conduit for migrants fleeing war and poverty across Africa and the Middle East, is notorious for its crowded detention centers run by militias and rife with abuse. Over 1,500 migrants are currently detained, according to the IOM.
With temperatures rising and the war worsening, the U.N. refugee agency has reported an increase in migrant departures from Libya despite a lack of rescue missions along the precarious central Mediterranean route. All charity rescue vessels have halted operations because of COVID-19 restrictions, while Malta has announced its resources are too strained by the pandemic to conduct rescues.
It may be the closest thing to a foreign-policy success that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had in years: Turkey’s intervention in Libya’s civil war has seemingly turned the tide in favor of the side he is backing. After a string of military successes by the Government of National Accord, the rebel commander Khalifa Haftar has been obliged to offer — under the convenient cover of Ramadan — a truce.
There is no doubt where the credit is due. The GNA was down and very nearly out at the end of last year, when Erdogan decided to provide military assistance. Haftar’s forces controlled most of the country; although the government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj had international recognition, its writ ran not much beyond Tripoli. It seemed a matter of months, perhaps even weeks, before the rebels took the capital.
Turkish troops and arms — and a large contingent of Syrian fighters answering to Ankara — have allowed the GNA to take the fight to the rebels. In critical theaters of the conflict, the besiegers are now the besieged, with the GNA rejecting Haftar’s truce offer.
This reversal is doubly impressive when you consider the array of Haftar’s allies: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have provided him with substantial military support, and Russian fighters have acted as “force multipliers.”
But Erdogan has little room to savor the vindication of his decision —unpopular with his own people — to intervene in Libya. Imposing an ever larger toll on Turkey, the coronavirus crisis is drowning out any discussion of foreign policy. For Turks paying close attention to their president’s military gambits, the successes on Libyan battlefield are also overshadowed by the stalemate in Syria.
Besides, Turkey is still a long way from being able to declare victory in Libya. If Erdogan’s goal was to force Haftar into negotiations with the GNA, that remains a mirage in the Libyan desert. Sarraj, apparently buoyed by his troops’ improved fortunes, has himself ruled out parleys. In any case, Haftar would have to suffer many more military blows before he will entertain meaningful talks.
That will require time, and far greater Turkish resources. If Turkey’s economy continues to deteriorate, voices in Ankara and Istanbul will express concern about the Libyan adventure’s cost. And Erdogan is coming under sharp attack at home for his handling of the economy.
He may be counting on his alliance with the GNA to expand opportunities for oil exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet even if he can navigate past European, Israeli and Egyptian opposition, no revenues will materialize for years to come. Talk of Turkish companies capitalizing on the Libyan market is, at best, premature.
Moreover, fantasies of an economic dividend from the intervention in Libya are hard to entertain when the news at home is so unremittingly grim. Turkey already has more cases of coronavirus than any country outside the U.S. and Western Europe. The impact on the economy, the largest in the Middle East, has been devastating. The lira is near its all-time low to the U.S. dollar. The government’s ability to goose economic activity is limited: Interest rates are effectively near zero.
With foreign-exchange reserves perilously low and Erdogan resolved not to approach the International Monetary Fund for a loan, Turkey is holding out for currency swaps with the U.S. Federal Reserve and other European central banks.
Under the circumstances, Erdogan can’t afford a greater commitment to Libya. His only consolation is that Haftar’s backers face economic difficulties, too: The UAE and Egypt (which, along with Saudi Arabia, are the Arab world’s three largest economies) are reeling from the effects of the pandemic. Russia, too, is feeling the strain.
But Haftar's backers, especially the Egyptians and Emiratis, who are regional rivals of the Turks, will not allow him to fail: When the opportunity arises, they will likely provide him with more resources, so he can fight back. The contest for Libya is a long way from over. At least for now, however, Erdogan can savor some quiet — and rare — satisfaction from a foreign-policy call that seems to be going right.
There is no doubt where the credit is due. The GNA was down and very nearly out at the end of last year, when Erdogan decided to provide military assistance. Haftar’s forces controlled most of the country; although the government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj had international recognition, its writ ran not much beyond Tripoli. It seemed a matter of months, perhaps even weeks, before the rebels took the capital.
Turkish troops and arms — and a large contingent of Syrian fighters answering to Ankara — have allowed the GNA to take the fight to the rebels. In critical theaters of the conflict, the besiegers are now the besieged, with the GNA rejecting Haftar’s truce offer.
