*CIA/Senate Bipartisan Report on Iraq Intelligence,
September 2006:
-Conclusion 1: "Postwar findings indicate that
Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa'ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Qa'ida to provide material or operational support."
-Conclusion 4: "Postwar findings support the April 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment that there was
no credible reporting on al-Qa'ida training at Salman Pak or anywhere else in Iraq. There have been no credible reports since the war that Iraq trained al-Qa'ida operatives at Salman Pak to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations."
-Conclusion 5: Postwar information indicates that
Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi
-Conclusion 6: Prewar interactions between Saddam Hussein's government and al-Qaeda affiliate group Ansar al-Islam
were attempts by Saddam to spy on the group rather than to support or work with them.. "Postwar information reveals that
Baghdad viewed Ansar al-Islam as a threat to the regime and that the IIS attempted to collect intelligence on the group."
http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf
