And what do you say about the intelligence being fixed around the facts, after bush became president?
• As originally reported in the 
The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005                                                                 SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
                                                                 DAVID MANNING
                                                                        From: Matthew Rycroft
                                                                        Date: 23 July 2002
                                                                        S 195 /02
                                                                 cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary,  Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards,  CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
                                                                 IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
                                                                 Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
                                                                 
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies  should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to  know its contents.
                                                                 John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest  JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The  only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action.  Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but  he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His  regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew  that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the  public was probably narrowly based.
                                                                 
C  reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible  shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. 
Bush  wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the  conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.  The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for  publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little  discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
                                                                 
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
                                                                 
The two broad US options were:
                                                                 (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US  troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from  the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days  deployment to Kuwait).
                                                                 (b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x  6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli.  Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier.  A hazardous option.
                                                                 The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with  basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and  other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main  options for UK involvement were:
                                                                 (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
                                                                 (ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
                                                                 (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to  40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from  Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
                                                                 The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime.  No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in  US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
                                                                 The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.  We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in  the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal  justification for the use of force.
                                                                 
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action.  There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian  intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be  the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be  difficult. The situation might of course change.
                                                                 
The Prime Minister said  that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam  refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were  linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD.  There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If  the political context were right, people would support regime change.  The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we  had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
                                                                 
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if  the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots  of questions.
                                                                 For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam  used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban  warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on  Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
                                                                 The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go  ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning  strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But  on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US  resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would  continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
                                                                 John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the  inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action  was real.
                                                                 The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He  cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the  ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out  the political context to Bush.
                                                                 Conclusions:
                                                                 (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK  would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture  of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell  the US military that we were considering a range of options.
                                                                 (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
                                                                 (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of  the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end  of the week.
                                                                 (d) The Foreign Secretary  would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and  discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
                                                                 He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the  positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key  EU member states.
                                                                 (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
                                                                 (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
                                                                 (I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
                                                                 MATTHEW RYCROFT