This reversal is doubly impressive when you consider the array of Haftar’s allies: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have provided him with substantial military support, and Russian fighters have acted as “force multipliers.”
But Erdogan has little room to savor the vindication of his decision —unpopular with his own people — to intervene in Libya. Imposing an ever larger toll on Turkey, the coronavirus crisis is drowning out any discussion of foreign policy. For Turks paying close attention to their president’s military gambits, the successes on Libyan battlefield are also overshadowed by the stalemate in Syria.
Besides, Turkey is still a long way from being able to declare victory in Libya. If Erdogan’s goal was to force Haftar into negotiations with the GNA, that remains a mirage in the Libyan desert. Sarraj, apparently buoyed by his troops’ improved fortunes, has himself ruled out parleys. In any case, Haftar would have to suffer many more military blows before he will entertain meaningful talks.
That will require time, and far greater Turkish resources. If Turkey’s economy continues to deteriorate, voices in Ankara and Istanbul will express concern about the Libyan adventure’s cost. And Erdogan is coming under sharp attack at home for his handling of the economy.
He may be counting on his alliance with the GNA to expand opportunities for oil exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet even if he can navigate past European, Israeli and Egyptian opposition, no revenues will materialize for years to come. Talk of Turkish companies capitalizing on the Libyan market is, at best, premature.
Moreover, fantasies of an economic dividend from the intervention in Libya are hard to entertain when the news at home is so unremittingly grim. Turkey already has more cases of coronavirus than any country outside the U.S. and Western Europe. The impact on the economy, the largest in the Middle East, has been devastating. The lira is near its all-time low to the U.S. dollar. The government’s ability to goose economic activity is limited: Interest rates are effectively near zero.
With foreign-exchange reserves perilously low and Erdogan resolved not to approach the International Monetary Fund for a loan, Turkey is holding out for currency swaps with the U.S. Federal Reserve and other European central banks.
Under the circumstances, Erdogan can’t afford a greater commitment to Libya. His only consolation is that Haftar’s backers face economic difficulties, too: The UAE and Egypt (which, along with Saudi Arabia, are the Arab world’s three largest economies) are reeling from the effects of the pandemic. Russia, too, is feeling the strain.
But Haftar's backers, especially the Egyptians and Emiratis, who are regional rivals of the Turks, will not allow him to fail: When the opportunity arises, they will likely provide him with more resources, so he can fight back. The contest for Libya is a long way from over. At least for now, however, Erdogan can savor some quiet — and rare — satisfaction from a foreign-policy call that seems to be going right.
14 MiG-29 fighter jets and SU-24 fighter bombers that were flown in by the Russian military, landing at Libya's Jufra air base.
The base is the main forward airfield for Khalifa Haftar and his eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), which has been waging an offensive to capture Tripoli.
Hadfield said Russia's activities in Libya gave it access to that country's oil and a military base in striking distance of Europe.
A big U.S. concern would be if Russia placed missiles in such a location, he added.
Russia has denied links to the aircraft, calling the claim "stupidity." Viktor Bondarev, the former Russian Air Force chief who heads the Defense Committee in the upper house of parliament, said the planes were not Russian, but could be Soviet-era aircraft owned by other African countries.
Hadfield disputed that, saying there were none of those aircraft in that part of Africa. And, he said, "not only did we watch them fly from Russia by way of Iran and Syria to Libya, we were able to photograph them at multiple points."
AFRICOM first released information about the arrival of the Russian aircraft in Libya on May 26.
It provided more details on May 27, saying Moscow deployed the jets and bombers to provide support for Russian mercenaries helping Haftar battle forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is recognized by the United Nations.
AFRICOM said that MiG-29s and Su-24s bearing Russian Federation Air Force markings departed Russia "over multiple days in May."
After the aircraft landed at the Russian military base of Hmeimim in western Syria, the MiG-29s "are repainted and emerge with no national markings."
Hadfield said the fighter aircraft will likely provide close air support and offensive strikes for the Vagner Group, a private military contractor believed to be close to the Kremlin that has been helping Hafter's forces.
The aircraft have not yet been used, but he said they will have to be flown either by pilots from Russia or contractors employed by Vagner.
Also on May 29 the U.S. State Department announced that Malta on May 26 seized $1.1 billion worth of counterfeit Libyan currency that it said was printed by a Russian state-owned company.
The money was printed by Joint Stock Company Goznak and ordered by "an illegitimate parallel entity," State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in the statement.
The statement said the influx of Russian-printed Libyan currency in recent years "has exacerbated Libya's economic challenges," adding that the United States remained committed to working with the United Nations and international partners to deter illicit activities in Libya.
Libya was plunged into chaos when a NATO-backed uprising toppled longtime dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.
The country is now split between a government in the east allied with Hafter and the UN-backed GNA in Tripoli.
The Russian Foreign Ministry says the situation in Libya is continuing to deteriorate and that a cease-fire announced in January is in tatters.
The cease-fire "has definitively collapsed, and hostilities have resumed in full," ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on May 29, according to Interfax.
The balance of power differs significantly from what it was when the cease-fire came into effect due to "massive foreign assistance," she said.
Russia is in contact with all sides in the conflict and will insist it is resolved through diplomatic means, she said.
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-libya-aircraft-us/30642879.html
The base is the main forward airfield for Khalifa Haftar and his eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), which has been waging an offensive to capture Tripoli.
Hadfield said Russia's activities in Libya gave it access to that country's oil and a military base in striking distance of Europe.
A big U.S. concern would be if Russia placed missiles in such a location, he added.
Russia has denied links to the aircraft, calling the claim "stupidity." Viktor Bondarev, the former Russian Air Force chief who heads the Defense Committee in the upper house of parliament, said the planes were not Russian, but could be Soviet-era aircraft owned by other African countries.
Hadfield disputed that, saying there were none of those aircraft in that part of Africa. And, he said, "not only did we watch them fly from Russia by way of Iran and Syria to Libya, we were able to photograph them at multiple points."
AFRICOM first released information about the arrival of the Russian aircraft in Libya on May 26.
It provided more details on May 27, saying Moscow deployed the jets and bombers to provide support for Russian mercenaries helping Haftar battle forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is recognized by the United Nations.
AFRICOM said that MiG-29s and Su-24s bearing Russian Federation Air Force markings departed Russia "over multiple days in May."
After the aircraft landed at the Russian military base of Hmeimim in western Syria, the MiG-29s "are repainted and emerge with no national markings."
Hadfield said the fighter aircraft will likely provide close air support and offensive strikes for the Vagner Group, a private military contractor believed to be close to the Kremlin that has been helping Hafter's forces.
The aircraft have not yet been used, but he said they will have to be flown either by pilots from Russia or contractors employed by Vagner.
Also on May 29 the U.S. State Department announced that Malta on May 26 seized $1.1 billion worth of counterfeit Libyan currency that it said was printed by a Russian state-owned company.
The money was printed by Joint Stock Company Goznak and ordered by "an illegitimate parallel entity," State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in the statement.
The statement said the influx of Russian-printed Libyan currency in recent years "has exacerbated Libya's economic challenges," adding that the United States remained committed to working with the United Nations and international partners to deter illicit activities in Libya.
Libya was plunged into chaos when a NATO-backed uprising toppled longtime dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.
The country is now split between a government in the east allied with Hafter and the UN-backed GNA in Tripoli.
The Russian Foreign Ministry says the situation in Libya is continuing to deteriorate and that a cease-fire announced in January is in tatters.
The cease-fire "has definitively collapsed, and hostilities have resumed in full," ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on May 29, according to Interfax.
The balance of power differs significantly from what it was when the cease-fire came into effect due to "massive foreign assistance," she said.
Russia is in contact with all sides in the conflict and will insist it is resolved through diplomatic means, she said.
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-libya-aircraft-us/30642879.html
...
Turkiye backed legimate Libyan government forces swept US-Russia-China-Europe-UAE-Egypt-Israel backed Libyan coup terrorist Hafter forces.
Turkish Airforces plays a big role in victory by neutralizing mobile troops and air defence systems and air units of Russia-Israel-China.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-russia-talks-on-libya-based-on-principles/1880912
Turkish Airforces plays a big role in victory by neutralizing mobile troops and air defence systems and air units of Russia-Israel-China.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-russia-talks-on-libya-based-on-principles/1880912
just because its a UN backed government; doesn't mean it's legitimate .
GNA has no popular support outside of Tripoli
It's the same thing that happened to the NTC that came out of Bengazi/east to go after Qaddafi.
No popular support and that government collapsed because of it
The only reason the GNA survives Hiftar's attack, is because of the great powers in the war
Egypt's intention to arm Libyan tribes to end up in failure due to historical hostilities
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics...in-failure-due-to-historical-hostilities/news
Last month, el-Sissi said that Libya's Sirte and al-Jufra air bases were a "red line" and that he would arm Libyan tribes in his country to fight alongside the ranks of East Libya-based warlord Khalifa Haftar.
He also suggested that Cairo could launch "external military missions" into Libya "if required," saying that "any direct intervention in Libya has already become legitimate internationally."
Plans have been made to settle Libyan-origin bedouin tribes, who live in the northwest of Egypt, in Libya, and to increase the population density in the east of the country.
However, historical hostilities among tribes of Libyan origin show that el-Sissi's plan is unlikely to be implemented.
There are many Libyan-origin tribes in Egypt. The largest is known as the Awlad Ali tribe, with a population of over a million. This tribe were forced to flee from Libya to Egypt in 1890, after facing defeat in a war that broke out between the Awlad Ali and Abidat tribes in Libya's Brega region.
Most members of the Awlad Ali settled in the Egyptian city of Marsa Matruh, located between the city of delta city of Alexandria and the al-Sellum district on the Libyan border.
The coexistence of these two tribes is considered a weak possibility due to historical tensions.
The United Arab Emirates and Egypt are planning to substitute Haftar with Aguila Saleh Issa, speaker of the pro-Haftar House of Representatives in the eastern city of Tobruk. However, Issa, who backs Haftar, belongs to the Abidat tribe.
Therefore, Awlad Ali tribe, which mostly resides in the regions close to the Libyan border, would not be expected to send its members to Libya to fight in the ranks of Haftar.
Other Libyan-origin tribes living in Egypt include the Barasa, Fawaid, Hanadi, Furjan, Bahja, Jamiat, Qatan, Jabaliye, Rimah, Habbun, Awlad Sheikh, Jalalat, Majabira and Al-Jawazi....
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics...in-failure-due-to-historical-hostilities/news
Last month, el-Sissi said that Libya's Sirte and al-Jufra air bases were a "red line" and that he would arm Libyan tribes in his country to fight alongside the ranks of East Libya-based warlord Khalifa Haftar.
He also suggested that Cairo could launch "external military missions" into Libya "if required," saying that "any direct intervention in Libya has already become legitimate internationally."
Plans have been made to settle Libyan-origin bedouin tribes, who live in the northwest of Egypt, in Libya, and to increase the population density in the east of the country.
However, historical hostilities among tribes of Libyan origin show that el-Sissi's plan is unlikely to be implemented.
There are many Libyan-origin tribes in Egypt. The largest is known as the Awlad Ali tribe, with a population of over a million. This tribe were forced to flee from Libya to Egypt in 1890, after facing defeat in a war that broke out between the Awlad Ali and Abidat tribes in Libya's Brega region.
Most members of the Awlad Ali settled in the Egyptian city of Marsa Matruh, located between the city of delta city of Alexandria and the al-Sellum district on the Libyan border.
The coexistence of these two tribes is considered a weak possibility due to historical tensions.
The United Arab Emirates and Egypt are planning to substitute Haftar with Aguila Saleh Issa, speaker of the pro-Haftar House of Representatives in the eastern city of Tobruk. However, Issa, who backs Haftar, belongs to the Abidat tribe.
Therefore, Awlad Ali tribe, which mostly resides in the regions close to the Libyan border, would not be expected to send its members to Libya to fight in the ranks of Haftar.
Other Libyan-origin tribes living in Egypt include the Barasa, Fawaid, Hanadi, Furjan, Bahja, Jamiat, Qatan, Jabaliye, Rimah, Habbun, Awlad Sheikh, Jalalat, Majabira and Al-Jawazi....
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France's Macron slams Turkey's 'criminal' role in Libya
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020...rkey-criminal-role-libya-200630090915443.html
Fighters loyal to the UN-recognised GNA pose after seizing the city of Tarhuna in early June [EPA-EFE]
France's president has accused Turkey of importing large numbers of fighters into Libya, labelling Ankara's intervention "criminal".
Emmanuel Macron also lambasted Russian President Vladimir Putin's ambivalence towards his country's mercenaries operating in the oil-rich North African state.
Turkey has recently intervened decisively in Libya, providing air support, weapons, and allied fighters from Syria to help the internationally recognised government based in Tripoli repel a 14-month assault by renegade eastern commander Khalifa Haftar.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020...rkey-criminal-role-libya-200630090915443.html
Fighters loyal to the UN-recognised GNA pose after seizing the city of Tarhuna in early June [EPA-EFE]
France's president has accused Turkey of importing large numbers of fighters into Libya, labelling Ankara's intervention "criminal".
Emmanuel Macron also lambasted Russian President Vladimir Putin's ambivalence towards his country's mercenaries operating in the oil-rich North African state.
Turkey has recently intervened decisively in Libya, providing air support, weapons, and allied fighters from Syria to help the internationally recognised government based in Tripoli repel a 14-month assault by renegade eastern commander Khalifa Haftar.
Without providing any evidence on the nature of the fighters, he said Turkey was "massively importing" them from Syria.
Macron denied backing Haftar's east-based forces, saying France is in favour of finding a "political solution".
Ties between NATO allies France and Turkey have soured in recent weeks over Libya, northern Syria, and drilling in the eastern Mediterranean.
Tensions escalated following a June 10 incident between Turkish warships and a French naval vessel in the Mediterranean Sea, which France considers a hostile act under NATO's rules of engagement.
Turkey has denied harassing the French frigate.
Paris has been accused of supporting Haftar politically, having previously given him military assistance.
France has long denied backing Haftar but has stopped short of rebuking his allies, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has also been singled out by the United Nations for violating an arms embargo in Libya.
Thousands of Russian mercenaries, along with fighters from Sudan and Chad are reportedly
on the way to the strategic city of Sirte, as the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) moves to take the city.
Haftar-allied forces released a video showing military reinforcements being deployed from Benghazi, where the eastern forces are based, towards Sirte, 570km (354 miles) to the west.
The reinforcements included Sudanese and Chadian fighters, as well as more than 3,000 Russian mercenaries, sources told Al Jazeera.
Macron spoke to Putin on Friday but stopped short of denouncing Moscow as he has with Ankara. He said the two leaders agreed to work towards the common goal of a ceasefire in Libya.
Macron said Putin had told him that private contractors fighting in Libya did not represent Russia.
Ties between NATO allies France and Turkey have soured in recent weeks over Libya, northern Syria, and drilling in the eastern Mediterranean.
Tensions escalated following a June 10 incident between Turkish warships and a French naval vessel in the Mediterranean Sea, which France considers a hostile act under NATO's rules of engagement.
Turkey has denied harassing the French frigate.
Paris has been accused of supporting Haftar politically, having previously given him military assistance.
France has long denied backing Haftar but has stopped short of rebuking his allies, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has also been singled out by the United Nations for violating an arms embargo in Libya.
Thousands of Russian mercenaries, along with fighters from Sudan and Chad are reportedly
on the way to the strategic city of Sirte, as the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) moves to take the city.
Haftar-allied forces released a video showing military reinforcements being deployed from Benghazi, where the eastern forces are based, towards Sirte, 570km (354 miles) to the west.
The reinforcements included Sudanese and Chadian fighters, as well as more than 3,000 Russian mercenaries, sources told Al Jazeera.
Macron spoke to Putin on Friday but stopped short of denouncing Moscow as he has with Ankara. He said the two leaders agreed to work towards the common goal of a ceasefire in Libya.
Macron said Putin had told him that private contractors fighting in Libya did not represent Russia.
Jets hit Libya's al-Watiya airbase where Turkey may build base, sources say
https://www.yahoo.com/news/jets-hit-libyas-al-watiya-084023627.html
Warplanes struck overnight at an airbase that was recently recaptured by Libya's internationally recognised government from eastern forces with help from Turkey, a military source with the eastern forces and a resident nearby said.
The strikes were carried out by "unknown aircraft", the military source with the Libyan National Army (LNA) of eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar said.
A resident at the nearby town of Zintan said explosions were heard from the direction of the base.
Watiya's recapture in May by the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli marked the start of a sudden collapse of the LNA's 14-month assault to seize the capital and its retreat along the coast to the new frontlines
the United States said Russia had sent at least 14 MiG29 and Su-24 warplanes to an LNA base via Syria, where their Russian airforce markings were removed.
Turkish involvement in Libya has also angered France and Greece and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has warned of new sanctions on Ankara.
~~
*Russian jets are now backing the LNA* (my comment)
https://www.yahoo.com/news/jets-hit-libyas-al-watiya-084023627.html
Warplanes struck overnight at an airbase that was recently recaptured by Libya's internationally recognised government from eastern forces with help from Turkey, a military source with the eastern forces and a resident nearby said.
The strikes were carried out by "unknown aircraft", the military source with the Libyan National Army (LNA) of eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar said.
A resident at the nearby town of Zintan said explosions were heard from the direction of the base.
Watiya's recapture in May by the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli marked the start of a sudden collapse of the LNA's 14-month assault to seize the capital and its retreat along the coast to the new frontlines
the United States said Russia had sent at least 14 MiG29 and Su-24 warplanes to an LNA base via Syria, where their Russian airforce markings were removed.
Turkish involvement in Libya has also angered France and Greece and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has warned of new sanctions on Ankara.
~~
*Russian jets are now backing the LNA* (my comment)
UN chief Guterres stated that foreign interference in Libya has reached ‘unprecedented levels,’ without directly stating the main culprits. It is looking increasingly likely that we will see a military operation by GNA forces, backed by Turkey, on the Sirte region.
Any military action in the Sirte region would be a direct danger to NOC’s future plans, as oil production and exports in the region would likely be halted.
The GNA (Tripoli government) and Turkish officials have openly stated that they are preparing a move against Sirte, currently in the hands of LNA forces, to regain control of the area’s strategic oil reserves. Indirectly Turkey has stated that it wants to regain power over the Sirte area in order to deliver a major blow to Haftar’s LNA and its backers, Russia, UAE, and Egypt.
The UN is currently trying in vain to set up a possible political solution for the crisis, but the developments on the ground suggest that there is no political will for such a deal at the moment.
As things stand, two major external forces are on track to clash in a military conflict within Libya. Turkish forces have recently put their full backing behind the GNA, while Egypt has promised the protect Haftar’s forces. Egyptian President Sisi has stated that any violation of Sirte and Al-Jufra will result in direct intervention from the Egyptian military as per international norms. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that “these threats clearly and currently endanger Egypt, and we will not tolerate these types of threats which are close to our borders, at a time when foreign interference provides those militants with support.”
To show their readiness to intervene, Egypt has held a military drill near the Libyan border called “Hasm 2020”. This drill was a direct reaction to a Turkish statement that the Turkish navy will hold exercises off the Libyan coast.
Egyptian defense sources have stated that Hasm 2020 involved Egypt’s Armed Forces’ land, maritime, and air defense. Some analysts expect more Egyptian naval maneuvers near Libyan waters in the coming days.
The Turkish Navy said the maneuvers, called “Naftex”, will take place off the Libyan coast, involving 17 warplanes and eight naval vessels. Ankara has reportedly reserved an area for military exercises in the Mediterranean, according to Turkish news Yeni ?afak, slated to be three different regions, named Barbaros, Turgut Reis, and Çaka Bey, off the Libyan coast.
On June 11th, Turkish armed forces held a maneuver in the Mediterranean with eight naval ships and 17 fighter jets.
A possible conflict between Egypt and Turkey is now a very real possibility. Such a conflict would likely draw in other forces as Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are indirectly involved already.
Turkish military moves, including a possible Sirte operation, will need to be backed up by Turkish naval forces. These naval forces would need to go via the maritime areas of the East Med countries, regardless of Libya and Turkey signing a bilateral EEZ agreement. Cairo is unlikely to back down any time soon as Ankara has been supplying armed drones, military advisors, and Syrian mercenaries to the U.N.-recognized GNA.
On July 4, Al Watiya airbase, where Turkey had started to deploy some of its MIM-23 Hawk air defense missiles, was attacked by unidentified airplanes. There are rumors that this attack involved Rafale fighters, which would suggest that Egypt is already involved as the country has a large fleet of such fighters. Military analysts clarified that Egypt’s Rafales are equipped with long-range air-to-surface Storm Shadow missiles, able to evade any low to medium-altitude air defenses.
Turkey’s willingness to take part in the Libyan conflict has put it on a collision course with Egypt, the UAE, and possibly even Israel.
Turkish Airforce and Navy capabilities are impressive, but Egypt and its partners have a geographic advantage. A significant Egyptian military intervention in Libya would be a litmus test for Ankara’s resolve. In the end, Turkey will have to transport its armor across the Mediterranean while Egypt would just have to drive or fly across the border.
In the coming days and weeks, we will likely see the Libya crisis swing in favor of one of the two major powers. Ankara and the GNA will have to consider the possibility that some European partners and Israel may refuse to sit on the sideline if a military conflict does happen.
Further destabilization of Libya and increased Turkish influence in the region would not be to the advantage of France (Total), Italy (ENI), or the littoral powers of the East Med. Whatever happens in the coming weeks, a revival of Libyan oil production and exports is looking extremely unlikely.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/libya-brink-major-military-conflict-230000885.html
Any military action in the Sirte region would be a direct danger to NOC’s future plans, as oil production and exports in the region would likely be halted.
The GNA (Tripoli government) and Turkish officials have openly stated that they are preparing a move against Sirte, currently in the hands of LNA forces, to regain control of the area’s strategic oil reserves. Indirectly Turkey has stated that it wants to regain power over the Sirte area in order to deliver a major blow to Haftar’s LNA and its backers, Russia, UAE, and Egypt.
The UN is currently trying in vain to set up a possible political solution for the crisis, but the developments on the ground suggest that there is no political will for such a deal at the moment.
As things stand, two major external forces are on track to clash in a military conflict within Libya. Turkish forces have recently put their full backing behind the GNA, while Egypt has promised the protect Haftar’s forces. Egyptian President Sisi has stated that any violation of Sirte and Al-Jufra will result in direct intervention from the Egyptian military as per international norms. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that “these threats clearly and currently endanger Egypt, and we will not tolerate these types of threats which are close to our borders, at a time when foreign interference provides those militants with support.”
To show their readiness to intervene, Egypt has held a military drill near the Libyan border called “Hasm 2020”. This drill was a direct reaction to a Turkish statement that the Turkish navy will hold exercises off the Libyan coast.
Egyptian defense sources have stated that Hasm 2020 involved Egypt’s Armed Forces’ land, maritime, and air defense. Some analysts expect more Egyptian naval maneuvers near Libyan waters in the coming days.
The Turkish Navy said the maneuvers, called “Naftex”, will take place off the Libyan coast, involving 17 warplanes and eight naval vessels. Ankara has reportedly reserved an area for military exercises in the Mediterranean, according to Turkish news Yeni ?afak, slated to be three different regions, named Barbaros, Turgut Reis, and Çaka Bey, off the Libyan coast.
On June 11th, Turkish armed forces held a maneuver in the Mediterranean with eight naval ships and 17 fighter jets.
A possible conflict between Egypt and Turkey is now a very real possibility. Such a conflict would likely draw in other forces as Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are indirectly involved already.
Turkish military moves, including a possible Sirte operation, will need to be backed up by Turkish naval forces. These naval forces would need to go via the maritime areas of the East Med countries, regardless of Libya and Turkey signing a bilateral EEZ agreement. Cairo is unlikely to back down any time soon as Ankara has been supplying armed drones, military advisors, and Syrian mercenaries to the U.N.-recognized GNA.
On July 4, Al Watiya airbase, where Turkey had started to deploy some of its MIM-23 Hawk air defense missiles, was attacked by unidentified airplanes. There are rumors that this attack involved Rafale fighters, which would suggest that Egypt is already involved as the country has a large fleet of such fighters. Military analysts clarified that Egypt’s Rafales are equipped with long-range air-to-surface Storm Shadow missiles, able to evade any low to medium-altitude air defenses.
Turkey’s willingness to take part in the Libyan conflict has put it on a collision course with Egypt, the UAE, and possibly even Israel.
Turkish Airforce and Navy capabilities are impressive, but Egypt and its partners have a geographic advantage. A significant Egyptian military intervention in Libya would be a litmus test for Ankara’s resolve. In the end, Turkey will have to transport its armor across the Mediterranean while Egypt would just have to drive or fly across the border.
In the coming days and weeks, we will likely see the Libya crisis swing in favor of one of the two major powers. Ankara and the GNA will have to consider the possibility that some European partners and Israel may refuse to sit on the sideline if a military conflict does happen.
Further destabilization of Libya and increased Turkish influence in the region would not be to the advantage of France (Total), Italy (ENI), or the littoral powers of the East Med. Whatever happens in the coming weeks, a revival of Libyan oil production and exports is looking extremely unlikely.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/libya-brink-major-military-conflict-230000885.html
The Libyan parliament aligned with strongman Khalifa Haftar issued a statement late Monday giving in-principle support to a threatened Egyptian military intervention against what it termed a "Turkish occupation".
Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, alarmed by Haftar's setback, warned last month that Cairo could send troops into Libya.
He threatened to send in his army if GNA forces capture Sirte, which is located more than 800 kilometres (500 miles) from the Egyptian border and now held by Haftar's troops backed by a local Salafist militia.
The pro-Haftar parliament said Monday on its website that it would back an Egyptian intervention if necessary "to protect the national security of Libya and Egypt if they see an imminent danger to both our countries"
Egypt's military said Saturday it had carried out exercises involving navy, airforce and special forces near the Libyan border in response to the "severe and rapid changes" in the region.
The UAE on Tuesday issued an implicit warning to GNA forces advancing on Sirte.
"The drums of the war raging around Sirte in Libya threaten serious developments and dangerous humanitarian and political consequences," tweeted its minister of state for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash.
Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, alarmed by Haftar's setback, warned last month that Cairo could send troops into Libya.
He threatened to send in his army if GNA forces capture Sirte, which is located more than 800 kilometres (500 miles) from the Egyptian border and now held by Haftar's troops backed by a local Salafist militia.
The pro-Haftar parliament said Monday on its website that it would back an Egyptian intervention if necessary "to protect the national security of Libya and Egypt if they see an imminent danger to both our countries"
Egypt's military said Saturday it had carried out exercises involving navy, airforce and special forces near the Libyan border in response to the "severe and rapid changes" in the region.
The UAE on Tuesday issued an implicit warning to GNA forces advancing on Sirte.
"The drums of the war raging around Sirte in Libya threaten serious developments and dangerous humanitarian and political consequences," tweeted its minister of state for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash.
Bengazi faction Khalifa Haftar's 14-month campaign failed to take the capital Tripoli before the new front line solidified between Misrata and Sirte.
Backed by Turkey, the Tripoli based faction has said it will recapture Sirte.
But Egypt, which backs the LNA (Bengazi based) alongside the UAE and Russia, has threatened to send troops into Libya if the GNA (Tripoli based) and Turkish forces try to seize Sirte.
The USA has said Moscow has sent warplanes to Libya via Syria in support of Russian mercenaries (Wagner group) who are fighting alongside the LNA. Libya in chaos since 2011 (NATO war) revolution against Muammar Qaddafi
~~~
Libyan GNA fighters head for front as battle for Sirte looms
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/libyan-gna-fighters-head-front-190558750.html
A member of the troops loyal to Libya's internationally recognized government rides a military vehicle as he prepares before heading to Sirte, on the outskirts of Misrata
Backed by Turkey, the Tripoli based faction has said it will recapture Sirte.
But Egypt, which backs the LNA (Bengazi based) alongside the UAE and Russia, has threatened to send troops into Libya if the GNA (Tripoli based) and Turkish forces try to seize Sirte.
The USA has said Moscow has sent warplanes to Libya via Syria in support of Russian mercenaries (Wagner group) who are fighting alongside the LNA. Libya in chaos since 2011 (NATO war) revolution against Muammar Qaddafi
~~~
Libyan GNA fighters head for front as battle for Sirte looms
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/libyan-gna-fighters-head-front-190558750.html
A member of the troops loyal to Libya's internationally recognized government rides a military vehicle as he prepares before heading to Sirte, on the outskirts of Misrata
Egypt's state-run al-Ahram daily reported on Sunday that the vote in Parliament was intended to mandate el-Sissi to “intervene militarily in Libya to help defend the western neighbor against Turkish aggression.”
Last week, el-Sissi hosted dozens of tribal leaders loyal to Hifter in Cairo, where he repeated that Egypt will “not stand idly by in the face of moves that pose a direct threat to security.”
Last week, el-Sissi hosted dozens of tribal leaders loyal to Hifter in Cairo, where he repeated that Egypt will “not stand idly by in the face of moves that pose a direct threat to security.”